Corporate governance in the context of corporate restructuring by Li, Xiao
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Governance  
in the Context of Corporate Restructuring 
 
 
 
 
by 
Mr Li, Xiao 
 
Submitted in Fulfilment of  
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Law (PhD in Law) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The School of Law                                                                                     January 2008 
© Li, Xiao 2008                                                                              
Faculty of Law, Business  
& Social Sciences 
  
 
 
Acknowledgement  
 
 
I owe my gratitude to Professor Iain MacNeil. It is his continued advice, 
persistent encouragement and unfailing supervision that make possible the 
completion of this work. 
 
Thanks are also expressed to the University of Glasgow, the scholarship of 
which provides me with a financial relief during my years in this great University. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to study corporate governance through a holistic 
approach by reviewing how the interests of shareholders, creditors and employees are 
protected and constrained throughout the life of a company.  
 
The thesis begins with the view that corporate governance is a control system 
with both an internal and an external governance scheme. By restructuring the 
parameters in both schemes, I set up a three-dimensional structure to study corporate 
governance. I first select shareholders, creditors, and employees as three factors of the 
axis of subjects. I then group social political issues, contracts, and laws and 
regulations as factors on the axis of constraints. After that, I define the third axis as 
the life cycle of corporate governance, parameters on which include corporate 
governance in the normal life, flotations, takeovers, and insolvency. By setting up this 
three-dimensional structure, I argue that corporate governance must be studied 
through a holistic approach integrating both the institutional perspective and the life 
cycle of corporate governance.  
 
The institutional perspective emphasizes the importance of social political 
issues in shaping the combination of constraints on the interests of stakeholders. The 
discussion in this thesis shows that different stakeholders have different combinations 
of constraints in safeguarding their own interests. On the whole, the current 
governance institution can provide due protection to stakeholders in different phases 
of the life cycle of corporate governance. One implication of this discussion is that 
company law is not the only relevant issue in corporate governance studies. In turn, 
shareholder primacy is a misleading conception in the institution of corporate 
governance even if it is a valid argument in the specific coverage of company law.  
  
The dynamic perspective on corporate governance points out that corporate 
governance also develops in a life cycle pattern. It is important to realize that, similar 
to the widely recognized path-dependence in corporate governance in comparative 
governance studies, the development of corporate governance practices in any 
company is also a continuous process in that existing governance practices and 
structures may make a difference to the occurrence of the later phases in the life cycle 
of corporate governance. Moreover, the dynamic perspective accentuates the 
importance of corporate governance around insolvency compared with that of other 
phases. Indeed, the solvency criteria which are legally prescribed merely in financial 
terms can not only exclude any serious consideration of non-financial interests but 
also reinforce the established finance oriented governance practices.  
 
This study also provides some thoughts on the current reform of corporate 
governance. In general, corporate governance is a multi-disciplinary issue and reform 
of corporate governance practices must be carried out with both an institutional and a 
dynamic approach. Accordingly, corporate governance reform can only be an ongoing 
and piecemeal process. Any abrupt change to the established system may only do a 
disservice and is thus inadvisable. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this thesis is to study corporate governance through a holistic 
approach by reviewing how interests of shareholders, creditors and employees are 
protected and constrained throughout the life of a company. 
 
The corporate form is reviewed in this thesis from both an internal and an 
external perspective. 1  An internal perspective centres on the intra-organization 
structure and arrangement whereas the external perspective focuses on the business 
environmental factors. Viewed from this perspective, corporate governance systems 
can be similarly divided into the internal governance scheme and the external 
governance scheme.2  The essence of this approach is that corporate governance study 
should adopt a holistic approach and the main objective of corporate governance 
study is to analyze the interrelationship among the components of both the internal 
and external governance scheme. Accordingly, corporate governance will be defined 
in this thesis as a system in which the interests of participants are balanced and 
orchestrated to pursue the purpose of company. 
 
The next step is to set up such a holistic approach to the corporate governance 
study. A further analysis of parameters in both the internal and the external 
governance schemes is thus necessary. In this context, I follow the institutional 
approach provided by David and North.3 For David and North,  
“The Institutional Environment is the set of fundamental political, 
social and legal ground rules that establishes the basis for production, 
exchange, and distribution.”  
 
And  
“An Institutional Arrangement is an arrangement between 
                                                
1
 Pfeffer, J., and Salancik, G., The External Control of Organizations, A Resource Dependence 
Perspective, (2003), Stanford University Press, at 6-10. 
2
 Gillan, S., Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview, (2006), Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 12(3):381-402. 
3
 Davis, L., and North, D., (with the assistance of Smorodin, C.), A Theory of Institutional Change: 
Concepts and Causes, in Institutional Change and American Economic Growth, (1971), CUP. 
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economic units that govern the ways in which these units can cooperate 
and/or compete.”4  
 
According to David and North, both markets and organizations are considered 
as institutional arrangements. However, an organization differs from a market in that 
the former exists to consciously coordinate firm-specific assets through discretionary 
rules while the latter consists of rules and conventions that regulate recurrent 
voluntary transfers of property rights through the competitive price system. 
 
The distinction between the institutional environment and the institutional 
arrangement and the further division of markets and the organization within the 
institutional arrangement tell us that factors considered in the control perspective of 
the governance structure can be divided into three groups, i.e., institutional 
environment, markets and organization. In detail, the organization in the institutional 
approach is comparable to the internal governance structure from the control 
perspective, the institutional environment corresponds to the legal, social and political 
factors in the external governance structure, and the markets constitute a third group 
of factors in the external governance structure.  
 
This regrouping thus dispels the complexity and generality in the traditional 
control perspective of corporate governance. By further reorganizing the factors in the 
external governance structure, this approach enhances the consistency among factors 
in the same group while at the same time provides a new perspective to study 
corporate governance as an organic whole.  
 
I. INTERNAL GOVERNANCE AND SELECTION OF THE SUBJECTS 
It is widely accepted that the internal governance scheme is mainly about 
shareholder control, stakeholder control, and director control. However, the separate 
legal personality of a company dictates that a company has its own interests, 
downplaying the priority of the interests of any stakeholders, including those of 
shareholders. Indeed, the understanding of the director control is strongly hinged on 
one key concept of the interests of the company, the definition of which reverts to the 
                                                
4
 ibid., at 6-7. 
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traditional shareholder and stakeholder debate. Viewed from this perspective, the 
“conflict” between shareholders and stakeholders is a basic issue of internal 
governance.  
 
Next, we need to select representative subjects of the internal governance 
structure. While it is easy to identify shareholders, it may be not to ascertain 
stakeholders. Indeed, the concept of stakeholder is a rather vague concept. 5  The 
broadest definition may include “any group or individual who can affect or is affected 
by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” 6  while a narrow view of 
stakeholder includes only those participants who have placed property or other assets 
at risk in a business firm.7 
 
In order to avoid unnecessary complexity and facilitate the discussion, I follow 
the narrow view of stakeholder preferred by OECD, which states that 
 “With respect to stakeholders as a concept, most agree that an 
essential component is the degree to which capital (human and physical) 
and other rights are tied to a given enterprise and therefore subject to 
possible losses from the action of, inter alia, management.”8 
 
Accordingly, I select shareholders, creditors, and employees, as stakeholders 
who bear direct and close relationships to the interests of the company, as the 
representative subjects to be studied in this thesis. 9 These factors represent the first 
dimension of this thesis. 
                                                
5
 Orts, E., and Strudler, A., The Ethical and Environmental Limits of Stakeholder Theory, (2002), 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 12(2):215-233. The authors argue that the current stakeholder theories can 
mainly be divided into two categories—a narrow version and a broad version, the latter of which has 
been criticized to be “meaningless” and doomed to “collapse”, at 218.   
6
 A broad view of stakeholders can be read as follows: “A Stakeholder in an organization is (by 
definition) any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organization’s objectives.” See Freeman, E., Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, (1984), 
Pitman Publishing, at 64. Another example can be seen in Sheridan, T. and Kendall, N. Corporate 
Governance: An Action Plan for Profitability and Business Success, (1992), London: Pitman, at 27-28. 
This concept may also include such concerns as the interests of community and environment. 
7
 Clarkson, M., A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social Performance, 
(1995), Academy Management Review, 20:92-117.  
8
 OECD Report, Corporate Governance: A Survey of OECD Countries, (2004), available at 
http://www.nhh.no/for/courses/spring/eco420/OECD-04.pdf, at 70. 
9
 But notice that the distinction between the three subjects may however not be as clear-cut as expected 
due to the creative contractual arrangements. In fact, as will be discussed, shareholders can be creditors 
through shareholders’ loan to the company, creditors can be shareholders by holding convertible 
securities, and employees can also be shareholders through Employee Stock Ownership Plans. 
However, such mutation of the dividing line between these three subjects is only a modification of the 
mainstream categorization and does not provide difficulty to the discussion of the thesis.  
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II. EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE I AND CONSTRAINTS ON THE 
INTERESTS OF SUBJECTS 
According to the categorization made earlier in this chapter, I will discuss in 
this section the group of institutional environmental factors, i.e., legal, social and 
political factors. These are background environmental factors which inform both the 
markets and the internal governance structure. A comprehensive study of corporate 
governance as shown in the control perspective of corporate governance necessitates 
the inclusion of these factors.  
 
For the purpose of corporate governance study, these environmental factors are 
important constraints on the interests of the subjects we are going to discuss in this 
thesis. Once we deem institutional factors as constraints on the interests of the 
subjects, we may have to include another parameter, i.e., contracts. For one thing, 
contracts are the main way through which subjects establish legal relationships with a 
company. For another, constraints on the interests of the subjects can almost always 
be found in the contracts. The inclusion of contracts thus transforms the categorization 
of institutional environment into the categorization of the constraints of the interests 
of the subjects. Such a reshuffle of the factors retains all the elements considered in 
the institutional environment but views such factors from a different perspective. Thus, 
the inclusion of contracts can be justified for both consistency and inclusiveness.  
 
For the sake of convenience, I combine social and political issues into one 
group. In other words, I will select three elements, i.e., contracts, laws and regulations, 
and social-political factors, as parameters on the axis of constraints of the interests of 
subjects. Such an approach, however, cannot be understood as an effort to disconnect 
the interrelationship between these three perspectives. Indeed, as Aoki argues, “actual 
institutional dynamics appear to involve interactions of economic, organizational, 
political, and social factors.”10 For instance, the interrelationship between ‘formal’ 
                                                
10
 Aoki, M., Endogenizing Institutions and Institutional Change, (2007), Journal of Institutional 
Economics, 3(1):1-31, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=918620, at 12. 
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legal rules and less formal social norms is hard to tell apart.11 Thus, the categorized 
discussion can only be understood as an effort to tap the intricacy of the institutional 
view of corporate governance.  
 
III. EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE II AND THE LIFE CYCLE OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
We still have one more group of external factors left untouched, i.e., the group 
of markets, which includes the production factor markets, the market for the corporate 
control and the product market. To simplify the discussion we should first see whether 
some factors can be integrated into the discussion of other two dimensions. It is not 
hard to see that the labour market can rightly be covered when we discuss employees 
and the private capital market is an issue which can readily be covered when we 
discuss creditors. Also, since the director labour market is relevant only to directors, I 
will leave it aside.  
 
Then, the third dimension emerges to contain the public capital market, the 
market for corporate control and the product market. A company is exposed to the 
public market mainly when the company goes through the Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
process or in the UK flotation.12 A flotation terminates the life of a company as a 
private company but at the same time begins a new life of the company as a public 
listed company. In other words, the public capital market connects the corporate 
governance of private companies with that of public companies.  
                                                
11
 As admonished by Deakin and Ahlering, “an understanding of more formal institutions, including the 
legal framework, must be complemented by an appreciation of how they interact with informal norms, 
social conventions and tacit understandings in shaping behaviour.” See Deakin, S., and Ahlering, B., 
Labour Regulation, Corporate Governance and Legal Origin: A Case of Institutional 
Complementarity?, (2005), CBR Working Paper No.312, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=898184, 
at 4. This view thus corresponds to that of Aoki, who argues that enduring institutions have self-
enforcing and self-sustaining characteristics which can not be reduced into formal rules, see Aoki, M., 
Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, (2001), Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press at 5. 
12
 Flotation is a process through which a private company can be transformed into a public company. 
However, flotation is not the only method by which a private company can be transformed into a public 
company. See ss90-96 of Part 7 (Re-registration as a Means of Altering a Company’s Status) of the 
Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006). Another point worth mentioning is that unlisted companies can also 
go through an Initial Public Offering (IPO) process to raise capital from the public. But unlisted 
companies will not be subject to the Listing Rules on the London Stock Exchange. Moreover, since an 
IPO is usually called a floatation in the UK (see Ferran, E., Company Law and Corporate Finance, 
(1999), OUP, at 567), we select flotation rather than IPO for the purpose of discussion in this thesis. 
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Alternatively, a company may resort to the market for corporate control for its 
strategic growth or downsizing purposes. From the perspective of corporate 
governance, if the growth proceeds smoothly, the growth and mature stages are still 
covered under the issue of corporate governance either of a private company or of a 
public company. Once the growth and mature stages are informed with merger and 
acquisitions and/or divestiture activities, corporate governance may undergo extreme 
turbulence. Such activities involve a big change to the existing governance structures, 
either due to the collision of the two existing governance structures of two separate 
companies, as happens in hostile takeovers, or because of the enhancement of the 
corporate control into the hands of a group of persons, as occurring in Management 
Buy Outs (MBOs) or Management Buy Ins (MBIs). In any case, takeovers can 
appropriately be seen as representing specific junctures in the life of corporate 
governance. Of course, the end result of takeovers may be a strengthened governance 
structure or a bad one. If good corporate governance is introduced and enhanced 
through takeover activities, a new cycle of either the corporate governance of private 
companies or that of public companies will be initiated. Alternatively, if the result is 
the latter bad one, we may have to move to the decline and death phases of the life of 
a company. In other words, the above analyses show that the market for corporate 
control is an important juncture in the life cycle of corporate governance. 
 
The above analyses thus show that flotation and takeover fit roughly with the 
birth and the growth or the downsizing phases. Such an understanding links with the 
life cycle of a company. Since the life cycle of a company is a strategic perspective of 
the birth, the growth and the death of the company, the inclusion of insolvency is thus 
necessary. Indeed, both a private company and a public company can become 
insolvent without going through all these intermediate stages. Also, we understand 
that the stage of insolvency includes both corporate rescuing efforts and the possible 
termination of the life of a company. If a distressed company, through reorganization 
of liabilities and assets, can come back to life, the company is successfully saved and 
a new life of corporate governance is initiated. If such a rescue process includes a 
flotation or a division of the company, and/or a taken-over by other companies, we 
may refer back to the governance around a flotation or that around a takeover. 
Alternatively, if, unfortunately, the end result is the liquidation and the dissolution, we 
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may reach the end of the life of corporate governance. For that matter, insolvency can 
be considered either as the end of the life of corporate governance or as the 
resurrection of a new life of corporate governance. In other words, insolvency is just 
another juncture in the life cycle of corporate governance.    
 
The above discussion thus tells us that corporate governance can also be 
studied from a life cycle perspective. Indeed, once we deem the governance of private 
companies and public companies as standard governance capsules, we may identify 
flotations, takeovers and insolvency as special junctures of the life cycle of corporate 
governance. If we further deem corporate governance around flotations, takeovers and 
insolvency as relatively separate governance capsules, we may draw a diagram of the 
life cycle of corporate governance as Diagram 1, which for the purpose of facility of 
discussion can further be reduced into the following linear Diagram 2.  
 
Flotatio
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 P
ublic
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Private 
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Note: Insolvency includes corporate rescue and the liquidation of a 
company. If corporate rescue involves flotations (IPOs) and/or 
takeovers, the corporate governance structure can be seen either as a 
repetition of some capsules of the above diagram. Also omitted from 
the diagram are takeovers between private companies and those 
between public companies. While only takeovers involving public 
companies are discussed in detail in the thesis, takeovers between 
private companies will be discussed briefly for the sake of simplicity. 
Diagram 1-1 The Life Cycle of Corporate Governance (1) 
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Once we establish that the life cycle of corporate governance is another 
dimension of the thesis, we can go back to the product market. Since competition on 
the product market informs the life of a company, it is an issue which can be covered 
wherever relevant. As a result, we successfully integrate markets into the life cycle of 
a company.  
 
It is recognized that the identification of special junctures in the study of 
corporate governance is not new. For example, Bernstein, when studying the 
corporate governance in case of insolvency, states that:  
“Governance decisions have the greatest impact when they are a 
matter of life and death—or, in the case of a firm, reorganization or 
liquidation—and that crossroad is therefore an excellent time to test the 
efficiency of a corporate governance system.”13  
 
Indeed, the most relevant study is Filatotchev’s study of corporate governance 
at the thresholds of IPO, takeover and insolvency. 14  For Filatotchev, conflicts of 
interests among and between stakeholders and shareholders intensify around these 
thresholds and thus study on corporate governance around these thresholds should 
deserve more attention from governance scholars.  This study echoes Filatotchev’s 
view in accentuating the thresholds in corporate governance but develops it into a life 
cycle perspective of corporate governance.  
 
                                                
13
 Bernstein, E., All’s Fair in Love, War & Bankruptcy? Corporate Governance Implications of CEO 
Turnover in Financial Distress, (2006), Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin., 11(2):299, at 303 
14
 Filatotchev, I., The Firm’s Life-Cycle and the Dynamics of Corporate Governance: Overcoming 
Governance “Thresholds”, in DTI Economics Paper No.13, Corporate Governance, Human Resource 
Management and Firm Performance, (2005), Papers from a Joint DTI/King’s College London Seminar, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=881730. 
Private 
Companies  
Public 
Companies  
Flotations 
(IPOs) Takeovers Insolvency 
Diagram 1-2 The Life Cycle of Corporate Governance (2) 
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With the completion of this methodology of the whole thesis, I will give a 
detailed discussion of flotations, takeovers, and insolvency in the life cycle of 
corporate governance in the second chapter. Discussion of shareholders, creditors, and 
employees will be covered in the ensuing three chapters. In those chapters, I will 
proceed with the discussion along the life cycle of corporate governance and examine 
the combination of contracts, and laws and regulations in each capsule of the life 
cycle with a due emphasis on social political issues as background information.   
 
Taking account of these considerations, we can now draw a cube to describe 
the structure of the whole thesis: 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 1-3 The Structure of the Thesis 
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CHAPTER 2. CORPORATE 
RESTRUCTURING AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE  
INTRODUCTION 
The foregoing chapter presents for this research a three-dimensional 
methodology, according to which I propose to discuss how interests of subjects are 
protected and constrained along the temporal dimension of the life cycle of corporate 
governance. The identification of the three junctures, i.e., flotation, takeover, and 
insolvency, however, is only sufficient for the purpose of describing the research 
methodology. Indeed, compared with the importance of factors on the other two 
dimensions in the following chapters, the role of corporate restructuring activities, a 
collective concept which refers to the above three junctures, is downplayed. This 
chapter is to redress this deficiency. 
 
For that purpose, I want to discuss two aspects of the corporate restructuring 
transactions in general. I will first discuss the economic aspects of such transactions in 
Part I. By presenting empirical evidence and management theories on the motives for, 
the governance role of, and the social implications of such transactions, I want to give 
a general idea of the role of corporate restructuring in the life cycle of corporate 
governance. 
 
In Part II, I provide an outline of the legal institution of corporate governance 
and discuss the legal approach to corporate restructuring transactions. The objective 
of this Part is to narrow down the discussion to the specific situation of the UK. A 
conclusion follows at the end. 
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PART I. CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING IN THE LIFE 
CYCLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
A. FLOTATIONS  
1. Motives for Flotations 
Flotations can be initiated for several reasons. First, flotations provide 
entrepreneurs with alternative financial resources. Investors may prefer investments in 
a public capital market to those in a closed and limited market since they can freely 
transfer their investments. Furthermore, the low cost derived from the free 
transferability of shares traded on the public stock market also facilitates mergers and 
acquisitions through share-for-share transactions. Thus, the liquidity of the capital 
market may provide companies with financial resources at cheaper costs than those 
provided by private capital.1  
 
Second, flotations can help insiders cash out their shareholdings in the 
entrepreneurship.2 For example, it is a usual practice that venture capitalists stipulate 
in their contracts with the entrepreneur that the company will go public at a chosen 
time.3 Such exits facilitate capital movement for more efficient uses and accelerate the 
investment cycle. Moreover, even though it is doubtful whether the management 
knows the true value of the firm,4 the going public process and the potential takeover 
bidding process can help to achieve a favourable valuation for shareholders. 5 
Alternatively, entrepreneurs may also take advantage of flotations to exit for a higher 
value than they can get from an outright sale.6 Indeed, one recent study even points 
                                                
1
 Scott, J., A Theory of Optimal Capital Structures, (1976), Bell Journal of Economics, 7:33-54. 
2
 Zingales, L., Insider Ownership and the Decision to Go Public, (1995), Review of Economic Studies, 
62:425-448 and Mello, A., and Parsons, J., Hedging and Liquidity, (2000), Review of Financial Studies, 
13:127-153. 
3
 Gompers, P., and Lerner, J., The Venture Capital Cycle, (2000), MIT Press Cambridge MA, and 
Cumming, D., and MacIntosh, J., A Cross-Country Comparison of Full and Partial Venture Capital 
Exit Strategies, Exits, (2003), Journal of Banking and Finance, 27(3):511-548, also available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=268557. 
4
 Rock, K., Why New Issues are Underpriced., (1986), Journal of Financial Economics, 15:187-212. 
5
 Chemmanur, T., The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: A Dynamic Model with Information 
Production, (1993), Journal of Finance, 48:285-303. 
6
 Zingales, (1995). 
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out that the primary motive for private companies to go public is to facilitate being 
taken over later at a better price.7  
 
Third, instead of being used as a way to exit, flotations can be used as a way 
for entrepreneurs to regain control from external controllers by taking advantage of 
the liquidity of the public capital market.8  By buying shares of external finance 
providers or external controllers, entrepreneurs can accumulate their own 
shareholding and enhance their decision rights. As a result, entrepreneurs can keep 
consistency in decision making by regaining the initially divided control.9  
 
Other benefits of flotations include the enhanced reputation 10  and more 
favourable analyst coverage. 11  Nevertheless, high compliance costs and stringent 
disclosure on the public capital market result in losses of the privacy entrepreneurs 
used to enjoy in a private company. Additionally, as more information is disclosed to 
the public, potential offerors have more opportunities to understand the real, 
especially financial, situation of the offeree companies. Since it will be easier for 
offerors to purchase shares on a liquid market than through negotiations with 
obstinate and inbound insiders, a new public company is also under incremental 
threats of being taken over. 12  Besides, it is documented that public trading also 
exposes the company to more intensive competition on the product market.13 The 
decision to go public can thus only be the end result of a series of cost-benefit 
                                                
7
 Brau, J., and Fawcett, S., Initial Public Offerings: An Analysis of Theory and Practice, (2006), 
Journal of Finance, 61(1):399-437. 
8
 Black, B., and Gilson, R., Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks versus Stock 
Markets, (1998), Journal of Financial Economics, 47:243-277. 
9
 Aldrich, H., Organizations Evolving, (1999), Thousands Oaks CA: Sage. 
10
 See Gomes, A, Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation Effects, (2000), Journal of 
Finance, 55:615-646 and Pagano, M., and Röell, A., The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency 
Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public, (1998), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113:187-
225. 
11
 Bradely, D., et al., The Quiet Period Goes out with a Bank, (2003), Journal of Finance, 58:1-36. 
12
 Anti-takeover procedures and terms with objectives to block such potential threats are widely 
inserted in the charter of the companies going IPO in the US. See Daines, R., and Klausner, M., Do 
IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, (2001), Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organizations, 17(1):83-120; Bebchuk, L., Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover 
Arrangements, (2003), U. Pa. L. Rev., 1(52):713-753. However, such practices are not popular within 
the UK capital market because of the reluctance of institutional investors to accept such anti-takeover 
measures. Also, General Principle 3 and Rule 21 of the Takeover Code and Part 28 of the CA 2006 all 
prohibit antitakeover measures without the prior approval of offeree shareholders.  
13
 Schultz, P., and Zaman, M., Do the Individuals Closest to Internet Firms Believe They are 
Overvalued?, (2001), Journal of Financial Economics, 59:347-381 and Maksimovic, V., and Pichler, P., 
Technological Innovation and Initial Public Offerings, (2001), Review of Financial Studies, 14:459-494. 
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analyses by decision makers with due consideration of specific situations of both the 
capital and product market.  
 
2. The Influence of the Existing Governance Structure 
(a) The Founders’ Retention of Control 
The founders’ retention of control has been testified in several empirical 
studies, which show that founders have strong incentives to retain their control by 
designing corporate charters and the initial ownership structure.14 In turn, original 
shareholders have to trade off between the retention of control and the benefits arising 
from a better portfolio diversification when they decide whether to go public.15  
 
The retention of control by the founders may bring benefits to the company. 
For instance, it is widely known that a flotation implicates a change from an 
entrepreneurial management or an ‘untested management’ 16  to a professional 
management. The experiences and external ties of entrepreneurs may accordingly 
facilitate both the psychological transition process of existent board members and the 
introduction into the board of outside directors who provide legitimacy and 
prerequisite social ties to the new public company.17 Also, the retention of the founder 
CEO can help to maintain the trust shaped and accumulated among employees during 
the entrepreneurship, an important effect which can lead to positive outcomes.18 Thus, 
founders’ retention of control in some cases can be justified during the transition 
                                                
14
 Field, L., and Karpoff, J., Takeover Defences at IPO Firms, (2002), Journal of Finance, 57:1857-
1889 and the above discussion of the adoption of antitakeover arrangements when companies going 
public. 
15
 Zingales, (1995); Bebchuk, L., A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control, 
(1999), NBER Paper No.7203, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7203 and Bolton, P., and von 
Thadden, E., Liquidity and Control: A Dynamic Theory of Corporate Ownership Structure, (1998b), 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 154:177-211. 
16
 Certo, T., et al., Wealth and the Effects of Founder Management Among IPO-Stage New Ventures, 
(2001), Strategic Management Journal, 22:641-658. 
17
 D’ Aveni, R., and Kesner, I., Top Managerial Prestige, Power and Tender Offer Response: A Study of 
Elite Social Networks and Target Firm Cooperation During Takeovers, (1993), Organization Science, 
4:123-151; and Geletkanycz, M., et al., The Strategic Value of CEO External Directorate Networks: 
Implications for CEO Compensation, (2001), Strategic Management Journal, 22:889-898. 
18
 Bolino, M., et al., Citizenship Behavior and the Creation of Social Capital in Organizations, (2002), 
Academy of Management Review, 27:505-522 and Brockner, J., et al., When Trust Matters: The 
Moderating Effect of Outcome Favorability, (1997), Administrative Science Quarterly, 42:558-583 
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period. 
 
(b) The Anomaly of Underperformance 
Most companies going public are expected to have a sound historical record19 
or at least a good product or the potentiality to have a good performance after 
flotations. Loughran and Ritter notice that the median age of companies going public 
in the US is stable at around 7 years ever since 1980 but with exceptions of a fall to 5 
years in the Internet bubble period and a rise to 12 years in 2001.20 Correspondingly, 
the median age of 1007 companies going public in Europe from 1995 to 2001 is 13 
years.21 It is thus natural to expect good performance of companies going public for a 
reasonable period.  
 
However, empirical evidence on company performance after flotations proves 
otherwise. Both Ritter et al.22 and Loughran et al. 23 report a long-term (3-5 years) 
underperformance of IPO stocks compared with non-IPO stocks matched on equity 
size.24 Also, in a study of IPOs in Australia from 1984 to 1993, Balatbat et al find that 
operating returns (accounting-based) of IPO companies are significantly lower than 
those of non-IPO peer companies from the third post-listing year but remain stable for 
up to five years after the IPO.25 Indeed, Balatbat et al. also find that the insider 
ownership declines monotonically over the first 5 post listing years. Such evidence 
shows not only the successful efforts of the insider ownership to survive in the 
exposed public market in the first two or three years but also the failure of the insider 
controllers to improve their performance in the following years.  
 
                                                
19
 For a number of basic criteria, see LR 6.1 of the Listing Rules. In fact, the Three-Year Rule forms the 
cornerstone of the Listing Rules’ quality control thresholds for companies to join the official list.  
20
 Loughran, T., and Ritter, J., Why has IPO Underpricing Changed over Time?, (2004), Financial 
Management, autumn, 5-37, also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=331780. 
21
 Giudici, G., and Roosenboom, P., Pricing Initial Public Offerings on “New” European  
Stock Markets, (2002), EFMA 2002 London Meetings, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=314275. 
22
 Ritter, J., The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings, (1997), Journal of Finance, 47:3-27. 
23
 Loughran, T., et al., Initial Public Offerings: International Insights, (1994), Pasic-Basin Finance 
Journal, 2:165-199. 
24
 But notice that the immature asset pricing methods may contest the reliability of such empirical 
evidence, see Ritter, J., and Welch, I., A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, (2002), 
Journal of Finance, 57: 1795-1828, at 1820. 
25
 Balatbat, M., et al., Corporate Governance, Insider Ownership and Operating Performance of 
Australian Initial Public Offerings, (2004), Accounting and Finance, 44:299-328. 
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It has been argued that the dilution of the control by the original founders of 
the company and the resulting low managerial incentives can contribute to the 
underperformance of those companies going public.26 In the UK, Brennan and Franks 
have observed that a dispersed shareholding structure only comes into being a few 
years after flotations because original founders effectively control the initial share 
allocation.27 Such empirical evidence indicates a possible relationship between the 
founders’ initiatives to retain the control and the long-term underperformance of 
companies going through flotations in the UK.  
 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the explanation of ‘low incentive after 
IPOs’ does not exist in the study of Mikkelson et al.28 Other empirical studies also 
document a lack of supportive evidence for the ‘low-incentive’ argument.29 Thus, we 
are still not sure whether the founders’ retention of control really contributes to the 
underperformance of companies going through flotations. 
 
(c) Implications for Existing Stakeholders 
A flotation process, as an important form of organizational transformation, 
may reset the clock of the operation of a company and subject the company to new 
risks.30 Existing stakeholders may have to face the transformation accompanied with 
flotations. For instance, the dilution of the control rights and the increasing public 
scrutiny has been claimed as a shock to the new public company, forcing it to adapt to 
                                                
26
 Jain and Kini find a positive relation between corporate performance and the shareholding retained 
by managers after the IPO. Jain, B., and Kini, O., The Post-Issue Operating Performance of IPO Firms, 
(1994), Journal of Finance, 49:1699-1726. 
27
 Brennan, M., and Franks, J., Underpricing, Ownership, and Control in Initial Public Offerings of 
Equity Securities in the UK, (1997), Journal of Financial Economics, 45:391-413. 
28
 Mikkelson, W., et al., Ownership and Operating Performance of Companies that Go Public, (1997), 
Journal of Financial Economics, 44:281-307. 
29
 Agrawal, A. and Knoeber, C., Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems 
between Managers and Shareholders, (1996), Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
31(3):377-397; Kole, S., Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance: Incentives or Rewards?, 
(1996), Advance in Financial Economics, 2:119-149; Loderer, C. and Martin, K., Executive Stock 
Ownership and Performance: Tracking Faint Traces, (1997), Journal of Financial Economics, 45:223-
255, and Goergen, M., Insider Retention and Long-Run Performance in German and UK IPOs, (2005), 
in Filatotchev, I., and Wright, M., (eds), The Life Cycle of Corporate Governance, Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 123-143, also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=149780.  
30
 Amburgey, T., et al., Resetting the Clock: The Dynamics of Organizational Change and Failure, 
(1993), Administrative Science Quarterly, 38:51-73. 
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the new regulatory scheme. 31  The enhanced shareholders’ control, especially the 
control of minority shareholders, on the public capital market may, in turn, intensify 
conflicts between shareholders and other stakeholders. In addition, new explicit and 
implicit coalitions between and among stakeholders, shareholders and directors may 
also come into being once some of them have common interests either for their own 
benefits or against the interests of others. 
 
Consequently, the transformation in flotations needs to be materialized with 
due consideration of the existing internal governance structure. Indeed, empirical 
evidence shows that positive feedback loops resulting from small differences from the 
initial situation can contribute to the success of firms undergoing transformation.32 In 
other words, the impending and inevitable changes to the existing governance 
structure should not be a total repudiation of the existing governance structure. Rather, 
such changes should be deemed as an active but gradual acclimatization process of the 
internal governance structure to the new environment.  
 
Nevertheless, as interests of stakeholders are covered more in the information 
disclosure, such as the consideration of interests of the employees and the material 
transactions relevant to creditors, the stringent regulatory scheme on the public capital 
market is generally favourable to stakeholders. For instance, companies with 
stakeholder oriented corporate governance structure in the US are found to experience 
less shock than shareholder oriented corporate governance when a firm goes public.33 
This function of inducing good corporate governance practices by the capital market, 
particularly that of the equity market, has been emphasized by Tadesse as “a conduit 
of socially valuable governance services …distinct from capital provision” and “the 
value of this service is economically large.”34 
 
                                                
31
 Frye, M., and Smith, S., IPO Shocks to Corporate Governance: Stockholder vs. Stakeholder Firms, 
(2003), Financial Management Association 2003 Conference Paper, available at 
http://207.36.165.114//Denver/Papers/fi_vs_nfi_ipogov.pdf. 
32
 Noda, T., and Collis, D., The Evolution of Intra-industry Firm Heterogeneity: Insights from a Process 
Study, (2001), Academy of Management Journal, 44:897-925. 
33
 See Frye and Smith, (2003).  
34
 Tadesse, S., The Allocation and Monitoring Role of Capital Markets: Theory and International 
Evidence, (2004), Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 39(4):701-730, also available 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=236102, at 6. 
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3. The Monitoring Role of the Public Capital Market 
The liquidity of the public capital market provides investors with opportunities 
to freely move their investment from companies with poor performance records to 
those with good ones. As more investors will go for those with good performance, 
companies with better performance are able to raise capital on more favorable terms 
than those inefficient ones.35 Alternatively, as mentioned earlier, the liquidity of the 
public capital market also performs its monitoring role through the potential takeover 
activities on the market.  
 
However, the effectiveness of even an efficient capital market is limited to the 
extent that corporations must rely on this market to seek capital in the first place. Thus, 
the monitoring role of capital markets should not be exaggerated in a market where 
companies rely more on other sources to meet their financial needs. For example, the 
effectiveness of the public capital market may have to be discounted for companies in 
the US where undistributed profits, rather than capital raised from the public, are the 
main source of funds for most public corporations.36  
 
Moreover, investors are not always rational. In a hot flotation market, 
everybody touts the shares going through flotations and the demands may simply be 
fads. Under such situations, the demand rather than the disclosed information will be 
the prevailing factor in deciding the price of new shares.37 Besides, investors having 
missed the former opportunity to be the original owners of flotation shares may not 
want to be excluded from the next opportunity again. Such regret may distort the 
rational decision which should have been made according to the information 
disclosed.38 In some cases, entrepreneurs may intentionally delay their flotations when 
their companies are undervalued, compared with their own expectation, until the bear 
market turns into a bull market.39 Given such considerations, the monitoring role of 
the public capital market should be taken with reservation. 
                                                
35
 Stout, L., The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and 
Securities Regulation, (1988), Mich. L. Rev., 87: 613. 
36
 Goshen, Z., Shareholder Dividend Options, (1995), Yale L. J., 104:881, at 882. 
37
 Choi, S., and Pritchard, A., Behavioral Economics and the SEC, (2003), Stan. L. Rev., 56:1, at 14-15. 
38
 Shefrin, H., Beyond Greed and Fear: Understanding Behavioral Finance and the Psychology of 
Investing, (1999), OUP, at 241-3.  
39
 Lucas, D., and McDonald, R., Equity Issues and Stock Price Dynamics, (1990), Journal of Finance, 
45:1019-1043. 
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4. The Social Implications 
A flotation is an alignment process between the internal governance scheme 
and the social environment. This alignment process can be understood in the 
following mutually influenced ways. On the one hand, as private companies go public, 
they have to go through lots of social pressures. The reputation established within the 
legally prescribed period dictates that a company going through a flotation may have 
to undertake necessary reorganization to show its fitness and justify its legitimacy40 as 
a public company to the outside society.41  
 
Moreover, more stringent social rules may also come into play. If the company 
going public is in a traditional industry, widely accepted rules and customary business 
practices may well be established among public companies in the same industry. A 
new public company in such an industry may in turn be subject to the strong influence 
imposed by those social rules. Alternatively, if a company is in an emerging industry, 
a company may be left with more discretion at the beginning. Still, social rules in 
similar fields may well be borrowed to apply to the new public company.42 Moreover, 
as more companies in the same line go to the public market, accepted rules and 
commercial practices may quickly come into being by “converging around the 
template of a highly visible and apparently successful firm in the field.”43  Thus, 
companies going public are subject to more stringent monitoring not only on the 
capital market but also of the society. This implies that companies going through 
flotations must undergo a transformation to justify themselves in both the public 
capital market and the wider society. Viewed from this perspective, the existing 
governance structure may thus act as a social political transformation shield to the 
organizational change.44 
                                                
40
 Legitimacy is ‘a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.’ See 
Suchman, M., Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, (1995), Academy of 
Management Journal, 20(3):571-610, at 574. 
41
 Martens, M., IPO Effects: Corporate Restructuring When a Firm Goes Public, (2003), Journal of 
Public Affairs, 4(2):155-170. 
42
 DiMaggio, P., and Powell, W., Introduction, in Powell, W., and DiMaggio, P., (eds), The New 
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, (1991), Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1-38. 
43
 Martens, (2003), at 160. 
44
 Fischer, H., and Pollock, T., Effects of Social Capital and Power on Surviving Transformation 
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On the other hand, flotations may also engender disruptive effects on the 
society. In addition to the long-term underperformance of companies going through 
flotations, empirical evidence also indicates that shares are usually underpriced in 
flotations in comparison with their first day market closing price.45 While several 
reasons have been proffered to explain the anomaly of underpricing,46 one reason 
entails special attention that underpricing is the compensation for underwriters who 
agree to sell the flotation shares and bear the risk if not all shares are sold.47 Indeed, 
compensation for underwriters has been identified as a main reason for the 
significantly higher underpricing in flotations in the UK.48 
 
The issue however is that public investors may not benefit from such high 
commissions for underwriters. Empirical evidence has shown that underwriters taking 
advantage of underpricing usually allocate underpriced shares to institutional 
investors for potential future cooperation (this is especially the result of the book 
building process) or to senior executives of unrelated companies so as to attract 
potential corporate finance businesses.49 The implication of such allocation practices 
is that public individual investors on the flotation market may have few opportunities 
to buy from these shares. Professor Coffee observes that 75% of the market value of 
the flotation shares has been acquired by either underwriters or institutional 
investors.50 What exacerbates the situation is that the industry practices and the legal 
scheme at the meantime attract those unlucky individual investors to buy later at a 
higher price, with the premium skimmed by those original buyers. As a result, the 
                                                                                                                                       
Change: The Case of Initial Public Offerings, (2004), Academy of Management Journal, 47(4):463-481.  
45
 Ritter and Welch, (2002). 
46
 ibid. Such reasons include information asymmetry between insiders and public investors; over-
optimistic attitude of the public investors to new public companies; the avoidance of potential legal 
actions initiated by disappointed investors; and a tax-avoiding wealth transfer to employees or business 
partners.  
47
 McDonald, J., and Fisher, A., New Issue Stock Behavior, (1972), Journal of Finance, 27:97-102; 
Ibbotson, R., Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues, (1975), Journal of Financial 
Economics, 2:235-272. Additionally, underwriters with good reputation find it easier than their peers to 
attract new clients. Carter, R., et al., Underwriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and the Long-run 
Underperformance of IPO Stocks, (1998), 53(1):285-311; Chen, C., and Mohan, N., Underwriter 
Spread, Underwriter Reputation, and IPO Underpricing: A Simultaneous Equation Analysis, (2002), 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 29(3/4):521-540. 
48
 Ljungqvist, A., Conflicts of Interests and Efficient Contracting in IPOs, (2003), New York University 
Centre for Law and Business Working Paper CLB 03-03, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=333820. 
49
 Benveniste, L., and Spindt, P., How Investment Bankers Determine the Offer Price and Allocation of 
New Issues, (1989), Journal of Financial Economics, 24:343-361. 
50
 Coffee, J., The IPO Allocation Probe: Who is the Victim, (2001), N. Y. L. J., 18 Jan 2001, at 5. 
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accumulating benefits for underwriters, institutional investors and favoured executives 
are in stark contrast to the loss suffered by the public individual investors. 
Considering the IPO market in the US, Hurt comments that “What at first seems to be 
a very respectable process, managed by the most elite investment banks, analysts, and 
venture capitalists substantially conforming to existing securities laws, turns out to be 
a Wall Street-sponsored “pump-and-dump” scheme.” 51  In this sense, IPOs or 
flotations can engender disruptive effects both on the existing governance structure of 
the companies going public and on the society as a whole. 
 
B. TAKEOVERS 
The active market for corporate control has long been shaping the industrial 
development in the UK.52  Takeover transactions can largely be divided into two 
groups.53 One group is that of the disciplinary takeovers, or more often what are 
termed ‘hostile takeovers’, and the other group is that of ‘synergistic takeovers’, or 
friendly takeovers as they are easily accepted by both sides, through which synergies 
between the offeree and the offeror company can be achieved. Franks et al reported 
that there were typically around 230 takeovers of publicly listed companies per annum 
and around 40 of these takeovers were hostile in nature.54 Since friendly takeover bids 
can be amicably reached between the offeree shareholders and the offeror company, it 
is the hostile takeover that attracts our attention. Also, as hostile takeover transactions 
usually involve the inter-relationship between the offeree and the offeror company, 
governance structures of both companies are relevant. Moreover, due to the recent 
resurgence of going private transactions, they also deserve a separate discussion.  
 
Another relevant concept is that of the transfer of undertaking, which can 
occur through statutory arrangements under s425 of the Companies Act 1985 or Parts 
26 and 27 of the Companies Act 2006 or under s110 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
                                                
51
 Hurt, C., Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, (2005), Cardozo Law Rev., 26:711-790, at 
713. 
52
 Hannah, L., The Rise of the Corporate Economy, (1976), Methuen & Co Ltd London. 
53
 Shleifer, A, and Vishny, R., Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, (1988a), Journal of Political 
Economy, 94: 462-489. Still, it is worth noting that takeover here covers the Mergers and Divisions of 
public companies, as defined in Part 27 of the Companies Act 2006. 
54
 Mayer, C., Corporate Governance in the UK, (2000), Hume Papers on Public Policy, 8(1):1-9. 
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However, these two statutory arrangements are more often employed as corporate 
rescue efforts. Accordingly, they are not discussed here though they will be included 
in the phase of insolvency in the following chapters.   
 
1. Motives for Takeovers 
For offeror companies, takeovers can be further divided into diversification 
and divestiture. The former is a method to pursue growth and the latter to downsize. 
We will discuss these two categories separately. 
 
(a) Diversifications 
The first motive for diversification is to acquire the control of more resources. 
Wernerfelt finds that return-generating specialized resources in one company but 
complementary to resources in another company may only be economically accessed 
via acquisition of the company if a full control of the resources is necessary.55 In this 
regard, takeover transactions provide companies with a channel to quickly access 
technological assets of rival companies, to acquire knowledge stock from a 
researchers’ team, to exploit their existing technological base (production knowledge 
and skills, technical know-how etc.) and to enhance the R&D efficiency of the offeror 
company.  
 
The second motive for diversification is to achieve efficiency enhancement. If 
managerial capability is really some currency which can be transferred between 
different lines of business, diversifications can lead to efficiency enhancement. A 
well-controlled group can cut information costs and transaction costs within the group 
if the control centre of the group takes advantage of its resources and inside 
information. Subsidiaries may also benefit from intra group transactions. Matsusaka 
argues that diversification is a dynamic search process, through which companies try 
to match with their organizational capabilities.56  
                                                
55
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The third motive for diversification is the provision of a bigger pool of inner 
capital. The availability of inner capital helps to overcome constraints of the external 
funding.57 Headquarters with control of a bigger capital pool may take advantage of 
the internal administrative structure and make more efficient uses of capital.58 Even 
though the increasing liquidity of the stock market and the variety of the products on 
the stock market has downplayed the importance of the internal capital market, the 
dual status of the internal capital providers may still engender incomparable 
monitoring initiatives.59 On the one side of the coin, internal capital providers are 
insiders compared with external capital providers, since they are more knowledgeable 
of the situation of the firm and can better deploy firm resources. On the other side of 
the coin, they are outsiders to division business management. They control the capital, 
which the division management does not own. They will thus impose more intensive 
monitoring activities though at the cost of decreasing managers’ entrepreneurship. 
Indeed, if the headquarter can allocate resources to divisions with the best investment 
opportunities, the cross-subsidization of investment among different divisions within 
the same diversified company may be more efficient than the outside capital market.60 
This attraction of the internal capital market thus provides a sound basis for 
diversification because the bigger the size of the group, the more capital the 
headquarter can control and the bigger the benefits can be engendered.61 
 
However, the effect of diversification is not without its dark side. For example, 
diversification may be initiated to achieve management entrenchment62  or for the 
purpose of empire building.63  Accordingly, the offeror board may serve their own 
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interests rather than the interests of their company. Moreover, when a company is 
diversified into unrelated lines of business, bureaucracy of headquarters will be 
fostered which in turn can offset any efficiency achieved in diversification 
transactions.64 
 
(b) Divestitures 
Related to diversification transactions are divestiture transactions, which, 
according to some theorists, are pursued to redress earlier business mistakes of the 
management. 65  For instance, even though Ravenscraft and Scherer find that the 
declining profitability of the divested is the reason for the decision of divestiture, they 
still argue that some divestitures are corrections of earlier acquisition decisions since 
internally developed units are sold less than those acquired units.66 Also, Porter found 
33 of the largest 100 corporations in the US divested the majority of the businesses 
they acquired in the 1970s.67 In his study, such correcting divestitures happened in 
over 50% of related acquisitions but 74% of unrelated lines of business. 
 
However, it is worth noting that managers may make initial decision mistakes 
in good faith. In that situation, takeovers are initiated not to redress earlier 
discretionary abuses of their control as claimed by the agency theory, because the real 
merit of strategic decisions cannot be judged ex ante but can only be assessed ex 
post.68 Still, the good intention argument is set up on a precarious presumption that an 
effective internal governance scheme is in place so that these bona fide managerial 
inefficiency and mistakes can be identified and corrected in time. In other words, the 
good intention argument is merely a modification of the discretionary misuse of 
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control argument and it may still be true that divestiture is mainly used as a method to 
redress the former decision mistakes, though intentions of management may be 
various. 
 
Alternatively, the efficiency effects of divestitures are still confusing. For 
instance, by studying 130 large-scale downsizings that occurred between 1985 and 
1994, Denis et al. find positive evidence of performance enhancing at least within two 
years following such activities. 69  However, their study also shows that these 
restructured companies reverted back to underperformance (compared with the 
average performance of their industry and their control companies) by the third year 
following downsizing. 
 
2. The Influence of the Existing Governance Structure 
(a) Governance Structure of the Offeror 
Due to the separation of ownership and control in big companies, board 
monitoring in offeror companies (which are often big companies) is important for 
offeror shareholders. Empirical evidence has shown that the percentage of 
independent outside directors on the offeror board is an important factor that offeror 
shareholders are concerned with in evaluating the bid proposal.70  Indeed, offeror 
companies with independent outside directors holding over half of the seats on the 
board are found to have higher abnormal returns on the announcement date than 
comparable offerors.71  
 
Still, shareholders’ control cannot be de-emphasised. In a usual takeover 
transaction, the offeror board must either seek authorization from their own 
shareholders 72  or already have such authorization as stipulated in the articles of 
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association. In fact, the marginal premium or loss for shareholders of the offeror 
company may present obstacles for the offeror board to persuade their shareholders in 
the first place. Moreover, large shareholding by outsiders may play an important role 
in reviewing the justification for takeovers.73  So, a concentrated shareholding by 
management may facilitate the passing of a takeover proposal at the general meeting.  
 
(a) Governance Structure of the Oferee  
i) Shareholding Structure 
In takeover transactions, offeree shareholders enjoy a control right in deciding 
the fate of an offer. For offeree shareholders, an important issue is the voting structure 
of shareholders. In this regard, we may observe competing effects of substantial 
voting rights. On the one side of the coin, block shareholders may pursue their own 
interests at the cost of minority shareholders. On the other side of the coin, the 
frustration of blockholders to the intended takeovers may also improve shareholders’ 
negotiation position thus increasing the premium to offeree shareholders in 
takeovers.74  
 
The analysis of shareholding structure can also be extended to the 
shareholding by management and that by employees. Management shareholding is 
closely connected with the attitude of the offeree company to takeovers. On the one 
hand, management with shareholding can exercise their voting rights with a strong 
propensity to retain their existing control. But on the other hand, considering the gains 
to shares in takeovers, management with shareholdings may just agree to transfer the 
control for share premiums. Thus, management shareholding presents a dilemma to 
the incumbent management, a situation which corresponds to Stulz’s observation that 
managerial equity holding and the wealth gains for shareholders of offeree companies 
are of a nonlinear U-shaped relationship.75 Empirical evidence in the UK also shows 
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that a low level of share ownership by the management is associated with financial 
motives whereas a high level of ownership by the management is related to the 
control motives from the management.76 Management shareholding thus is important 
in deciding the fate of the takeovers.77 
 
Alternatively, if an employee shareholding scheme has already been 
introduced into the offeree company, the offeror company may have to give a second 
thought to its intended offer because of the dual status of employee shareholders in 
the offeree company. Worried about their job security, employee shareholders may 
well rebuff any takeover initiatives.  
 
Another important factor is the shareholding by the offeror company in the 
offeree company. It is not difficult to think that the more shares the offeror company 
holds in the offeree company, the easier the intended takeover will succeed. 
Shareholding by the offeror company in the offeree company, however, may lessen 
the gains to shareholders of the offeree company. Stulz et al found that the higher the 
shareholding of the offeror company in the offeree company, the less the gains for 
shareholders of the offeree company.78 In the UK, Franks and Harris found that the 
negative relationship is apparent only when the offeror company holds over 30% of 
shares of the offeree company.79 
 
ii) Anti-takeover Stance of the Offeree Board 
The fate of a hostile offer can also be decided by another important factor, i.e., 
the discretion of the offeree board to adopt anti-takeover procedures in case of 
takeover threats. Since the management also has specific investment and private stake 
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in the company, incumbent management may try to avert restructuring activities.80  
 
However, the regulatory regime in the UK has long been constraining the 
discretion of the offeree board to adopt antitakeover measures without the prior 
approval of the offeree shareholders.81 Nevertheless, board’s resistance to takeover 
bids is still possible and, in fact, has been observed in such various ways as through 
an announcement of a profit forecast or an increased dividend payouts with the aim to 
discourage shareholders from selling their shares to the offeror company, re-
evaluation of company assets with the aim to increase the cost of the offer and thus 
frustrating offering efforts, or a referral to antitrust authorities in the hope that the 
transaction can be blocked by the government.82 However, it is worth noting that such 
resistance from the offeree board can benefit offeree shareholders by forcing up the 
offer price.83   
 
3. The Monitoring Role of Takeovers 
Given that the liquidity of the stock market effectively decreases the exit cost, 
the monitoring role of corporate restructuring transactions should not be 
underestimated. Empirical evidence shows that a company faces a significantly higher 
risk of being taken over if its cost performance lags behind its industry benchmark.84 
This incomparable monitoring role is important in deterring directors from pursuing 
their own interests while leaving behind the interests of the other actors because the 
market for corporate control creates high-powered incentives for managers by the 
threat of job losses and the damage on their reputation.85 Thus, the strong disciplinary 
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role of the market for corporate control is a good supplement to the often failed 
internal governance scheme and the incomplete competition on the product market.86 
 
This said, empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the monitoring role of 
takeovers is mixed. On the one hand, positive evidence abounds. For instance, Weir 
found that takeovers play a positive monitoring role on the poor internal governance 
practices of offeree companies.87 Sustained performance improvement over a period 
at least up to two years after takeover transactions was also documented in later 
researches.88  
 
On the other hand, negative evidence also exists. Franks and Mayer notice that 
hostile takeovers do not perform their disciplinary role as expected, as directors from 
both the badly and normally performing offeree companies are ousted from their 
positions.89 They also found that offeree companies in hostile takeovers are not so bad 
performers as their peer companies. 90  In another study, Herman and Lowerstein 
observe that offeror companies are not necessarily better performers than offeree 
companies before takeovers and it may be hard to tell they are better afterwards, 
indirectly vitiating the disciplinary role of takeover transactions.91 
 
In parallel, by examining the long-run pre- and post-takeover performance of 
hostile takeovers in the UK from 1985 to 1996, Cosh and Guest find that offeree 
companies may not be less poorly managed than non-merging companies and offeror 
companies are not necessarily better performers compared with their peer companies 
in terms of profit levels.92  They conclude that “There is little evidence that they 
[hostile takeovers] play an important role in reversing the non-value maximizing 
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behaviour of target companies.”  
 
In addition, the ineffectiveness of the market for corporate control can also be 
probed from other perspectives. First, potential offerors must exist in the market to 
locate those inefficient corporations. This may not be easy if those companies occupy 
a niche or monopoly on the market. Second, efficient capital markets are needed to 
provide financial support and accurate information. However, the efficiency of capital 
markets is at best a debate without unanimous agreement.93 Last but not least, since 
management also has specific investment and private stake in the company, 
underinvestment in human capital will arise if the incumbent management anticipates 
that implicit contracts between them and the company would be breached.94 In such 
situations, takeover activities may backlash on the effectiveness of the internal control 
system.  
 
4. Special Cases of Takeover Transactions 
(a) MBOs and MBIs 
Takeovers can be initiated not only by an offeror company but also by 
individuals such as the management team of the company in concern (MBOs) or that 
from an outside company (MBIs).  
 
The benefits of MBO transactions are multi-faceted. First, company managers 
may be more knowledgeable about the specific situation of the division and thus may 
be more competent than outsiders to manage the division. Second, since such 
transactions necessitate a high debt ratio, increasing monitoring from such outsiders 
as bankers or venture capitalists may help to constrain the discretion of the 
management. Third, the enhanced control enjoyed by the incumbent management 
after MBOs may align their own interests with those of the company. Empirical 
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studies also show a usual premium of 40% to shareholders in MBO transactions.95  
 
The monitoring role of MBOs, however, is confusing. Information asymmetry 
between managers and outside investors on the intrinsic value of the company may 
lead to a misevaluation of the company concerned. Indeed, the ability of the 
management to be cashed out in the ensuing going public process after the company 
goes private has already led some observers to suspect the initiatives of such 
transactions.96 Moreover, the high debt ratio in MBOs and MBIs may invalidate any 
ambitious plan to engender cash flows in the following years. In addition, proceeds 
from these downsizing plans may well be reinvested into other projects with low 
efficiency. Thus, some MBOs and MBIs can also be deemed as indicators, rather than 
rectifiers, of the often-observed agency concern.  
 
Nevertheless, the negative argument should not be overrated. In fact, if there is 
under-evaluation of the value of the company by the incumbent management, it is 
hard to imagine why outside potential bidders may overlook such opportunities on the 
open market. Rather, it is highly possible that the same management team will have to 
face a potential threat from other outside raiders, who, if they acquire the information 
of under-evaluation, may initiate their own takeover efforts, destroying the originally 
planned MBOs or MBIs. Empirical evidence also supports the above argument. For 
example, Kaplan found that managers who hold substantial amounts of equity but are 
not part of the post-buyout management team are systematically selling their shares 
into the buyout.97 If managers are insiders taking advantage of their inside information 
for their own benefits, such activities observed by Kaplan may seem odd.  
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(b) The Wave of Private Equity and Hedge Funds 
Recent Management Buy-Out and Buy-In transactions are more often 
supported by private equity and hedge funds.98  Private equity used to suffer the 
trouble of illiquidity. However, the development of the secondary market has largely 
mitigated this concern.99  Alternatively, hedge funds implement long-term lock up 
agreements in their fund structure to show their confidence in the project they invest 
in, mitigating the traditional short-term concern of their investment.100 In addition, 
both private equity and hedge funds can effectively align the interests of the fund 
managers with the performance of the funds through a creative design of the 
partnership structure. The resurgence of buyout transactions supported by private 
equity and hedge funds is thus not a surprise. 
 
The ripple effects of these funds on the governance practices of public 
companies can be located at two levels. One level is that of the target companies. In 
practice, funds usually take up a material share of the equity of the investee company 
and sit on the board through detailed contractual arrangements so that their 
transformation efforts can be carried out without too much resistance.101  Moreover, 
by engaging in club-deals and high gearing debt ratios, private equity firms and hedge 
funds are usually proactive or in some cases even aggressive in improving the 
governance practices of targeted public companies. In addition, with their expertise in 
certain industries and their efforts of due diligence, fund managers usually 
‘professionalize’ the new company, bring new staff and input new finance into the 
company to improve the governance practices.102  Indeed, the relatively long-term 
objective has positioned private equity firms and hedge funds as meaningful co-
                                                
98
 FSA, Hedge Funds: A Discussion of Risk and Regulatory Engagement, (2005), FSA Discussion 
Paper 05/4. (FSA, Hedge Funds); FSA, Private Equity: A Discussion of Risk and Regulatory 
Engagement, (2006), FSA Discussion Paper 06/6 (FSA: Private Equity), in Para. 2.8. The FSA 
observed that “In the first half of 2006 the total value of UK mergers and acquisitions was £69.5bn, an 
increase of 40% on the same period in 2005. Buyout activity almost trebled in value in the first half of 
2006 compared to the same period in 2005, reaching £34.4bn, or 50% of total M&A activity”, see para. 
1.2. Such development also gives birth to the development of the secondary market for private equity 
assets, which “in the first half of 2006 represented 32.4% of the total value of UK MBO and MBI.” See 
para.3.36. 
99
 FSA, Private Equity, paras. 3.22-3.25. 
100
 ibid., para. 3.26. 
101
 ibid., para. 3.95. 
102
 ibid., paras. 3.95-3.102.  
Chapter 2. Corporate Restructuring and Corporate Governance 
January 2008 32 
operators with the management team.103  
 
Alternatively, the governance effect of these funds is also apparent among the 
other public companies in general. The painful due diligence and the deep-digging of 
the potential of the governance practice of public companies do keep warning those 
insolent boards. In fact, even those companies that are not targets are employing 
similar governance practices used by such funds.104  
 
Admittedly, the resurgence of the private equity wave “appears to facilitate 
more accurate valuation of companies, factoring in their growth and restructuring 
potential as well as current balance sheet, profit and loss account and cash flow 
fundamentals.”105 However, such transactions are usually structured through complex 
transactions with excessive leverage and ambiguous ownership of economic risks.106 
Moreover, the adoption of complex transaction structure and financial innovation and 
derivatives may bring in systematic risk to the capital market.107 Nevertheless, after a 
series of consultation on issues arising from the wave of hedge funds and private 
equity, both the Takeover Panel and the FSA stop short of imposing more stringent 
regulations.108  
 
While financial market regulations and corporate rules are slow in imposing 
further constraints, regulations may still be imposed for other reasons. The staggering 
income for some fund managers has already courted criticism from employees for fair 
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distribution.109  The government has also responded with potential tax reforms.110 
Viewed from this perspective, the current resurgence of buyout transactions backed by 
private equities or hedge funds provides another piece of evidence that corporate 
governance can only be studied from the institutional approach.  
 
5. Social Implications of Takeovers  
It is widely known that takeover transactions can engender disruptive effects 
on the implicit contracts between the company and its stakeholders, especially 
employees.111 Stakeholders usually invest in the company achieving something that is 
not useful outside the company. The new management after takeovers usually disrupts 
the original implicit contracts between the stakeholders and the original company. In 
turn, stakeholders will under-invest their firm-specific investment and/or require 
higher compensation for the potential loss. The resulting jeopardy on such non-
economic values as loyalty, community and cultural continuity is also noteworthy.  
 
The essence of what is objectionable of takeovers is the ‘unusual scope and 
rapidity of the change’ they engender.112 In fact, persistent takeover activities may 
produce an impression of a turbulent business world among top executives and 
management consultants. Top executives may then be pressed to act according to a 
cognitive order which deems takeovers as unequivocal possibilities in the real 
business world. Such a psychological state will engender a negative loop which can 
further reinforce the turbulence of the real business world. In contrast, subordinate 
employees may have a cognitive disorder.113 For one thing, subordinates may not 
place a similar value on the board’s strategic decisions to align a company with its 
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outside turbulent business world. For another, once takeover decisions have been 
made, subordinates may have to face new information and new options in 
implementing the decisions. Established operation norms within the company may 
thus be challenged. Such a bifurcating effect may escalate takeover activities in the 
real world, enhancing the disruptive effects of takeover activities on subordinate 
employees.  
 
This, in combination with the high turnover of the management of the offeree 
company, and subsequent large assets sales and breakup of companies, has led Mayer 
to claim that “the market for control appears to be more closely associated with 
changes in strategies of firms than with corporate governance and the disciplining of 
bad management.”114  
 
However, the disruptive effects of takeover transactions may easily be 
exaggerated. In fact, positive empirical evidence also exists. 115  Still, the positive 
evidence of takeover transactions on employment should not overshadow the 
disruptive effects on displaced employees and the wider society. In consequence, a 
balanced view of both the potential efficiency and the disruptive effects of takeover 
transactions should be preferred. In this regard, the succinct comment by Parkinson is 
pertinent:  
“In short the market for control may promote dynamic efficiency, 
but as a society we may prefer less efficiency of that kind in order to 
obtain the benefits of greater social stability and the maintenance of 
community values.”116 
 
C. INSOLVENCY 
1. Insolvency as a Governance Device 
As companies face insolvency, significant changes to the existing governance 
structure occur. Since the worsening performance becomes widely known among 
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stakeholders, they will modify their behaviour accordingly. In the vicinity of 
insolvency or if insolvency is imperative, shareholders may prefer risky projects in 
consideration of their own short-term interests at the expense of the interests of 
creditors, as they know what is at stake is the money of creditors and the utmost loss 
for them is the fixed amount of share capital, which may be worth nothing in the case 
of insolvency. Or, shareholders may simply prefer a quick exit from a long troubled 
distress.  
 
In comparison, creditors, especially secured creditors, may want to realize 
their collateral as quickly as possible so that they can invest in other businesses. The 
result of such exits, however, is a decrease of the value of the pool of assets of the 
company. Employees may also make underinvestment if they realize their jobs have 
already become unsafe. Morale among employees will thus decline. Alternatively, 
employees may be inclined to get a decent compensation and start their new life 
elsewhere rather than remain enmeshed in a distressed company. Directors attracted 
by the generous severance compensation package will at most not interfere to save the 
troubled business. Or they may simply continue the business recklessly for the 
benefits of shareholders or for their own reputation without due consideration of the 
interests of creditors. Or they may set up coalitions with employees for the reason of 
job security but at the cost of both shareholders and creditors by failing to achieve a 
better result through quick liquidation.  
 
Such diverse initiatives, if left unregulated, will be disastrous. For the purpose 
of regulation, two concerns are of special importance. We may have to decide first 
who should participate in the insolvency process and second how to regulate 
individual efforts of each participant to pursue his own objectives.117 Viewed from the 
perspective of corporate governance, insolvency regulations can be deemed as a 
governance device for companies in distress. 
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2. Insolvency in the Continuum of Corporate Governance 
(a) Implications of the Existing Governance for Insolvency 
In general, insolvency does not come into being at a stroke. While empirical 
evidence does not show a clear causal relationship between good governance practices 
and good corporate performance, it is usually the case that corporate insolvency will 
be a destined result of bad corporate governance when the company is still a going 
concern.118 
 
Moreover, governance arrangement instituted when companies are going 
concerns can still persist when companies turn into distress. For instance, even though 
creditors are protected collectively in insolvency, the interests of secured creditors 
over their collateral or security are expressly excluded from the collective distribution 
scheme. Alternatively, creditors can stipulate in their contracts with the company 
much stricter initiating terms than the general requirement in insolvency law. In 
consequence, creditors may intervene in corporate governance when such terms are 
satisfied rather than when rescue efforts will be tried in vain. Therefore, pre-
insolvency contractual arrangements may well penetrate into the control structure 
around the invocation of insolvency. 
 
(b) Implications of Insolvency for Governance in the Normal Life 
Conversely, the role of insolvency as a monitoring mechanism can be 
extended to governance practices of healthy companies.119 For instance, insolvency is 
tested according to two tests, one of which is the ‘cash flow’ insolvency, according to 
which a company is insolvent if it is “unable to pay its debts” when they are due, 
while the other is the ‘balance sheet’ insolvency, according to which liabilities of a 
company exceed its assets. 120 The common point is thus that the solvency status of a 
                                                
118
 Patterson, J., The Link Between Corporate Governance and Performance, (2000), Canada 
Conference Board No.1276-00-RR, available at 
http://www.conferenceboard.ca/documents.asp?rnext=890. 
119
 Pochet, C., Institutional Complementarities within Corporate Governance Systems: A Comparative 
Study of Bankruptcy Rules, (2002), Journal of Management and Governance, 6:343-381, at 343. 
120
 IA1986 s123(1) and s123(2) respectively. 
Chapter 2. Corporate Restructuring and Corporate Governance 
January 2008 37 
company is legally evaluated in financial terms only. In turn, even if we are not sure 
what best governance practices are, we are definitely certain that bad financial 
performance meeting these criteria will lead to insolvency. The strong financial 
orientated criteria at the end of the life of a company thus keep ringing a bell to 
directors when it is operated as a going concern.  
 
Such understandings can, then, help us explain the current disadvantaged 
position of employees in corporate governance in general. It is curious to find no 
proposal has ever been made to include non-financial interests of stakeholders into the 
insolvency criteria prescribed in law. In other words, if such inclusive criteria are still 
infeasible in practice, the current claim for stakeholder oriented governance may only 
lead to efforts in vain. 
 
Moreover, an efficient corporate insolvency system is also relevant to the 
initiatives of entrepreneurs to set up businesses in the first place.121 Entrepreneurship 
is highly risky. Though limited liability of their investment in the company helps to 
encourage entrepreneurship, an efficient insolvency system will encourage 
entrepreneurs to start from scratch again by helping entrepreneurs escape from the 
trap of bad investment efforts and use either their entrepreneurship or financial 
resources in other areas. It must be realized that this is not only an issue to give a 
distressed company a second chance to revive through corporate rescue efforts but 
also a concern to encourage entrepreneurs to bear risk to begin a new business. The 
latter is more of a concern of efficiency in the wider society. Viewed from this 
perspective, insolvency law is relevant not only to the demise of a company but also 
to the birth of a new company.  
 
Discussion in this section thus reveals that governance in the normal life and 
governance around insolvency are mutually influenced. An appropriate inference 
drawn from the above discussion is that governance in insolvency is just a phase in 
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the continuum of the life cycle of corporate governance.122  
 
3. The Monitoring Role of Insolvency 
Insolvency itself may be deemed as a violent penalty for incumbent managers, 
who usually find it hard to find similar jobs when their companies go insolvent. 123 
This deterrent effect of insolvency is a real menace to incumbent directors as it is hard 
to imagine that directors do not consider the potential threat of insolvency, the 
institution of which has long been in existence.124 Still, as for the deterrent effect of 
insolvency, Hart warns that  
“A bankruptcy mechanism that is ‘soft’ on management … may 
have the undesirable property that it reduces management’s incentive to 
avoid default, thus undermining the bonding or disciplinary role of 
debt.”125  
 
However, since “the invocation of corporate insolvency law has typically been 
treated as the end of the road for a company” in the UK, 126 the deterrent effect of 
insolvency on directors cannot be deemphasized.  
 
In addition, directors’ control is strictly controlled in insolvency law. For 
instance, if a director of a company in distress still allows the company to continue to 
operate though he should have known there is no reasonable prospect of survival, the 
director may be under the coverage of the wrongful trading action under the 
Insolvency Act 1986 unless he takes every reasonable step to avoid the insolvent 
liquidation.127 In fact, directors’ duty of care and skill has largely been lifted to a 
higher level by adopting both objective and subjective criteria according to the 
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wrongful trading section of the Insolvency Act 1986.128 Moreover, shareholders and 
creditors may also initiate misfeasance actions against past or present directors who 
breach their fiduciary duty and other duties to the company. 129  Besides, the 
disciplinary role of insolvency on directors is further substantiated by the Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986, according to which unfit directors may be 
disqualified from serving on a board for a period up to 15 years.130  
 
In addition to the above disciplinary role of insolvency, the pro-creditor 
insolvency scheme may also help to increase creditors’ incentives to make 
investments. In turn, the potential increase of the ratio of debt to equity may indicate 
an enhanced governance role of creditors in governance in the normal life. However, 
it is worth noticing that given the priority for secured creditors in case of insolvency, 
they may just have fewer incentives to care about the corporate governance in general 
than to be concerned about the disposition of their collateral once their contractual 
rights are breached. 131  Viewed from this perspective, the pro-creditor insolvency 
governance scheme in the UK may indirectly discount the governance role of secured 
creditors in healthy companies. 
 
4. Corporate Rescue 
If liquidation or winding-up does happen, the dissolution of the company will 
almost be certain.132 In that case there is little need to discuss the governance of the 
company. Thus, the importance is attached to the period in the vicinity of insolvency, 
and more specifically, the performance of those companies going through turn around 
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or corporate rescue. 
 
(a) The Necessity of Corporate Rescue 
Generally, corporate rescue is a worthy pursuance mainly for two reasons. For 
one thing, corporate rescue is necessary for the purpose of saving the value of the 
company in distress. This is because once the insolvency procedure is initiated, the 
value of the company may precipitate, and, in turn, the speed of the collapse will be 
accelerated due to the precipitation of the value of the company.133 Also, the going 
concern value of a company as a whole is greater than the accumulation of the value 
of assets in separate sales.134  
 
For another, the disruptive effect of the failure of a company provides another 
rationale for corporate rescue. It was emphasized in the Cork Report that “[t]he chain 
reaction consequent upon any given failure can potentially be so disastrous to 
creditors, employees and the community, that it must not be overlooked.” 135 This is 
because stakeholders’ long-term investment in the company brings them private 
benefits, which will be lost in liquidation.136 Besides, the confidence and morale of 
investors can also be maintained in a pro-rescue culture. Successful corporate rescue 
is thus beneficial to all stakeholders and the society as a whole. Viewed from this 
perspective, corporate rescue involves a holistic consideration of all the parties, rather 
than creditors alone, who have vested interests in the company.137   
 
The traditional lack of a corporate rescue culture in the UK has been widely 
criticized.138 However, efforts to build a corporate rescue culture have been ongoing 
since 1982, when the Cork Committee introduced the administration procedure, the 
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effect of which was to freeze the enforcement of rights against the company so that 
the administrator appointed by the court can manage the company to facilitate the 
regime of voluntary arrangements. 139  Besides, company voluntary arrangements 
(CVAs) for small companies 140  and statutory arrangements under s425 of the 
Companies Act 1985 and s110 of the Insolvency Act 1986 for big companies are all 
good examples of corporate rescue efforts in law.141   
 
The recently introduced Enterprise Act (2002) for most purposes limits the 
availability of administrative receivership, through which creditors holding floating 
charges enjoy a disproportionate power and lack sufficient incentives to rescue a 
failing company as a whole.142  Instead, this Act obliges the administrative receivers 
appointed by courts to consider interests of all creditors rather than only those of 
secured creditors. It is also hoped that the limitation of secured creditors to appoint 
administrative receivers will help to increase the reliance on administration and CVAs 
in the current law.143 
 
Besides, administrators are required to prioritise the survival of the company 
as a going concern among the other stated objectives.144 However, the law further 
states that once the administrator, according to his own subjective judgment, thinks it 
is not reasonably practicable to achieve that objective, the interests of creditors as a 
whole will be the substitute primary objective.145 Such arrangements may in practice 
change little the dominant pro-creditor insolvency scheme and do little to promote 
proactive participation from the other stakeholders.  
 
Despite the benefits of corporate rescue, for those companies which do not 
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have such a realistic future as going concerns, corporate rescue efforts may insensibly 
dissipate assets that would otherwise be available for distribution.146 In such cases, 
immediate liquidation may be a better choice to maximize the pool of assets for 
distribution or to help enmeshed capital find new opportunities. 147  Unviable 
companies will then not absorb and waste new credits, which may be provided to 
other promising projects.  
 
(b) Governance in Corporate Rescue 
To project the end result of corporate rescue efforts, however, is not easy. The 
uncertainty of the end result of corporate rescue efforts in effect engenders conflicts 
between creditors and other stakeholders. In law, the ambiguity has led to two 
different cultures of corporate insolvency systems: liquidation oriented or pro-creditor 
corporate insolvency and rescue oriented or pro-management corporate insolvency 
arrangement.148  
 
The role of incumbent management in corporate rescue still needs empirical 
evidence to clarify. On the one hand, a corporate rescue culture requires an active 
involvement of the incumbent management, who is familiar with the company. But on 
the other hand, it is possible that these people will take advantage of the debt 
enforcement moratorium period to pursue risky projects to gamble the fate of the 
company. Empirical evidence in the US indicates that insider information and 
expertise of the incumbent management may be indispensable in corporate rescue of a 
small company while this may not be the case in big public companies.149 Thus, the 
benefits of the retention of the management control may well be a case sensitive 
judgment. 
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In the UK, we can observe that the traditional pro-creditor liquidation oriented 
insolvency arrangements co-exist with pro-management rescue oriented insolvency 
arrangements. For example, the incumbent management will still be in office and 
remain in full control of the company during the moratorium under a CVA albeit an 
insolvency practitioner will exercise a monitoring role in the process. In contrast, in 
an administration, insolvency practitioners will run the company but with an objective 
to serve first the interests of the company and, if that objective cannot be achieved, 
the interests of creditors as a whole.150  
 
Moreover, even though corporate rescue has not been found as a main 
character of the traditional insolvency law in the UK, business practice in reality 
presents us with a different picture. Franks and Susamman find that about 75% of the 
small to medium sized companies in their study avoid formal insolvency 
procedures. 151   They attribute this to the existence of one main creditor who 
dominates the corporate borrowing, a situation which provides the creditor with 
special advantages so that “it can control the resolution of financial distress, both 
within formal insolvency, and in rescue.” In comparison, no such dominant creditor 
exists for big public companies. However, it is widely claimed that “the London 
Approach” is a practice with the import of corporate rescue.152  This approach is 
applicable where banks are lenders to the same major borrower in financial distress. 
The leading bank, i.e. the bank with the largest exposure, initiates this voluntary 
procedure that provides short-term collective support and stability while a longer-term 
solution is sought for. In this procedure, the Bank of England usually acts as a 
“facilitator”. Banks agree to stand still and not to gain advantages over the other banks. 
The input of “super-secured” fresh capital also helps the salvage process.  
 
Another aspect of the corporate governance in corporate rescue is the widely 
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observed coalitions among stakeholders in the UK. 153  Since insolvency almost 
inevitably indicates a reshuffle of the board and the management teams, especially in 
the case of big public companies, it is highly possible that unions, the board and the 
management may set up some kind of coalition to resist any potential turnover. This is 
because employees and directors are often displaced in divestiture, which is often 
used in corporate rescue to achieve a lean structure. The concern of job security may 
thus induce the two parties to set up a coalition. Moreover, unsecured creditors and 
shareholders may prefer risky efforts since they are more often than not left with 
nothing in liquidation. In turn, a coalition between unsecured creditors and 
shareholders may also be set up against the interests of secured creditors, who may 
prefer a quick exit by realizing their collateral. Therefore, coalitions among 
stakeholders in corporate rescue may distort the corporate rescue process as set up 
under the insolvency law. 
 
(c) The Effect of Corporate Rescue 
The study of the effect of corporate rescue in the UK is comparatively sparse. 
In its survey,154 R3 Association of Business Recovery Professionals found that from 
January 2002 to June 2003 creditors of insolvent companies got back about 18.5 
pence for every pound though ordinary trade creditors are in the worst position with 
only 5 pence for every pound. Among the current available insolvency procedures, 
secured creditors recover most (53%) from administration and least from company 
voluntary liquidation (8.8%) whereas unsecured creditors get back most (17%) in 
CVAs and least in company voluntary liquidation (4.8%).  
 
As for the influence of insolvency on employees, R3 found a job preservation 
rate of 41% in their sample. While administration has played an important role in 
keeping 66% job preservation, CVAs are the second worst in preserving nearly 26% 
jobs, only better than the 20% preservation rate in company voluntary liquidation. 
This has been attributed to the fact that CVAs have been adopted by small and service 
sector business, “both of which are inclined to use staff reduction as a key cost-saving 
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technique.”  
 
Discussion in Part I reveals that corporate restructuring transactions engender 
disruptive effects on both the existing governance structure of participating companies 
and the society as a whole. Both motives for and economic effects of such 
transactions are multifarious. Still, what are common to all such transactions are the 
disruptive effects on the existing governance structure, indicating that the recurrent 
conflicts of interests in the normal life of corporate governance become intensified in 
corporate restructuring activities. Moreover, our discussion also reveals that corporate 
governance in corporate restructuring transactions can produce important implications 
on governance practices when companies are going concerns. In specific, we 
accentuate the governance role of insolvency in the life cycle of corporate governance. 
In a word, discussion in this Part substantiates our argument that corporate 
governance develops in a life cycle pattern. 
 
An alternative implication of the above discussion is that government 
interventions in corporate restructuring transactions are necessary.  We will then 
discuss in the next Part the legal institution of corporate governance in general and 
that of corporate restructuring transactions in specific.  
 
PART II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING: THE LEGAL 
INSTITUTION 
A. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
From the perspective of the regulatory approach to corporate governance, 
corporate governance systems can be categorized into the self-regulated system, as the 
traditional case of the UK, and the statutory-regulated system, as in most countries 
with a civil law system.155 However, it may be safe to say that regulations of corporate 
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governance in different jurisdictions are more often at some point between these two 
extremes.156 
 
Considering the economic regulation in the UK, Professor Wilkes commented:  
“British economic regulation involves a striking combination of 
continuity in ideas (or traditions) and innovation in organisations. British 
traditions of public administration have consistently attached importance 
to the autonomy of the firm. This has rested on a deep-seated respect for 
property and the freedom to contract, combined with the legacy of a non-
interventionist, minimalist state. In practice this has translated into 'arm's 
length' regulation and has produced a regulatory style, which is based on 
accommodation, mutual respect and negotiation.”157 
 
Correspondingly, the corporate governance system in the UK had long been 
predominantly relying on regulations by the private sector. 158  For instance, the 
Hampel Committee Report on Corporate Governance stated:  
“Business prosperity cannot be commanded. People, teamwork, 
leadership, enterprise, experience and skills are what really produce 
prosperity. There is no single formula to weld these together, and it is 
dangerous to encourage the belief that rules and regulations about 
structure will deliver success.”159  
 
In such a system, members of the regulated sector bear the task of creating the 
rules, supervising activity and operating enforcement mechanisms. Regulation in such 
a system may also be delegated through the use of ‘self-regulation’ in addition to the 
public intervention.160 An example is the regulation of takeover transactions by the 
City Code on Takeovers and Mergers before Part 28 of the Companies Act 2006 
comes into effect. The Takeover Panel did not in the past have any legal authority, 161 
though it performed a public authority role through stipulations of other statutory 
regulations, such as the Financial Services and Market Act 2000.   
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Notable among the merits attributable to self-regulation is its flexibility. For 
example, the City Code was conducted in pursuance of its spirit rather than its letter 
by prescribing some general principles without defining the precise extent of such 
principles.162 However, it is worth noting that “the argument for our preference for 
flexibility arising from self-regulation shall not be attributable to our strong 
commitment to autonomy, or our ignorance of the merits of different systems, but to 
our recognizance that there is no universal rule applicable to every situation.”163  In 
other words, it is the limitation of our ability to deal with the versatile reality that 
justifies the argument of flexibility for self-regulation. 
 
Self-regulation, meanwhile, enjoys the benefits of expertise, dynamism and 
great sensitivity to specific circumstances. Accordingly, flexibility also comes 
together with speed, i.e., the speed to create, to cover gaps in regulations and to apply 
them. Accompanying costs may also be saved in monitoring and enforcements due to 
the internalization of administrative costs and the reliance of the self-regulatory 
regime on mutual trust between the regulator and the regulated.164  
 
But on the other hand, the flexibility of a self-regulation scheme may lead to a 
lack of precision and transparency.165 Moreover, even though active participants with 
expertise are the characteristic of the self-regulatory authority, rent seeking may still 
be a big concern due to the relative absence of both accountability and external 
constraints.166 Besides, the reliance upon outside control and the lack of authority to 
investigate in its enforcement are two main demerits of a self-regulatory scheme.167  
 
Compared with self-regulatory schemes, statutory-regulated schemes rely 
more on public authorities, which prescribe hard and fast legal rules for companies to 
observe. For example, corporate internal matters like the structure of board are 
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prescribed in German law.168 While statutory regulation has the merit of “democratic 
legitimacy, accountability of ministers and open and independent enforcement 
through the courts,”169 the inflexibility inherent in this kind of system fails to meet the 
flexible and complex nature of commercial practice. Additional compliance cost is 
another drawback compared with the self-regulation system. Moreover, statutory 
regulation may lead to bureaucracy and legalistic observance of the letters rather than 
the spirit of the regulation.  
 
Even though the continuing codification of corporate governance has been 
vital in recent corporate governance development,170 the importance of self-regulation 
cannot be overlooked. For instance, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance171 
of listed companies itself does not have a similar legal status to the Listing Rules, 
which are made and can be enforced by the statutory authority.172 In fact, the Code 
itself is not a part of the Listing Rules though the latter does require that a listed 
company incorporated in the UK make ‘appliance’ and ‘compliance’ statements in its 
annual reports and any non-compliance of the Code be given a reasoned 
explanation.173 The underlying theme of such a regulatory scheme is that while good 
governance practices are promoted through the Code, flexibility is still maintained by 
providing companies with discretion to justify any non-compliance according to the 
specific situation of any given company.  
 
The ‘comply or explain’ philosophy established in the Combined Code can be 
understood as “the latest gloss on UK company law’s long-standing preference for 
private ordering.”174 Indeed, before the introduction of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000), even the rule making process of the Listing Rules 
was under the control of the London Stock Exchange (LSE), which is a private 
company but with a strong regulatory role. Such a quasi-regulator “can adopt 
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innovative approaches to problems and modify ineffective solutions quickly by its own 
rule-making process” and “can craft rules for listed companies in areas where law 
makers lack the proper jurisdiction.” 175 However, since the FSMA 2000 removed the 
listing authority from the LSE to the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which is a 
governmental regulator, a loss of flexibility and expertise accompanied with the self-
regulatory or the semi-regulatory governance scheme can be expected. While it may 
go too far to claim that the introduction of the FSA signifies the demise of the self-
regulation within the City,176 the regulatory scheme of the Combined Code can fairly 
be described as a ‘hybrid form of self-regulation’ for the closeness of the Code with 
the Listing Rules and the potential for the FSA to enforce the disclosure obligation.177 
The implication of such efforts to integrate the market discipline into the regulatory 
structure is still hard to tell for the time being.  
 
While the initiative to strengthen the power of the single regulator on the 
financial market comes from inside the UK, the pressure to codify takeover 
regulations and establish a public authority to regulate takeover transactions comes 
from the EU. In order to implement the Thirteenth Directive on Takeovers and 
Mergers 178  while at the same time preserving the characteristics of the former 
takeover regulation, the UK Government introduced “statutory underpinning to the 
regulatory activities of the Panel” and left “the Panel considerable scope to decide its 
internal structures and operational framework.”179 Thus, the UK complies with the 
legal requirements from the EU in form but maintains the benefits of self-regulation in 
essence.  
 
Besides, the regulatory scheme of corporate governance should also cover 
those laws and regulations outside the scope of company law. At least, as will be 
discussed, employment law should also be included. Even though the interests of 
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employees are considered perfunctorily without substantive legal supports within the 
scope of company law, the legal development in the EU and the corresponding 
changes to the employment law in the UK have already changed the picture.180 In 
other words, employment law is also an indispensable component of the legal 
institution on corporate governance.  
 
B. LEGAL APPROACHES TO CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 
In general, grounds for regulation can largely be categorized into seven groups, 
i.e., 1) information asymmetry; 2) market stability; 3) rent control; 4) spillover 
correction; 5) moral hazard; 6) rationalization and 7) other considerations.181 A brief 
review of the above discussion provides sound grounds for regulating corporate 
restructuring transactions. For instance, information asymmetry among governance 
participants informs the whole life of corporate governance. Also, the disruptive 
effects of corporate restructuring on both the product and the capital market are 
evident. Besides, we have seen the importance of distribution within the rationale for 
insolvency regulations. In other words, legal regulation of corporate restructuring is 
necessary.  
 
Still, we need to move a little step forward. In this section, this author is going 
to discuss as a general picture how the legal approach changes in different phases of 
the life of company. More detailed analyses regarding shareholders, creditors and 
employees are carried out in the following chapters.   
 
1. Rules Setting  
Rules, in contrast to standards, prescribe behavior ex ante.182 They are widely 
used in the corporate context and financial market regulations. Corporate governance 
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rules can be divided into default rules and mandatory rules. The former is largely in 
the sense that rules will apply unless stated otherwise by the regulated. Accordingly, 
the regulated have a choice to adopt the rules or to contract around them. Viewed 
from transaction cost theories, one benefit of default rules is that they can cut the 
transaction costs, which have already been identified as hurdles in efficiency 
pursuance. Moreover, default rules can also stipulate terms which are not likely to be 
adopted by agents. With these ‘penalty default rules’ in place, agents will have to 
negotiate otherwise ex ante by revealing their private information to the other party or 
the third party in order to avoid the more expensive ex post court determination.183 
Default rules thus both provide the flexibility to suit the varieties in the real world and 
play the gap filling role in cases of possible hiatuses.  
 
In contrast, mandatory rules are rules which must be observed without 
modification and therefore cannot be contracted around by economic agents. Thus 
rigidity is the main character of mandatory rules. The rigidity preferred by the 
regulator may arise from concerns of public interests, the distributive justice, or social 
fairness. In other words, such immutability is justified to protect parties within the 
contract (paternalism) or parties outside the contract (externalities).  
 
In light of such a differentiation, we may observe a changing combination of 
mandatory rules and default rules in the life cycle of corporate governance. Corporate 
governance rules for companies in their normal life can mainly be located in company 
law and the Combined Code on Corporate Governance for listed companies.184 These 
rules are largely default in nature. For instance, by default rules, company law grants a 
company great discretion to deal with a wide range of issues, including the board 
structure and the distribution of rights and duties among stakeholders in the 
companies regulated.185 Indeed, the Companies Act 1985 had been claimed by some 
scholars as an Act with “minimum standards”.186  
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In contrast, a strong role of mandatory rules is evidenced in the regulations on 
corporate restructuring transactions since corporate restructuring activities, as 
discussed, involve intense conflicts of interests and potentially violent disruptive 
effects on the capital market, the product market and the wider society. Indeed, as will 
be discussed, mandatory information disclosure is the main approach to regulate 
flotations and takeovers.187  
 
More apparently, mandatory rules are also the main feature of the insolvency 
law. When companies are regarded as going concerns, free negotiations are the norm 
among corporate actors. Default rules can accordingly be justified as the main 
character of company law. In contrast, collective autonomy fails to settle those 
intensive conflicts among stakeholders in companies in financial distress. Whether to 
turn around the business in distress or to discontinue the business of the company and 
redistribute the assets among stakeholders, a reshuffle of the rights and duties of 
participants is unavoidable. Mandatory rules are thus entailed to impose a new 
governance scheme to address the above concerns. In addition, the establishment of 
the corporate rescue culture in law and the introduction of more efficient rescue legal 
arrangements, such as the introduction of the moratorium period in company 
voluntary arrangements and the out-of-court appointment of administrators, are all 
achieved through mandatory rules.   
 
Nevertheless, the distinction between mandatory rules and default rules should 
not be exaggerated.188 Some rules may be default prima facie but mandatory indeed. 
The discussed Combined Code is a relevant example. Alternatively, mandatory rules 
may in fact be of a default nature. Ever since the adoption of the Second Company 
Law Directive189  in 1976, pre-emption has been a statutory principle in the UK. 
However, the default nature of this rule has changed little, as it can be disapplied by 
stipulations in the articles of association or by a special resolution at the meeting.190  
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2. Standard Setting 
By setting standards, a regulator controls the regulated ex post.191 Standard 
setting has been divided into three forks.192 One is the target standard, according to 
which penalty is imposed for certain harmful consequences. A relevant example is that 
issuers and directors are responsible for their negligent misrepresentation in a 
prospectus or registration statement. The second is the performance standard, which 
stipulates the criteria of the quality at the point of supply of the product. Suppliers are, 
however, free to choose the way they meet the criteria. For instance, directors’ 
fiduciary duty and common law duty of care and skill can be said to be performance 
standards. Another example is that a company applying for an IPO on the Stock 
Exchange has to produce a sound record of a certain period. The third is the 
specification standard, which may proscribe or prescribe certain production methods 
or materials. Detailed prescription of the contents of the prospectus and listing 
particulars for companies going public is the example of the specification standard. 
Moreover, the International Accounting Standards or the International Financial 
Reporting Standards can also be put in this group. 
 
One concern in corporate governance rules may be too many inconsistent 
standards. A review of accounting standards will tell how complex the current 
situation is. Different accounting standards will produce different reports regarding 
the same fact, a concern which may be relieved to some extent by adopting the 
International Financial Reporting Standards in the consolidated accounts for those 
companies listed in the EU.  
 
3. Information Disclosure 
Information disclosure is a main technique used in financial market 
regulations and corporate governance rules. Information disclosure covers both the 
mandatory information disclosure and the control of misrepresenting information.193 
The basic aims of information disclosure include: 1) making sufficient information 
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available to the market so that no party may take an undue advantage of the 
information and 2) allowing an information receiver to access and assess the 
information and make informed decisions. As the Cadbury Report states:  
“The lifeblood of markets is information and barriers to the flow of 
relevant information represent imperfections in the market. The need to 
sift and correct the information put out by companies adds cost and 
uncertainty to the market’s pricing function. The more the activities of 
companies are transparent, the more accurately will their securities be 
valued.”194 
 
The exploitation of the technique of information disclosure can be found in 
both Companies Act 1985 and Companies Act 2006. The principal relevant aspects of 
the statutory regime are the annual accounts, the directors’ report and the business 
review.195 Public disclosed reports cover not only financial aspects but also directors’ 
duties and the consideration of the stakeholders. Information disclosure so required is 
to meet the spirit rather than only the letter of relevant rules. The cardinal principle is 
to present a true and fair view of the company performance.196    
 
In addition, the management of a public company is under more stringent 
monitoring through their continuing obligations required by the Stock Exchange and 
through self-regulation like the Combined Code. Main Principle C.1 of the Combined 
Code states that: “the board should present a balanced and understandable 
assessment of the company’s position and prospects.” To be balanced indicates that 
“setbacks should be dealt with as well as success” and to be understandable means 
that both words and figures should be emphasized.197  The detailed and extensive 
disclosure requirement thus aims to streamline the corporate governance structure and 
enhance the corporate performance.   
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The above information disclosure is a continuing obligation of companies in 
their normal lives. When companies go through the three thresholds in the life cycle 
of corporate governance, information asymmetry appears more important than when 
companies are going concerns. 198  In specific, to regulate information asymmetry 
signifies to regulate the content, the timing, the quality and the accessibility of the 
information. All these issues are of special importance in cases of special junctures in 
the life cycle of corporate governance.  
 
(a) Information Disclosure in Flotations 
The dominating principle underlying the law in this area ‘is easy enough to 
define’:  
“It is that members of the public who are offered company 
securities are entitled to full disclosure to them of the nature of what is on 
offer before they make a financial commitment, and to effective remedies 
to redress any loss incurred as a result of failure on the part of the 
company to make complete or accurate disclosure.”199  
 
The above quotation reveals that information asymmetry is the main concern 
in regulating flotations. Companies going public have normally developed from 
private companies about which outside investors know nothing. Without sufficient 
information, investors will have to average the quality of the products on the market 
and thus pay less for good products and more for bad. The upshot is the ‘market for 
lemons’,200 where products with low quality will drive out those with good quality. On 
the other hand, investors are also inclined to free ride on the others’ efforts to 
investigate the offeree companies. Mandatory information disclosure is thus necessary 
to ensure that investors will be given sufficient quality information to make their 
informed decisions, achieving efficiency in allocating financial resources.  
 
In specific, control of misrepresenting information is especially evident in the 
regulation of the prospectus required for public offers of both listed and unlisted 
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securities. 201  An offeror, who makes a public offer, is responsible for any 
compensation to investors if they suffer a loss due to the inaccuracy in the information 
contained in the prospectus.202  
 
(b) Information Disclosure in Takeovers  
In takeover transactions, information asymmetry exists between directors and 
shareholders, between different groups of shareholders of both the offeree and the 
offeror company, and between different competing offeror companies as well. The 
objective of the regulation of information asymmetry is to ensure information 
receivers make informed decisions on the basis of the information received on an 
equal basis.  
 
Investors in security markets are inherently vulnerable in changes of corporate 
control. For instance, offeree shareholders are often in such a disadvantaged situation. 
In an unregulated market for corporate control, the open period of the offer may be 
limited, leaving scarce time for shareholders to make an informed decision. In 
addition, an offeror may not be bound to take up the tendered acceptances, placing 
later-tendering shareholders at the mercy of the offeror if there is an oversubscription. 
Furthermore, the incumbent management with a hope to keep their position may stall 
the offer. Or considering the generous severance payment to the incumbent 
management, they may transfer the control without due consideration of the interests 
of shareholders. In consequence, an unregulated takeover offer will invariably be 
made “under a cloak of secrecy”.203 Additionally, the above-mentioned actions also 
transmit wrong signals to the market and may intensify the fluctuation of the market. 
In turn, integrity of the market will be compromised. In a word, information 
asymmetry can badly compromise the interests of investors but unfairly benefit those 
inside information holders. 
 
Besides, competing offerors should receive equal treatment from the 
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management of the offeree company in acquiring relevant information.204 In Heron 
International v Lord Grade205, the Court of Appeal indicated that even if the board 
had already given irrevocable undertakings to accept what turned out to be the lower 
bid, the higher of the two competing bids should still be preferred. Additionally, the 
offeree management must seek competent independent advice on the offer. Their 
opinions are also required to be circulated to shareholders. Thus, board neutrality is 
required so that offeree shareholders can be provided with timely, accurate and 
comprehensive information to make their informed decision.  
 
Information disclosure is required not only for the purpose of financial market 
regulations but also for the consideration of the interests of other stakeholders. 
Takeovers without due consideration of interests of employees are doomed to destroy 
employees’ loyalty and waste resources invested by both the employer and employees. 
While information disclosure in the public capital market is one channel for 
employees to acquire information, such disclosure may be too late for employees to 
transform their destiny. Thus, employees should have the right to know the impending 
changes of corporate control and the implication of such changes on their job security, 
issues which have already been covered in the Information and Consultation Directive, 
the Works Council directive, the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
Regulations (TUPE) and other relevant European Directives and domestic laws.206  
 
(c) Information Disclosure in Insolvency 
Information disclosure is also vital in insolvency as creditors can only know 
the financial status of the company through information disclosed by the company. 
Such a concern involves the standards of the information disclosure to achieve a fair 
and true revelation of the value of the company in concern. While financial reports 
and the directors’ report have been the ongoing obligation of companies, such reports 
may be especially important in insolvency. Directors of a company facing insolvency 
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commit offences if they falsify the company's books 207  or make any material 
omissions in any statement relating to the company's affairs.208  
 
Information disclosure is also important for the reason that insiders may 
acquire their own benefits at the cost of other stakeholders in corporate rescue 
activities. The law accordingly prescribes the disclosure of transactions during a 
certain period prior to the file of insolvency.209 Also, negotiated rescue plans must be 
approved by courts or court-assigned insolvency practitioners, who are further 
required to keep records of their acts and dealings in discharging their duties.210 The 
basic objective of these arrangements is to let all relevant parties know the facts and 
compromises reached. In other words, almost every deal in insolvency is under the 
supervision of either the court or the insolvency practitioner. 
 
Protection to creditors is further enhanced as disclosure rules are enforced on 
all companies and directors may be sanctioned for the breach of their duties to 
creditors. 211  For employees, if transfers of undertaking are involved in corporate 
rescue efforts, information disclosure to employees or representatives is also required 
under the TUPE and the Employment Rights Act 1996. This is additional to the 
information and consultation rights of employees under the Information and 
Consultation Directive.212 
 
The above discussion thus reveals that mandatory information disclosure is a 
main characteristic of the legal approach to corporate restructuring transactions. Since 
such information disclosure requirements are initiated by the occurrence of specific 
events, they are event-driven and thus more specific than the general information 
disclosure as required when companies are going concerns.  
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4. Prior Approval of Intermediaries 
Prior approval is the strongest intervention by the authority among the 
regulatory techniques.213 This form of regulatory technique is especially important in 
the area of financial market regulations. For example, both Recognized Investment 
Exchange and Recognized Clearing House in the FSMA 2000 are examples of this 
technique. 214  As for corporate restructuring transactions, licensed accountants, 
auditors and lawyers are all indispensable actors. 
 
Apart from that, we may observe specific intermediaries need additional prior 
approval of the court or other regulatory authorities. For instance, a flotation on a 
Stock Exchange must involve licensed intermediaries. A sponsor approved by the FSA 
acts as the intermediary between the issuer and the FSA. Such a sponsor is a person 
recognized by the Stock Exchange to carry out stipulated activities, including to make 
‘due and careful enquiry’ of the issuer, and to ensure that the directors acknowledge 
their duties and the compliance by the company with the Listing Rules. 215  The 
importance of the regulation of intermediaries can also be evidenced on the 
Alternative Investment Market, where even though three-year records are no longer 
strictly required, the role of advisors who must play an active role in monitoring and 
screening the flotation is reinforced.216  
 
As for insolvency, insolvency practitioners, like liquidators and administrators 
are more often licensed accountants or lawyers and court appointed. As for takeover 
transactions, there is no corresponding mandatory approval of intermediaries apart 
from approval required for professionals from their associations they belong to. 
However, financial advisors, strategic investors and banks are experienced takeover 
specialists who are familiar with the law and commercial practice in the takeover 
market. Considering the intensive competition in the market for corporate control, 
intermediaries on the takeover market may in fact be subject to high requirements of 
                                                 
213
 Ogus, (1994), at 150. 
214
 FSMA 2000 Part XVIII.  
215
 FSMA 2000 s88(3). 
216
 LSE, AIM Rules for Companies, (2007), Part One Section 1. And advisers must comply with the 
requirements in AIM Rules for Nominated Advisers by London Stock Exchange. 
Chapter 2. Corporate Restructuring and Corporate Governance 
January 2008 60 
their clients. 
 
C. COSTS OF REGULATION 
According to Posner and Stigler, regulations may bring more costs than 
benefits.217 The first cost is the moral hazard, which means actors may adapt their 
behaviour as a result of a particular arrangement, including regulation. The classical 
example is the response from the private sector to the provision of fire insurance. 
Individuals who purchase insurance will be more inclined to be careless to potential 
risks. As applied to regulation, moral hazard may result in a relaxation of normal 
standards of prudence. A similar situation also occurs when company insolvency law 
provides strong protection for secured creditors, who may thus be lax in playing their 
monitoring roles when companies are going concerns. Such effects are thus 
counterproductive and undesirable. 
 
The second is the compliance cost. Document requirements in flotations and 
the ongoing information disclosure obligation of the listed companies are only two of 
the apparent examples. Compliance costs can be so high that they may function as 
deterrents to some participants. For example, high compliance costs involved in a 
flotation may either stop some companies from entering the market or encourage them 
to delist from the market, vitiating the role of the public capital market to raise capital 
for companies.  
 
Moreover, there are some indirect costs arising from the compliance cost. For 
example, the regulated may try to coin obfuscated words to meet the requirement. The 
upshot is the provision of low quality and less understandable information, which is 
not the originally intended objective of the regulation. One example will make it vivid. 
In an explanation for the discrepancy from the Combined Code, a listed company 
stated: “Save where detailed below, Yell complied with the 1998 Code…”.218 In this 
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 Posner, R., Theories of Economic Regulation, (1974), Bell Journal of Economics, 5(2):335-358 and 
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 Yell Group Plc Annual Report 2003/2004, available at 
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case, instead of giving a clear statement of any discrepancy, the company leaves the 
reader to identify any areas of non-compliance within the report.219  
 
Other categories of costs include the decreased economic efficiency, which 
can be attributed to the few activities of agents after the introduction of regulations, 
and the increased dynamic cost of regulations, which is attributable to the inertia of 
regulators who may resist potential beneficial changes for their own interests. Thus, 
given the potential high costs of mandatory rules, some scholar argues that 
“mandatory rules (in corporate rules) should apply only to elements of the corporate 
contract which would not voluntarily be adopted.”220 
 
However, all these costs may also bring benefits as well. Even though 
compliance costs are a heavy burden for small companies, small companies can in 
fact save fees on research and development and adopt sophisticated management or 
production standards by complying with statutory requirements. In other words, the 
dynamic cost can also engender benefits by inciting more innovations.  
 
Last but not least, authorities may intentionally prefer regulation costs for 
public interests. In the financial market in the UK, authorities have been creating both 
entering and exiting costs, which effectively prevent those ‘hit and run’ raiders from 
destroying the stability of the financial market and thus help to preserve the integrity 
of the market.221  
 
CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, I discuss corporate restructuring transactions from both an 
economic and a legal perspective. I first present diverse motives for flotation, which 
range from to acquire an alternative financial resource at a lower cost to exit from 
original investments. While benefits of the public capital market are attractive, 
management, who usually hold large shareholding and thus can decide the fate of 
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flotation, may have to strike a balance between these benefits and the increasingly 
stringent public disclosure. Management’s retention of control, however, has in many 
empirical studies been linked with the anomaly of underperformance of floated 
companies after they go public. In combination with that anomaly, shares are usually 
underpriced in flotations. Empirical evidence shows that the anomaly of underpricing 
is connected with the collaboration between institutional shareholders and 
underwriters in floatations. Accumulatively, these two anomalies engender the 
observed social disruption of the current flotations.  
 
But the flip side of the management’s retention of control is that it can also 
contribute to a successful transformation from a private company to a public company. 
In fact, a small difference from the existing governance structure is helpful in 
achieving a successful transformation. But, it must be noticed that since interests of 
shareholders, especially interests of minority shareholders, are enhanced on the public 
capital market, a flotation may intensify the conflicts of interests among different 
groups of stakeholders. Nevertheless, the regulatory environment of the public capital 
market can produce an overall net positive effect on stakeholders.  
 
In parallel, we also observe the intensified interest conflicts among and 
between shareholders, stakeholders and the management in takeover transactions. We 
discuss takeovers from the perspectives of both the offeree company and the offeror 
company. From the perspective of the offeree company, we see that different 
shareholding structures may have different effects on the takeover offer. We also see 
that the pro-shareholder stance of the Takeover Panel largely restricts the discretion of 
directors to rebuff takeover offers even though antitakeover measures by the board 
may still be observed in the UK. From the perspective of the offeror company, we 
further divide takeovers into diversification and divestitures. Motives for these 
activities can be either mala fide or bona fide. But in contrast to diversification, which 
may produce both positive and negative performance, divestitures are often carried 
out to redress the former mistakes in diversification. On the whole, even though 
takeover transactions can bring financial benefits to offeree shareholders, the 
monitoring role of takeover transactions is confusing.  
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As special cases in takeover transactions, MBO and MBI transactions are 
discussed as a separate topic. Empirical evidence on the performance of MBO and 
MBI and the recent private equity wave is still incomplete and confusing. However, 
the co-existence of both positive and negative evidence regarding takeover 
transactions may indeed lead us to deem the market for corporate control as an 
environmental factor which should not be bluntly cleared away. Still, the violent 
social implications of takeover transactions need us strike a delicate balance between 
economic efficiency and the social stability.  
 
As for the case of Insolvency, we first see that insolvency is a continuum of 
the existing governance structure. We then analyse corporate governance around 
corporate rescue. Here, we emphasize both the legal rescue efforts and the private 
rescue efforts. The strong intrusion of law produces important effects on governance 
practice when companies are still going concerns. The discussion also warns us that 
even though corporate rescue is recommendable, the long-term performance after 
rescue may not be strong.  
 
With these discussions, we strengthen our argument that flotations, takeovers 
and insolvency are thresholds in the life cycle of corporate governance. We then move 
on to the legal institution on corporate restructuring transactions. We first explain the 
dominant self-regulatory regime of corporate governance in general, though 
juridification is incrementally perceptible. While default rules are the feature of 
governance rules for companies as going concerns, mandatory rules inform 
regulations on corporate restructuring transactions. In specific, we discuss such legal 
approaches as rule setting, standard setting, information disclosure and prior approval 
of intermediaries. We specially discuss mandatory information disclosure which is 
widely used to solve governance issues throughout the life cycle of corporate 
governance. Still, except for a growing preference to corporate rescue, neither 
preference nor opposition to restructuring transactions per se is observed in relevant 
regulations. While regulations can be necessary and may produce positive effects, the 
accompanying costs of regulations are also undeniable.  
 
In sum, this chapter further develops the life cycle of corporate governance by 
a detailed analysis of the mutual influence between the existing governance structure 
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and the three restructuring activities. The confusing empirical evidence on the effect 
of these restructuring transactions provides a huge challenge to the government and 
regulatory authorities. However, strong disruptive effects of restructuring transactions 
do provide a strong rationale for government intervention for the purpose of public 
interests and social stability. Nevertheless, the legal institutions discussed in the latter 
part of this chapter show that the legal approach to corporate restructuring 
transactions adopts a neutral policy to, i.e., neither favouring nor opposing 
restructuring transactions. As a result, the law in this area is more to provide a level 
playing field than to prescribe concrete steps to be adopted by participants. 
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CHAPTER 3. SHAREHOLDERS  
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I will apply the research structure set up in the first chapter to 
shareholders. With a brief introduction of social political issues relevant to 
shareholders, I will examine how interests of shareholders are constrained in the life 
cycle of corporate governance through the perspectives of contracts, and laws and 
regulations.  
 
The basic aim of such a discussion is to provide the governance institution 
specifically relevant to shareholders. In the social political discussion I will mainly 
discuss the one-share-one-vote norm and the dispersed shareholding structure of 
public companies in the UK. I will also talk about the influence of the concentration 
of shareholding for institutional shareholders and discuss the role of institutional 
shareholders in corporate governance. In the remaining parts, I will discuss 
shareholders in the normal life, flotations, takeovers, and insolvency consecutively. 
By analyzing contractual arrangements and relevant laws and regulations in the four 
capsules, we will examine how the interests of shareholders are promoted and 
constrained. One point to make at the outset is that corporate rules and contracts may 
largely overlap as it is widely recognized that company law provides a standard 
contract through a set of default rules.   
 
In Part I, I will look at social political issues; from Part II to Part V, I will 
discuss shareholders in the normal life, flotations, takeovers, and insolvency in 
sequence. A conclusion follows at the end. 
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PART I. SOCIAL POLITICAL ISSUES 
A. A BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW 
1. The Development of Shareholders  
Modern company law developed from the earlier partnership law, where 
shares were mainly used as a vehicle to calculate the rights and liabilities of partners. 1 
In a partnership, partners are owners of the firm collectively. They enjoy the rights 
and assume the responsibilities according to a prefixed ratio of their respective share 
holdings. Conversely, shares in a partnership are not transferable, or can only be 
transferred with prior approvals of the other partners. The non-transferability is 
balanced by the fact that most partners are closely involved in the management of the 
partnership. The inheritance of this conception by the early joint stock companies 
helps to explain the origin of the modern idea that shareholders are the owners of the 
companies in which they hold shares.  
 
However, the financial requirement arising from the industrial revolution, 
especially with the advent of the railways, necessitated the availability of capital of a 
bigger size but with a greater transferability. This market driven process spurred the 
development of a company as a separate legal personality, leading shareholders a step 
away from their original image as partners.2 In fact, once companies are recognized as 
separate persons in law, shareholders can no longer be deemed as owners of 
companies. Companies, in law, are not things and cannot be owned by shareholders. 
They enjoy the legal status as persons just as shareholders do. Indeed, they themselves 
are often shareholders, who invest in other companies. Viewed from this perspective, 
shareholders can only be deemed as financial resource providers for companies. 
 
Still, some legal rights attached to partners are successfully retained by 
shareholders. One example is their decision right. Even though shareholders are no 
longer partners or owners of a company, they still enjoy the right to vote on important 
                                                 
1
 For a relevant historical review, see Ireland, P., Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder 
Ownership, (1999), M. L. R., 62: 32. 
2
 Blair, M., Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the 
Nineteenth Century, (2003), U.C.L.A. L. Rev., 51(2):387-455. 
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strategic issues and the right to appoint and dismiss members of the board, who 
largely control the daily management of a company. In other words, the deprivation 
from shareholders of the ownership rights originally conferred on partners is legally 
counterbalanced by the retention of decision rights for shareholders. Thus, 
shareholders’ legal rights can only be appropriately understood as an outgrowth of 
legal development.   
 
2. The Superiority of Capital to Labour in the UK  
In a similar vein, the current ‘enlightened shareholder’ value model of internal 
governance in the UK must also be studied through a historical perspective. Labour in 
the UK has not been as strong as its counterpart in Germany ever since World War II. 
One consequence of this historically established superiority of capital to labour in the 
UK is that labour has been historically dislocated out of the management in the UK, a 
situation which contributed to the establishment of the single-tier board in the UK 
rather than the two-tier board in Germany.3  
 
However, as the integration of the European Market moves on, the increasing 
political influence of labour can also be seen in the UK as more pro-employee 
regulations and directives of the EU are implemented in the UK.4 Indeed, when the 
Steering Group issued its final report on the company law review, it said:  
“it sets as the basic goal for directors the success of the company 
in the collective best interests of shareholders. But it also requires them to 
recognize, as the circumstances require, the company’s need to foster 
relationships with its employees, customers and suppliers, its need to 
maintain its business reputation, and its need to consider the company’s 
impact on the community and the working environment.”5  
 
This view is further written in the Companies Act 2006 where directors are 
expressly required to take into consideration the interest of employees and other 
                                                 
3
 Hopt, K., The German Two-Tier Board: Experiences, Theories, Reforms, in Hopt, J., et al., (eds), 
Comparative Corporate Governance – The State of the Art and Emerging Research, (1998), OUP, 225-
258, at 228.  
4
 The obligation to take the interests of employees into account was introduced by the CA 1980. 
5
 DTI, Modern Company Law for A Competitive Economy, Final Report, (2001), at para. 3.8. (DTI, 
Final Report ). 
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stakeholders in performing their duties to achieve the success of their company.6 
Consequently, the strong influence from the EU may have already changed the so-
called shareholders’ primacy in a significant manner.   
 
The above brief historical review of the legal status of shareholders and the 
development of the relationship between capital and labour tells us that the 
governance debate must be understood as a dynamic issue because different social 
political environments may dictate different internal governance arrangements.  
 
B. SHAREHOLDING STRUCTURE IN THE UK 
1. The Norm of Dispersed Shareholding and One-Share-One-
Vote  
Dispersed shareholding is the norm in the UK. According to the European 
Corporate Governance Network, the median size of the largest block in the UK is just 
10%, in stark contrast to the 34% in Spain and 52% in Austria.7 Crespi-Cladera and 
Renneboog also document that over 85% of listed companies lack a shareholder with 
25% or more of voting rights.8 Combined with this dispersed shareholding theme is 
the business norm of One-Share-One-Vote in the UK,9 a norm which is important in 
maintaining the integrity and the liquidity of a free stock market and the market for 
corporate control.10 
                                                 
6
 CA 2006 s172. 
7
 Becht, M., Strong Blockholders, Weak Owners and the Need for European Mandatory disclosure, 
(1997), ECGI research paper, available at 
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9
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Application of the One share-One Vote Principle in Europe, (2005), available at 
http://www.deminor.com/download.do?doc=deminorratingDocs/ABIOneShareOneVoteFullReport.pdf,
at 17.  
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 Warren, M., One Share, One Vote: A Perception of Legitimacy, (1988), Journal of Corporation Law, 
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The combined effect of the dispersed shareholding structure and the one-
share-one-vote scheme is that individual shareholders have little or no incentive to 
monitor the management. The atomized shareholding structure leads individual 
shareholders to exercise their statutory rights only when the company undertakes very 
controversial decisions. Moreover, since a shareholder does not owe fiduciary duties 
to the company or the other shareholders, he can vote in his own interests. This is the 
case even when directors holding shares in the company exercise their voting power 
as shareholders.11  Alternatively, shareholders in large public companies have long 
been claimed to pay more attention to their short-term return on their investment than 
the long-term development of the company.12 Such observations partially explain why 
shareholders’ proactive performance of their monitoring role is of importance in the 
current corporate governance reform.  
 
But on the other hand, the norm of dispersed shareholding should also be 
understood bearing in mind that in the UK coalitions of the five largest shareholders 
in a company can in fact control 30% of a company’s outstanding equity.13 Similarly, 
Leech has also argued that a bloc of a few large shareholders working in concert can 
control many big companies in the UK and in almost all such companies, the top six 
shareholdings can accumulate a working control without holding a majority of the 
shares.14 In fact, shareholders’ control through a constellation of interests has already 
been a strong characteristic of the majority of enterprises in the USA and Britain.15 In 
other words, the norm of dispersed shareholding may eclipse the underlying 
concentrated voting structure, a real concern of the internal governance scheme. 
                                                                                                                                            
14: 89-110. In stark contrast to the one-share-one-vote is the cumulative voting scheme, which 
complicates the voting structure as shareholding structure can no longer be simply used as a starting 
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competition. 
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2. The Concentration of Shareholding in the Hands of 
Institutional Shareholders 
Although the dispersed shareholding structure is the norm in individual 
companies, the shareholding structure in the whole corporate sector does not have a 
similar picture. In fact, partly due to the fact that pension funds and other funds have 
been attracted by the higher returns from shares by comparison with fixed interest 
securities and partly due to the current government policy which encourages fund 
managers to invest proactively, the UK equity market has become more 
‘institutionalized’ ever since the 1960s.16 Empirical evidence reveals that individual 
share ownership dramatically fell from over 50% of the equity market to under 20%17 
while at the same time institutional investors in the UK own assets worth more than 
half the quoted equity markets.18 The concentration of shareholding in the hands of 
institutional investors thus indicates a gravity of voting rights to institutional 
shareholders in the corporate sector. The importance of institutional investors in 
corporate governance practice is thus apparent. 
 
However, in stark contrast with the important role implied in the concentration 
of voting rights to institutional investors is the negative empirical evidence which 
reveals that most institutional shareholders are rather dormant than proactive in 
governance practice.19 But why institutional shareholders with their concentration of 
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 Davies, P., Shareholder Value, Company Law, and Securities Markets Law, A British View, (2003b), 
in Hopt, K., and Wymmersch, E., (eds), Capital Markets and Company Law, (2003), OUP, 261-289, at 
271, also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=250324. 
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Ownership, A Report on the Ownership of Shares at 31/12/99’, at 4 and 8. 
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financial firms prior to and post the implementation of the recommendation of the Cadbury Committee, 
Dedman found no evidence of pressure from institutional shareholders in encouraging recommended 
board structure. See Dedman, E., An Investigation into the Determinants of UK Board Structure Before 
and After Cadbury, (2000), Corporate Governance: An International Review 8(2):27-67. But Stapledon 
pointed out that institutional shareholders’ activism may be “masked by the methodology employed” in 
Chapter 3. Shareholders 
January 2008 71 
voting rights do not exercise their rights proactively? In this section, I will explore the 
reasons for the observed weak voice of institutional shareholders in individual 
companies. As the analysis goes on, it can be seen that the active role of institutional 
shareholders is, however, expressed in the wider corporate sector. 
 
(a) Factors Contributing to the Weak Monitoring Role of 
Institutional Shareholders in Individual Companies 
Institutional investment is managed by fund managers, who get their payment 
according to the performance of the fund. Given that the remuneration for fund 
managers is evaluated by the performance of the shares they are in charge of, the 
indexed investment policy20 is accordingly preferred as it more or less ensures a fund 
manager a general performance assessment equivalent to that of the market, if not 
better. Moreover, the peer bench-marking among fund managers further stereotypes 
the indexed investment policy. Because the risk of terminating the mandate in case of 
underperformance is disproportionately large compared with the beneficial effect of 
winning a new customer through better performance, fund managers may thus follow 
the widely adopted indexed investment policy among their peers for a safe choice.21  
 
Since institutional investors pursuing the diversified investment policy usually 
‘[hold] literally a thousand or more stocks’22 in which no single stock is likely to 
make up a small percentage of the whole portfolio, active monitoring of the 
management in any particular company will be forestalled by a low expected payoff 
and the information overload problem.23 Moreover, the indexed investment policy 
may produce a lock-in effect because a transfer from one share to some other cannot 
outperform the market but rather only increase the costs to fund managers.24 Thus, 
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institutional shareholders’ monitoring of corporate governance practices of the 
companies in the portfolio may not be cost-benefit efficient. 
 
In addition, the weak voice of institutional investors can also be explained by 
the intricate business relationships between the firm the fund manager works for and 
the company the firm invests in. In practice, an active governance promoter may find 
the business of its firm’s corporate finance arm has been prejudiced. 25  Thus, 
considering the fierce competition for mandates among fund managers, they may just 
prefer free riding or dormancy to active confrontation with the corporate 
management.26  
 
In sum, both the diversified investment policy and the agency cost concern 
contribute to the weak monitoring role of institutional shareholders in individual 
companies. Still, it must be emphasized that fund managers with the guidance of this 
kind of investment policy care more about the whole economic performance than the 
short-term price fluctuations in any given company or companies in their portfolio.27 
In other words, corporate governance concerns are of importance to institutional 
shareholders in the sense of the whole corporate sector rather than specific practices in 
individual companies.  
 
(b) Collective Action 
Nor should the weak voice of institutional shareholders in corporate 
governance in individual companies eclipse their strong collective voice in instituting 
governance rules in general. Indeed, “UK institutional investors have been active in 
                                                                                                                                            
relative poor performance of the companies concerned, a situation which has been attributed to the high 
costs in both the possible monitoring and potential exit. See Faccio, M., and Lasfer, A., Do 
Occupational Pension Funds Monitor Companies in which They Hold Large Stakes?, (2000), Journal 
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Davies, (2003b), at 276. 
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 Short, H. and Keasey, K., Managerial Ownership and the Performance of Firms: Evidence from the 
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lobbying regulators or in seeding market norms.”28 
 
It has already been noted that “British institutional investors tend to act 
collectively through umbrella institutions when dealing with the corporate 
management.” 29  Associations of institutional investors often cooperate in sharing 
experience and expenses of their confrontation with and challenges to the incumbent 
management. They usually issue guidelines which not only regulate the action of their 
own members but also provide meaningful predictions to the management of the 
attitude of institutional investors on issues covered by relevant guidelines. For 
instance, even though the pre-emptive rights of existing shareholders may well be 
defaulted in practice, the Stock Exchange Pre-Emption Group Guidelines30 with the 
aim to avoid either the control dilution or the financial dilution among existing 
shareholders, must be considered seriously by corporate management.  
 
Another example is the disadvantaged position of management in takeover 
transactions. It is usually believed that the dispersed shareholding structure in the UK 
should predict a greater discretion for directors and thus, like what happens in the US, 
the possibility of anti-takeover measures being put in place. However, at the time 
when the City Code was introduced, institutional shareholders had taken under control 
about 20% of the equity shares of companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
Moreover, the takeover rule making process was then delegated by the Government to 
the City institutions, which include institutional investors.31 Interests of management 
were thus less considered than those of City institutions. Accordingly, the 
concentration of shareholding by institutional shareholders effectively facilitates their 
collective negotiation position in establishing rules against anti-takeover measures.32  
 
In addition, the collective voice of institutional investors is also of importance 
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 Armour, J., and Skeel, D., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?—The Peculiar 
Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation, (2007), Georgetown Law Journal, also available at 
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 Coffee, (1993), at 51. 
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in setting up the self-regulatory governance institution in the UK. Indeed, the 
geographical concentration of institutional investors with in the Square Mile of the 
City of London has produced two implications.33 For one thing, such closeness, in 
combination with the close communication and experience sharing among 
institutional investors, reinforces the political solidarity among institutional investors. 
For another, the closeness reinforces the monitoring role of reputation among such 
repeated game players as institutional investors, indicating that self-regulation without 
government intervention can be a real possibility. The mutually enhanced implications 
thus institute a historical preference for a self-regulatory regime on corporate 
governance in the UK.  
 
(c) Implications for Corporate Governance Reform 
The above discussion tells us that the role of institutional shareholders in 
corporate governance must be viewed from two perspectives. On the one hand, their 
dispersed shareholding in any given individual company implies a weak voice in the 
company concerned. On the other hand, institutional shareholders play an important 
role in the corporate sector through their collective actions. Thus, a fair view of the 
role of institutional shareholders in corporate governance entails due considerations 
from both perspectives.  
 
Nevertheless, institutional shareholders’ proactive voting in individual 
companies can still make sense simply for the reason that “no voter can correctly 
argue ex ante that his or her vote will not count, whatever may be observed ex post. 
No trustees have the right to assume, just because the holding is small, that they are 
therefore without influence or power.” 34 Thus, the positive collective role of 
institutional shareholders in the corporate sector should not overshadow the concern 
of their weak voice in governance practices of individual companies.  
 
Moreover, if the traditional nonchalant attitude of institutional shareholders 
continues, the intensive political pressure will be expected to impose on them a 
                                                 
33
 Armour and Skeel, (2007), at 54-55. 
34
 Charkham, J., and Simpson, A., Fair Shares, The Future of Shareholder Power and Responsibility, 
(1999), OUP, at 145. 
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specific legal duty of mandatory voting.35 In order to stave off such heavy government 
interventions, institutional investors have reacted by promoting wide responsible 
intervention and developing best practice principles for voting. 36  In addition, the 
revised Combined Code has also reiterated that institutional investors should avoid 
“box-ticking” but enhance their proactive role in the corporate governance by 
encouraging “a dialogue with companies based on the mutual understanding of 
objectives” and “[making] considered use of their votes.” 37  
 
C. SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND MINORITY SHAREHOLDER 
PROTECTION 
Within the group of shareholders, the tenet of social democracy dictates that 
majority shareholders should not be privileged and minority shareholders should not 
be disadvantaged.38 Correspondingly, we observe direct legal protections of minority 
shareholders and stringent stipulations constraining the discretion of such corporate 
plutocrats as large shareholders or voting trusts.39  
 
Still, the promotion of the interests of minority shareholders must be 
differentiated from the inference that each individual shareholder should hold one 
vote. This inference confuses the inhuman nature of shareholders, who are merely the 
personification of shares, with the personal rights of shareholders as individual 
citizens and thus distorts the image of shareholders in corporate governance. 
 
                                                 
35
 Newbold Committee, the Committee of Inquiry into UK Vote Execution (Yve Newbold, Chair), 
Report, (1999), London National Association of Pension Funds, at 3, where the Committee suggested 
that a failure to increase the voting level “would …justify further investigation by the Government”. 
Also see Short, H., and Keasey, K., Institutional Voting in the UK: Is Mandatory Voting the Answer?, 
(1997), Corporate Governance: An International Review, 5(1):37-77; and Ferran, E., The Role of the 
Shareholder in Internal Corporate Governance, in Ferrarini, G., et al., (eds), Reforming Company and 
Takeover Law in Europe, (2004), OUP, 417-454, at 446. More, as for the current stance of the 
government, see CA 2006 ss1277-1280 on information as to exercise of voting rights by institutional 
investors. 
36
 See Institutional Shareholders’ Committee, The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and 
Agents—Statement of Principles (2002). 
37
 See the Combined Code on Corporate Governance 2003, E.1 and E.3, and the Myner’s Report.  
38
 Dunlavy, C., Corporate Governance in Late 19th Century Europe and the US: The Case of 
Shareholder Voting Rights,(1998), in Hopt, K., et al., (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance The 
State of the Art and Emerging Research, (1998), OUP, 5-40. 
39
 See discussion in the following section. 
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PART II. SHAREHOLDERS IN THE NORMAL LIFE  
A. THE ROLE OF CONTRACTS 
1. Shares and Shareholders 
The legal nature of shares and shareholders in modern companies has long 
been perplexing to scholars.40 Indeed, legal definitions of share or shareholders cannot 
be found in statutes. A share, however, has been defined in a case as “an interest 
measured by a sum of money and made up of various rights contained in the contract, 
including the right to a sum of money of a more or less amount.”41 In other words, 
shares are contracts to label an investor as a shareholder of a given company. 
 
To be a shareholder of a company indicates that a holder of shares will assume 
liabilities and enjoy benefits attached to the shares he subscribes.42 Viewed from this 
perspective, legal regulations on shareholders are in essence those on shares and a 
shareholder in law is merely a personification of shares attached with different rights 
and duties.43 However, shares are not the only contracts shareholders are bound to. 
Shareholders are also bound by the mutual covenants between and among 
shareholders, among which the contract implied in the Articles of association is just 
one example.44 A shareholder can accordingly be referred to as a contractual party to a 
series of contracts either among and between shareholders or with a company.  
 
Here, it is worth noting that the flexibility of contracts does not lead to the 
multitude variety of shares. It is true that shares can be classified. But, rights and 
duties attached to shares in each one class are undeniably uniform. Moreover, a 
                                                 
40
 Pennington, R., Can Shares in Companies Be Defined, (1989), Comp. Law., 10 (7):140-144. 
41
 Farwell J in Borland’s Trustee v Steel Bros & Co Ltd [1901] 1 Ch 279, 288. 
42
 Interests of shareholders may strictly be limited to the terms attached to shares. For example, the 
common law tells us that preferential rights attached to preferential shares, shares “which in respect of 
dividends and/or capital, [enjoy] priority, for a limited amount, over the company’s ordinary shares,” 
(Ferran, E., Company Law and Corporate Finance, (1999), OUP, at 323), must be expressed and 
cannot be implied. See Re London India Rubber Co (1869) LR 5 Eq 519. 
43
 Admittedly, rights and duties is normally uniform to shares in the same class. 
44
 As it is well known that Table A to the CA 1985 provides a set of standard articles of association to 
companies in the UK, the discussion of contracts regarding shareholders will thus overlap with 
discussion of laws and regulations. 
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common interest in profit maximization can easily be identified among different 
classes of shareholders. 45 The uniformity of the interests of shareholders is especially 
apparent when compared with the variety of the individual expectations of both 
creditors and employees, or with the strong human nature of employees. Viewed from 
this perspective, shareholders “are in significant senses immortal, uncommitted and 
universal.”46  
 
2. Articles of Association 
Section 14 of the Companies Act 1985 47  is a legal recognition of the 
contractual nature of the Articles of Association. Within the Articles of Association, 
we can observe stipulations on the inter-relationship between shareholders and on that 
between shareholders and directors. Such relationships are mainly constrained by the 
voting rights of shareholders, through which shareholders may in law have the 
decision rights on most important issues of corporate matters and the right to decide 
the membership on the board. 
 
A change to the Articles of Association may not be easy as usually a special 
resolution with three quarters of approval from shareholders is required.48 Moreover, 
the law explicitly permits entrenched provisions of the Articles.49 Thus, contractual 
relationship established through Articles of Association may not be a meaningful 
reliance for unsatisfied shareholders in public companies where articles of association 
may have been fixed a long time ago without expectation of the specific changes later 
on. In consequence, individual shareholders in public companies, who do not have a 
strong negotiating power, may bear an inborn preference to exit rather than to voice in 
corporate governance practices.  
 
                                                 
45
 It is worth noting that shareholders may pursue either a long-term or a short-term financial interests 
or even a pure moral one as in the ethical investment or socially responsible investment. However, such 
a variety is not important when our focus is on telling the difference among and between the three 
subjects we are studying in this thesis. 
46
 Greenwood, D., Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 
(1996), S. Cal. L. Rev., 69:1021, at 1025. 
47
 To be replaced by s33 of the CA 2006. 
48
 CA 1985 s9, to be replaced by CA 2006 s22.  
49
 CA 2006 s22(1). 
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3. Shareholders’ Agreement 
Shareholders’ agreements are different documents from the Articles of 
Association. In these agreements, shareholders are bound by an agreement only when 
they are contractual parties to the agreement concerned. Thus, shareholders’ 
agreements suffer from the strict rule of mutual consent and thus may be inefficient 
when we imagine that a new contract has to be signed each time a new member joins 
a company or an old member exits from the company. In practice, shareholders’ 
agreements may only be of a constitutional sense among all the shareholders in 
private companies with limited number of shareholders.50  
 
But on the other hand, shareholders’ agreements may provide a good 
supplement to the Articles of Association. In comparison with the rigidity of the 
Articles of Association, shareholders’ agreements are rather flexible because 
shareholders can negotiate and reach agreements on any issue at any time. For 
instance, minority shareholders can establish a voting coalition protecting their 
common interests.51 Shareholders’ agreements can thus supplement deficiencies in the 
constitutional documents according to the specific development of the company and 
specific interests of shareholders involved. However, in the case that shareholders’ 
agreements are in conflict with mandatory rules of company law, the law up till now 
supports the shareholders agreement only to the extent that it is an agreement on 
voting activities by contractual shareholders.52    
 
It has been claimed that shareholders’ agreements are not common in the UK 
though they are mainly used in management-buy-out transactions and joint venture 
projects.53 Given the limited usages in the UK and the legal effects on contractual 
parties, shareholders’ agreements are discussed to the extent that such agreements 
may make a difference to the voting activities of shareholders.  
 
                                                 
50
 Russell v Northern Bank, [1992] 3 All ER 161. However, such ag4reements may subject to public 
disclosure, see CA 1985 ss380 (1) and (4)(c) (to be replaced by CA2006 s30(1) and s29(1) 
respectively).  
51
 Roe, M., Strong Managers, Weak Owners, The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance, 
(1994), Princeton University Press. 
52
 Russell v Northern Bank, [1992] 3 All ER 161.  
53
 Sealy, L., Cases and Materials in Company Law, (2001), (7th edn), Butterworths, at 107. 
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4. Shareholders’ Contractual Rights 
(a) Voting Rights and the Right to Voice 
The right to vote and that to sell are two important rights attached to shares. 
However, since voting rights attached to shares to a large extent overlap with the 
relevant stipulations in company law, we will further discuss this issue in the next 
section. The importance of this issue here is that voting rights are rights to voice, or to 
participate in corporate governance autonomously. In contrast, the right to sell is a 
right to exit. While exit plays an important disciplinary role as too many exits can 
precipitate the share price of a company, such exits may make the company a 
vulnerable target for potential offeror companies or may even go insolvent. Also, exit 
implies a passive rather than an active role of shareholders in corporate governance. 
Thus, it is the proactive voice, rather than the passive exits, of shareholders in the 
corporate governance when companies are going concerns that is emphasized in the 
current governance reform. 
 
(b) Dividend Rights 
Another important right attached to shares is shareholders’ right to dividend. 
In the UK, an ongoing and regular dividend payment is the norm.54  An ongoing 
regular dividend payment sends to shareholders positive signals of the performance of 
the company.55 An abrupt deviation from the norm may signify poor performance of 
the company, and thus precipitate the value of the company.56 Moreover, a regular 
payout of dividends constrains the discretion of directors and blockholders to misuse 
                                                 
54
 Cheffins, B., Dividends as a Substitute for Corporate Law: The Separation of Ownership and 
Control in the United Kingdom, (2006), Washington and Lee Law Review, 63:1273-1338, also available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=906068 and Renneboog, L., and Trojanowski, G., Patterns in Payout Policy 
and Payout Channel Choice of UK Firms in the 1990s, (2005), ECGI Finance Working Paper 
No.70/2005, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=664982, the authors observe that despite the 
increased uses of share repurchases as a method of payout to shareholders, dividends still constitute a 
vast proportion of the total payout.  
55
 Lease, R., et al., Dividend Policy: Its Impact on Firm Value, (2000), Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press, at 102-6. 
56
 This however may engender a process of “dividend ‘smoothing’”, i.e., companies will generally be 
prudent and adopt a conservative dividend policy in which dividend incremental, if any, will be gradual 
so that it can be sustainable for a long term. See Ross, S., et al., Corporate Finance, (7th edn), (2005), 
McGraw-Hill, at 526-527. 
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the free cash flow in the company.57  
 
Additionally, shareholders’ rights to dividends are protected by default rules in 
company law, according to which though shareholders do not have a right to modify 
the size of the dividend, they usually have a veto right to the dividend policy proposed 
by the board.58 Thus, even though shareholders’ veto rights to the dividend policy may 
never be adopted in practice,59 the business norm of the regular, ongoing payment of 
dividends still implies that shareholders’ rights to dividends can implicitly play an 
active monitoring role in the UK.60 
 
(c) Actions against the Company 
Shareholders also enjoy litigation rights based on their contracts with the 
company. Shareholders can initiate either a derivative action on behalf of the company 
or a personal action against the company on their own. However, shareholders’ 
derivative actions are not promoted in the UK. For one thing, this can be attributed to 
shareholders’ free-rider concern, i.e., a shareholder who initiates the derivative action 
may bear the cost and the risk of losing the case by himself while the benefits, if the 
case succeeds, will be enjoyed by the company first and indirectly by him. For another, 
courts in the UK have long been following the established rules set up in Foss v 
Harbottle,61 which strictly constrain the locus standi of individual shareholders to sue 
on behalf of the company. As Lord Davey summarized in Burland v Earle,62 there are 
two principles set up in Foss v Harbottle: one is that courts do not interfere in the 
internal management and the other is that the company should be the proper claimant. 
Such a widely accepted tradition among courts has “made it very difficult, and in 
many cases impossible, for shareholders with grievances—sometimes shareholders 
                                                 
57
 Faccio, M., et al., Dividends and Expropriation, (2001), American Economic Review, 91:54, at 55. 
58
 Companies Act 1985 Table A Articles 102-3. 
59
 Edwards, J., and Mayer, C., An Investigation into the Dividend and New Equity Issue Practices of 
Firms: Evidence from Survey Information, (1985), Institute for Fiscal Studies, Table 2. 
60
 Dividends play a more important role in corporate governance in the UK than in the US, as dividends 
paid out in the UK make up on average 40% of profits, almost double the corresponding figure for their 
counterparts in the US. See Oughton, C., Competitiveness Policy in the 1990s, (1997), Economic 
Journal, 107(444):1486-1503. 
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 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189.  
62
 Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83, at 93. 
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who are the victims of very real injustices—to obtain a legal remedy.”63  
 
Alternatively, a shareholder may also sue the company based on his personal 
contracts with the company.64 Shareholders, however, must establish that he has ‘some 
cause of action vested in him personally.’ 65  Nevertheless, even though case law 
demonstrates examples of such personal rights, there is no conclusive definition of 
such rights in common law or statute. So, the role of shareholders’ personal action in 
protecting shareholders’ interests may have to be discounted. 
 
In sum, it is contracts that label an investor as a shareholder. By subscribing to 
shares, a shareholder enters into a series of contracts with the company and with other 
shareholders. The above discussion also shows that shareholders’ interests are 
constrained by contracts attached to shares, articles of association, and shareholders’ 
agreements. Among the contractual rights, voting rights and rights to dividends are 
emphasized as important governance tools in the UK. However, actions by 
shareholders against the company on the basis of their contracts with the company are 
not promoted in the UK.    
 
B. THE ROLE OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
1. Company Law Related 
(a) Voting Rights as a Counterbalance to the Discretion of Directors 
In the UK, only registered shareholders are entitled to vote. 66  Registered 
shareholders can exercise voting rights on any issue stipulated in the Articles of 
Association and in law. Viewed from this perspective, shareholders enjoy direct 
decision rights which other stakeholders do not. However, shareholders’ voting rights 
                                                 
63
 Sealy, L., Company Law and Commercial Reality, (1984), Sweet & Maxwell London, at 53. 
64
 Re A Company [1987] BCLC 82. 
65
 Pettet, B., Company Law, (2001), Pearson Longman, at 234. 
66
 See CA1985 s370 (6) (to be replaced by CA 2006 s284(1)(3)). Relevant to the voting rights, 
registered shareholders also enjoy the rights to receive notice, to appoint a proxy, and to convene a 
meeting, etc. See CA 1985 s368(1)(2) ( to be replaced by CA 2006 s303(1)(2)(3)) on extraordinary 
general meeting; s370(1)(2); s372(1)-(7) and Table A Article 54-63 of the CA 1985, to be replaced by 
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must be considered with the separation of ownership from the control and the legal 
practice that subject to the provisions of the Companies Acts, the memorandum, the 
articles of association and directions given by shareholders in a special resolution, 
directors enjoy almost all the powers of management.67  Indeed, shareholders can 
mandate directors’ future powers only by way of a special resolution.68  
 
Nevertheless, the great discretion and power vested in directors are subject to 
an important removal right, which cannot be overridden by other terms, in the hands 
of shareholders through an ordinary resolution at any time.69 “It means that the notion 
of a term of office for a director in Great Britain has little meaning.”70 It is true that 
shareholders could be largely written out of the appointment process, without 
violating the law, by inserting an appropriate provision in the articles. However, this 
rarely happens in reality due to the pressure to attract investors, especially institutional 
shareholders, to subscribe issued shares. 
 
The strong menace of shareholders’ removal rights, however, is largely 
disarmed by shareholders’ voting activities in practice. Since few shareholders attend 
the meeting in person and they usually appoint directors as their proxies, shareholders’ 
voting at the meeting is indeed a voting at the board by directors with proxies. In fact, 
shareholders’ removal rights may only be exercised when the performance of the 
company or directors is especially poor. Viewed from this perspective, shareholders’ 
rights to remove directors may only be a menace in letters in most of the normal life 
of the company. 
  
Consequently, shareholders’ voting rights are in essence both negative and 
incomplete.71 They are negative because they are exercised by shareholders through 
vetoes. They are incomplete because they only cover certain specific areas of the 
whole spectrum of the management and also because they are not the norm of real 
business practices. But they are important in that they set boundaries to the discretion 
of the management. So, shareholders’ voting rights and the right to displace 
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 CA 1985 Table A Article 70.  
68
 ibid, also for a detailed analysis, see Davies, P., Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company 
Law, (7th edn) (2003a), London Sweet & Maxwell, at 303 
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 See CA 1985 s303, to be replaced by CA 2006 s168. 
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 Davies, (2003a), at 310. 
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incumbent management should more appropriately be deemed as tools in the 
corporate accountability mechanism to counterbalance the discretion of directors, 
rather than tools for shareholders to claim their supremacy among stakeholders.72 
 
(b) Information Rights 
Shareholders also have information rights relating to the performance of the 
company they invest in. Law plays an important role in prescribing the contents and 
accessibility of the information provided by the company so that shareholders are 
assured to receive quality and accurate information in due time for them to make 
informed decisions. 73  Within company law, the information disclosure is mainly 
focused on the disclosure of financial performance of the company and disclosure of 
directors’ interests in the company. In addition, listed companies are subject to the 
continuing obligation as stipulated in the Listing Rules and the Combined Code. With 
these legal tools, shareholders are expected to monitor the performance of both the 
company and the directors. 
 
(c) Shareholders’ Pre-emptive Rights 
Pre-emptive rights of existing shareholders in law may be initiated if the 
company decides to make a rights issue.74 The two overriding objectives of the pre-
emptive right are to protect the voting power of the existing shareholders from being 
diluted and to limit any fall in the share price if a discount is given to the issuance of 
new shares.75 The first objective can be further understood in two situations, one of 
which is the issuance of shares to outside investors and the other is the issuance of 
shares to part of the existing shareholders or the issuance is made at odds with the 
original shareholding structure. Both will lead to the dilution of the voting powers of 
existing shareholders. The second objective targets another situation where a discount 
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is given to outside investors when a company issues new shares. The discount so 
given will lead to a ‘financial dilution’ of the share price of the existing shareholders 
since the increase of the total number of shares will be beyond the capital and 
dividend paying capability of the company.  
 
But, existing shareholders’ pre-emptive rights will not be applied if the new 
issuance is made otherwise than in cash.76 Also, new shares can be issued on a pre-
emptive basis to shareholders of a certain class, limiting the general application of the 
pre-emption right.77 Moreover, whereas private companies can exclude pre-emptive 
rights entirely or in part in the statutory constitution,78 public companies can disapply 
the pre-emption rights of existing shareholders by a modification to the articles of 
association or by passing of a special resolution, which requires the consent of a 75% 
majority of shareholders voting on the resolution.79 Thus, the pre-emptive right can be 
defaulted in due cases even though it is a statutory right for existing shareholders.80  
 
(d) Statutory Litigation for Minority Shareholders 
The provision of s459 of the CA 198581, and s122 of the IA 1986 are intended 
to protect disadvantaged minority shareholders. The current theme of the unfair 
prejudice remedy contained in s459, as supported by the Final Report by the 
Company Law Review,82 culminates in the case of O’Neil v Phillips.83 For S459 to be 
applicable, the treatment must be both unfair and prejudicial. However, the 
application of s459 should be under a ‘useful cross-check’ i.e., to ‘ask whether [it] … 
would be contrary to what the parties, by words or conduct, have actually agreed.”84 
What this signifies is almost equal to a resort to an actual promise, or a contract, 
which is enforceable as a matter of law, except for the concept of “legitimate 
expectation” which is subject to the traditional equitable principles.  
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 CA 1985 s89(4), to be replaced by CA 2006 s565. 
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The concept of legitimate expectation covers two situations, i.e., where the 
existence of a personal relationship prevents a member from exercising a 
constitutional power bestowed by the articles of association and where the power in 
the constitution is applied for an improper purpose. It can be seen that such exceptions 
only modify the original contractual relationship already in existence between the 
company and shareholders or between shareholders. Thus, it is not surprising to read a 
comment that s459 is a reflection in the law that “contract is the cohesive force 
underlying corporate relationships.”85 
 
In comparison, s122 of the IA 1986, which cannot be granted if other 
alternatives are available, entitles minority shareholders to apply for a winding up of 
the company on a just and equitable basis. However, case law shows that the 
consideration of “just and equitable” will be superimposed only on exceptional 
conditions, for example, where there is a mutual confidence between shareholders due 
to their personal relationship, or an agreement that stipulates participation by all or 
some of the shareholders in the management, or where restrictions of share transfer 
may prevent a member from realizing his or her investment.86  Additionally, such 
considerations must, as Lord Hoffman stated in O’Neil, “be applied judicially and the 
content which is given by the courts must be based upon rational principles.’87       
 
The relatively wide coverage of s459 of the CA 1985 has largely eclipsed the 
application of s122 of the IA 1986 because a petition for the latter will be struck out if 
there is another appropriate remedy available, among which we can name s459 of the 
CA 1985. 88   However, with the enactment of CA 2006, shareholders’ derivative 
actions will only be possible under Part 11 of the CA 2006 or as a result of an order of 
the court in proceedings under Part 30 of the CA 2006, according to which a court 
may possibly order a compulsory buy-out of those disaffected minority shareholders’ 
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 Lowry, J., Mapping the Boundaries of Unfair Prejudice, in de Lacy, J. (ed), The Reform of United 
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shares. The newly introduced scheme facilitates shareholders’ derivative actions both 
by broadening qualified claimants to include both a member and a prospective-
member who will hold shares in the company as a result of the operation of law, and 
by removing barriers to initiating derivative claims, for example, there is no need to 
show that wrongdoers are persons controlling the company and that the wrongdoers 
benefit from such actions. Also, a member of the company can continue a derivative 
action initiated by a company or some other members so that minority shareholders 
may not be deprived of opportunities to redress their suffering once the company or 
some other member initiates but later stalls the action.89 Nevertheless, it is still too 
early to predict the end result of such statutory stipulations as it is hard to believe that 
the culture established in Foss v Harbottle long before the new act will perish that 
quickly.  
 
2. Others 
For the purpose of this thesis, laws relating to shareholders also include 
regulations on securities markets such as regulations of public offering of shares and 
share trading, regulations of insider dealings. In addition, the Combined Code of 
corporate governance also provides a regulatory regime for shareholders in public 
listed companies. Since they can rightly be covered in the following sections, they 
will not be further discussed here. 
 
PART III. SHAREHOLDERS IN FLOTATIONS 
A. THE ROLE OF CONTRACTS 
For companies going through flotations, shareholders can be discriminated 
into existing shareholders of the (old) private company and shareholders of the new 
public company. On the one hand, existing shareholders play an important role in 
initiating flotations and in designing rights attached to new shares. But on the other 
hand, the shares issued must be attractive enough to new investors. This, in turn, 
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entails a special discussion of the share allotment process, in which institutional 
shareholders and financial intermediaries play important roles. 
 
1. Contracts with Existing Shareholders 
A decision to go public signifies the giving up of contractual control rights by 
existing shareholders in private companies. Once companies go through a flotation 
process, shareholders in the original private company will either choose to be 
shareholders of the new public company, thus accepting new rights and duties 
attached to their shares, or to exit through sales of their shares to other investors. Thus, 
a decision to go public is a result of the balance-striking process between the 
attraction of the bigger public capital market and the dilution of the control rights 
enjoyed by existing shareholders in private companies.90  
 
As controlling shareholding by management is the norm of shareholding 
structure among companies going public, the unity of owners and managers limits the 
application of the separation of ownership from the management. In turn, the decision 
to go public reflects the interests of the majority shareholders or the management. In 
other words, contractual rights implied in shares safeguard the interests of block 
shareholders. But on the other side of the coin, contracts may not be a perfect solution 
to protect the interests of minority shareholders in private companies. If the one-share-
one-vote scheme is adopted in private companies, minority shareholders can hardly 
rebuff the decision made by controlling shareholders. If a cumulative voting structure 
is adopted, it is hardly the case that non-management members will have the 
cumulative voting power. Thus, while the concentrated shareholding structure may 
facilitate the passing of the proposal to go public at the general meeting, it intensifies 
the conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Pagano and 
Röell warn that “in this situation, the main conflict of interest is that between the 
controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders, rather than between hired 
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managers and the generality of shareholders.”91 
 
Moreover, what further complicates the governance structure of the company 
going public is the rather strong control role of venture capitalists, who often have the 
right to appoint members onto the board and that to decide the timing of going public. 
Venture capitalists can achieve such rights either through being shareholders of the 
company going public or through direct contractual arrangements with private 
companies. However, since venture capitalists are more prone to exit and invest 
elsewhere to achieve the highest value of their principal, their interests are different 
from those of founding shareholders. Within this context, the interests of the company 
going public can only be the end result of series of negotiations among different 
participants. Hence, it is hard to conclude that in a company going public, 
shareholders are the only constituency directors are acting for. One scholar points out, 
“[for companies seeking to go public], the agent analogy is inaccurate, the focus is 
outward not inward, and the director’s identification with other social groups may be 
quite as strong as that with the investors.”92 
 
2. The Allotment of New Shares 
(a) The Role of Underwriters in Share Allotment 
Flotations can be structured mainly in two ways in the UK.93 One is through 
an offer for sale, in which financial intermediaries act as principals who sell those 
shares they buy from the issuer company. The difference between the price at which 
they acquire shares from the issuing company and that at which they offer to the 
public is the compensation for the intermediaries who bear the risk that the public do 
not take up the offer. The other is through an offer for subscription, in which the issuer 
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 Pagano, M., and Röell, A., The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and 
the Decision to Go Public, (1998), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113:187-225, at 188. 
92
 Whincop, M., Entrepreneurial Governance, (2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=254169, at 
11. Whincop argues that “The public corporation inhabits a world quite unlike the milieu of the 
entrepreneurial firm. Relation between the entrepreneur and the investor is far more social than that 
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social groups may include investment banks, service providers, trade bodies, fund investors, industry 
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company is the principal while financial intermediaries are agents who do not bear the 
risk of unsold shares.  
 
Since most companies going public are one-time players, the reliance on 
underwriters is apparent. Thus, offer for sale is more often adopted than offer for 
subscription in practice. The issue here is that underpricing is used as a compensation 
for those intermediaries.94 However, for existing shareholders of private companies, 
underpricing in flotations represents a wealth transfer from existing shareholders to 
the underwriter and those new public shareholders.95 Thus, the role of underwriters in 
share allotment in flotations entails a special discussion.   
 
(b) The Implicit Coalition between Institutional Investors and 
Underwriters 
It must be realized that underwriters in flotations are not trustees of the issuer 
company and have their own interests to serve. Considering the strong financial 
power of institutional investors, it is not a surprise to find that underwriters usually 
keep a close relationship with institutional investors. On the one hand, underwriters 
need stable relationships with big subscribers so as to reduce the risk of 
undersubscription. A bad sales record will exacerbate the reputation of an underwriter 
and thus harm its future businesses. 96  On the other hand, fund managers of 
institutional investors require good investments in their portfolio. A stable coalition 
between institutional investors and underwriters thus brings mutual benefits.  
 
Empirical evidence also supports the projected coalition. For example, 
Boehmer et al. demonstrate that underwriters “systematically provide institutions with 
shares in firms that turn out to perform better.” 97  This is partly due to the 
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 For a discussion of the combined implication of underperformance and underpricing in flotations, see 
discussion in the previous chapter. 
95
 Griffith, S., Spinning and Underpricing A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Preferential 
Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, (2004), Brook. L. Rev., 69:583-662. 
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 Booth, J., and Smith, R., Capital Raising, Underwriting, and the Certification Hypothesis, (1986), 
Journal of Financial Economics, 15(1-2):261, and Tinic, S., Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of 
Common Stock, (1988), Journal of Finance, 43(4):789. 
97
 Boehmer, B., et al., Do Institutions Receive Favourable Allocations in IPOs with Better Long Run 
Returns, (2004), University of Miami Working Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=350720. 
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underwriters’ other business opportunities with institutional investors and partly due 
to the institutional investors’ potential status as informed investors in companies going 
public. In fact, studies have also shown that the more information institutional 
investors disclose to underwriters, the more allocation they receive in favourable 
offerings. 98  In sum, a stable coalition between institutional shareholders and 
underwriters can be developed over a long term for mutual benefits. 
 
The coalition between underwriters and institutional investors is also 
evidenced in institutional shareholders’ past experience of collecting underwriting 
commissions on rights issues. The bulk of the standard level of the commissions goes 
to sub-underwriters, the main participants of whom are institutional shareholders. 
Although the law does allow collections of such fees on certain conditions,99 it is still 
possible that institutional shareholders’ large stake in the commission can be 
prejudicial to the interests of other shareholders because institutional shareholders as 
members in the companies going public may take advantage of inside information and 
facilitate the passing of relevant proposals on the commission. Similar concerns were 
also expressed by the Office of Fair Trading, which found that large institutional 
investors earn substantial fees from the company they invested in while the possible 
losers will only be individual investors and other small institutional investors who are 
unable to take part in the sub-underwriting process.100 
 
In sum, the strong role of underwriters in flotations and the stable implicit 
coalition between underwriters and institutional shareholders distorts the contracting 
activities as implied in the dispersed shareholding and one-share-one-vote scheme. 
For one thing, individual investors on the public capital market are accordingly 
double disadvantaged by the information asymmetry concern arising both from 
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 Jenkinson, T., and Jones, H., Bids and Allocations in European IPO Bookbuilding, (2004), Journal of 
Finance, 59(5):2309-2369 and Ljungqvist, A., and Wilhelm, W., IPO Pricing in the Dot-com Bubble, 
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institutional investors and from the private companies. For another, the superiority of 
institutional shareholders to other shareholders may have already come into being 
before the birth of the public company.  
 
(c) Share Allotment to Other Stakeholders 
In flotations, existing contracts with directors and key employees must be 
taken into consideration because compensation contracts with those people usually 
include a term that parts of their compensation package are made up of newly allotted 
shares. Also, as mentioned, venture capitalists may stipulate in their loan contracts 
with the company that part of the new shares should be allotted to them once the 
company goes public.  
 
Allotment of new shares to public investors can only be made after these pre-
flotation contracts between the company and existing stakeholders are satisfied. This 
observation thus provides another perspective to review underpricing of shares in 
flotations. Indeed, underpricing is also to the benefit of these existing contractual right 
holders because these parties may well skim the profits from the discrepancy of share 
prices.101 Thus, if the negotiating power of these stakeholders permits, they may well 
achieve similar protections to those for shareholders by transforming their status into 
shareholders through their pre-flotation contractual arrangements with the company. 
In other words, conflicts between shareholders and stakeholders can be partially 
settled through private contractual arrangements. 
 
B. THE ROLE OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
If flotations were only controlled by contracts, we might expect more violent 
underpricing activities and outside investors, frustrated by the information asymmetry, 
will lose confidence in the entire securities market. Moreover, as said in the last 
section, minority shareholders may have to subject their fate to the decision of 
controlling shareholders. These concerns thus entail legal interventions. 
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1. Information Disclosure 
(a) Prospectus 
Given the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders in flotations, 
the law requires detailed information disclosure. Specifically, a prospectus is required 
of companies engaging in a flotation so as to provide public investors, or potential 
shareholders, with a standard statutory contract, a contract which can save transaction 
costs of public investors.102 A contravention of relevant stipulations of prospectus may 
constitute a criminal offence.103 Also, any significant change of the situation must be 
filed to the FSA for approval.104 The offeror will be responsible for any loss of public 
investors caused by the inaccuracy in the listing particulars. 105  Alternatively, a 
subscriber may also rescind the share allotment contract if he can prove that his 
subscription is made on the faith of the contents of the prospectus.106  
 
(b) Disclosure of Shareholding  
While shareholders in private companies are not required to disclose their 
shareholding, a flotation may initiate stringent disclosure obligation on relevant 
parties under the company law.107 Indeed, a public company can require any person to 
disclose information about his interests in its shares.108 Moreover, vote holdings by 
concerted parties will be calculated cumulatively as shareholdings by one party.109 
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 See the Prospectus Regulation (EC) No1606/2002, FSMA 2000 s90 and Sch.10. The requirement of 
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In fact, the shareholding structure of a company going through flotations will 
have to be changed to make their shares attractive to the public investors and to meet 
the liquidity requirements of the exchange where the stocks are listed.110 In addition, 
for listed companies, transparency rules dictates shareholders, and those with rights to 
acquire shares, must simultaneously disclose to both the issuer and the FSA of 
changes of their major shareholding. In contrast to the disclosure of interest in shares 
in company law,111 transparency rules of the FSA pay attention to the “notifiable 
interest” in holdings of 3% or more of the issuer’s total voting rights.112 Accordingly, 
any change from below 3% to 3% or a change of a whole percentage over 3%, is 
required to be disclosed. Such disclosure may effectively help the company to identify 
the major shareholders (or potential shareholders) who can exercise their meaningful 
voting rights to make a difference to the decision making process. 
 
Once companies go through the flotation process, block stake building is not 
easy either. Indeed, due to the stringent shareholding disclosure requirements, 
especially the function of mandatory bid rule, blockholding in listed companies 
abruptly tapers off at 30%.113 Moreover, controlling shareholders are also required to 
keep an arm’s length relationship with the company by the London Stock Exchange 
both through the Listing Rules and the Relationship Agreement signed with the listed 
companies.114 Nevertheless, it must be realized that coalitions among shareholders, 
especially institutional shareholders, can substantially change the voting structure of 
most listed companies.115 
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 DTR 5.1.2 R.  
113
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(c) Insider Dealing 
Regulations of information disclosure also include relevant stipulations on 
insider dealing activities. Given the potential coalition between institutional 
shareholders and the underwriter, institutional investors may well be considered as 
insiders who receive price sensitive information not available to the general public 
before the transaction. The potential liabilities under insider dealing laws and 
regulations may thus frustrate institutional shareholders from proactive participation 
in the corporate governance during this period.  
 
(d) Disclosure of Lock-Up Agreements116 
Disposition of shares by directors and substantial shareholders may make a 
difference to the share price of the new public company. Thus, lock-up agreements 
signed between directors, substantial shareholders and the company are required to be 
disclosed in the prospectus.117  
 
A mandatory disclosure of lock-up agreements has two benefits. On the one 
hand, such a requirement largely plays a role of signaling, through which public 
investors can overcome the information asymmetry concern. On the other hand, a 
disclosure requirement, in contrast to a mandatory expiry date, can effectively retain 
the flexibility provided by contractual arrangements, through which contracting 
parties may design contractual terms according to their own conditions. For instance, 
for owner directors in high tech companies, a longer lock-up period with a distant 
fixed expiry date may be a price paid for the information asymmetry. Since investors 
in such companies are more concerned with the future cash flow rather than historic 
figures in the accounts, a fixed but distant expiry date on lock-up agreements may 
thus be preferred by investors to an expiry date which, as usually prescribed in lock-
up agreements of other companies, is tied with such events as the announcements of 
financial results and the publication of annual or interim reports.118 
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2. Minority Shareholder Protection 
It is true that an efficient capital market may well induce good governance 
practices by its pricing process because  
“Prospective minority shareholders will realize that the owner-
manager’s interests will diverge somewhat from theirs; hence the price 
which they will pay for shares will reflect the monitoring costs and the 
effect of the divergence between the manager’s interest and theirs.”119  
 
Thus, if minority shareholders are necessary participants in an efficient capital 
market, we may observe that corporations with sound minority shareholder protection 
can raise capital easily and cheaply. However, public capital markets in reality are 
never as efficient as scholars presume. In fact, an issuer company may well consider 
interests of institutional shareholders more important than those of minority 
shareholders. A total reliance on the efficiency of the capital market to protect 
minority shareholders may be too risky. Indeed, as discussed in the previous section, 
the intensive conflict between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders is 
one of the main governance concerns in companies going public. Legal intervention is 
thus necessary for the interests of minority shareholders.   
 
While controlling shareholders do not owe statutory fiduciary duties to 
minority shareholders, the Prospectus Rules require that major shareholders and the 
nature of the potential control of major shareholders on the issuer be disclosed and 
that measures be in place to avoid the misuse of such control.120 Moreover, minority 
shareholders in private companies going public may resort to the statutory litigation 
rights. However, minority shareholders’ derivative actions for the company may not 
be a reliable remedy as the company’s decision to go public can hardly be argued as 
against the interests of the company. In such cases, minority shareholders may rely on 
                                                                                                                                            
the company over the precise timing of the lock-up expiry date as directors can in practice decide the 
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UK, (2001), Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 28 (9/10):1235-1278. 
119
 Jensen, M., and Meckling, W., Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure, (1976), J. Fin. Econ., 3:305.  
120
 PR Appendix 3.1, Annex 1 18.3.  
Chapter 3. Shareholders 
January 2008 96 
s459 of the Companies Act 1985121 or s212 of the Insolvency Act 1986. While s459 
will apply if unfair prejudice is proved, the valuation of the shares in the private 
company may still be a big concern. In comparison, s212 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
may not be applicable as it is hard to argue why a company going public should face a 
threat of dissolution on a just and equitable basis. Thus, even though legal 
intervention on minority shareholder protection provides a meaningful supplement to 
the disadvantaged position of minority shareholders in their contractual arrangement 
with the company, the net effect may be limited.  
 
In addition to these corporate rules on information disclosure and minority 
shareholder protections, shareholders also enjoy other statutory rights applicable to 
the threshold of flotation. For instance, shareholders’ approval is usually required for 
both an increase in the share capital122 and a change of the nature of the company.123 
Discussion in this Part thus shows that benefits from this alternative capital source are 
achieved at the expenses of wide and stringent disclosure of any skeletons in the 
cupboard and the potential strict discipline on the public capital market. 
 
PART IV. SHAREHOLDERS IN TAKEOVERS 
A. THE ROLE OF CONTRACTS 
The importance here is the role of contracts for shareholders of the offeree 
company. For offeror shareholders, the role of contracts is mainly expressed through 
the shareholding, or vote holding structure of the company, an issue which is similar 
to that discussed in Part II. 
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1. Share Transfer 
(a) The Block Vote Holding Structure 
Due to the contractual nature of shares, a takeover transaction is actually 
undertaken by the offeror company with each individual shareholder in the offeree 
company. The dispersed shareholding structure norm among public companies in the 
UK accordingly indicates that the offeror may have to negotiate with a large group of 
individual shareholders to transfer the control of the offeree company.   
 
However, as said, what matters is the voting structure rather than the 
shareholding structure of the offeree company. Since a fund manager is usually in 
charge of funds from several institutional shareholders, he can exercise aggregate 
voting rights in one company even though each institutional shareholder only holds a 
minor shareholding. In other words, a block voting rights holding structure is still a 
real possibility in public companies with dispersed shareholding structures. 
Alternatively, if the potential target is a private company, a block shareholding 
structure, or the block voting right holding structure, is the norm. Thus, block 
shareholders in private companies and block vote rights holders in public companies 
play important roles in takeover transactions. 
 
This on the one hand may potentially reduce the number of share transfer 
contracts and the efforts involved in negotiating relevant contracts but on the other 
hand indicate that block voting rights holders can decide the fate of the takeover offer. 
Whereas block voting right holders can function as continuing internal monitors of 
discretionary management and accentuates the voice oriented insider control,124  they 
can also constrain the outside monitoring of the market for corporate control through 
frustration by exercising their voting rights.  
 
In both cases, given the marginal negotiating power and influence of minority 
shareholders in the corporate decision making process, it is justifiable for minority 
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shareholders to free ride on the monitoring of block voting rights holders. 
Alternatively, frustration of block shareholders or block voting rights holders may 
also bring benefits to minority shareholders since frustration by the blockholders can 
enhance the negotiating power of shareholders as a whole. In turn, free-riding 
minority shareholders in a takeover may retain their shares waiting for more 
premiums arising from the increasing offer price by the offeror or from competing 
offers from other potential offerors. 125  Therefore, while the disciplinary role of 
takeover transactions may be discounted by frustrations of block voting right holders, 
the net effect on shareholders, especially on minority shareholders, is not clear.  
 
(b) The Implication of Directors’ Shareholdings 
Another noticed character of the shareholding structure in the UK is that 
directors, with the inclusion of Non-Executive-Directors, hold an average 10% of all 
the shareholdings, recorded as the largest single blockholder in the UK.126 Such a 
blockholding may be attributed to the pre-flotation arranged share allotment in 
compensation packages for directors. While directors’ shareholding may help to align 
the conflicting interests between directors and shareholders, its effect on the market 
for corporate control in the UK is worth a second thought.  
 
It is widely claimed that the market for corporate control is shareholder-
favored as it is shareholders, not directors, who will decide the fate of any potential 
offer. In comparison, directors are marginalized to play a role of loyal consultants in 
the decision making process. However, director shareholders can vote for their own 
interests as shareholders per se. It is thus hard to eliminate the concern of the interest 
conflicts between director-shareholders as significant block holders and other non-
director-shareholders. Thus, the observed blockholding by directors may partially 
discount the decision-making role of shareholder on the market for corporate control. 
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2. Institutional Shareholders’ Activism-- A Substitute for the 
Market for Corporate Control? 
As discussed, dispersed shareholding in individual companies in the UK is 
overshadowed by a concentrated shareholding by institutional shareholders in the 
corporate sector. Since coalitions among institutional shareholders are well 
established, it is thus reasonable to project that proactive voices from institutional 
shareholders may settle the governance concern from within. In that case, will the 
market for corporate control be superfluous?  
 
The answer to that question is a conservative no. It is true that the current 
promotion of shareholders’ activism, especially the proactive role of institutional 
shareholders, has been widely supported even from the institutional shareholders 
themselves. However, as discussed, institutional shareholders have their own 
insurmountable agency concerns. Moreover, non-interference is a cost-benefit 
selection for institutional shareholders, whose shareholding in any individual 
company is very small. In fact, most empirical evidence testifies little, if any, positive 
effects of institutional shareholders in corporate governance at the company level.127  
 
Besides, it seems persuasive to argue that proactive interventions by 
institutional shareholders at individual companies is only possible when “institutions 
come to perceive it to be in their own self-interest to intervene more extensively or 
legal or regulatory controls require such intervention on the part of the 
institutions.”128 Accordingly, Davies has linked the less hospitable environment for 
sale, rather than the initiative of these institutional shareholders, with the transitory 
spate of institutional shareholders’ activism in the 1990s in the UK.129 If this is the 
case, the claimed institutional shareholders’ activism may just be promoted at a right 
time rather than be adopted as the right solution to the agency problem inherent in the 
management of institutional shareholders.  
 
On the other hand, even if institutional shareholders play their due role as 
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active monitors, they are not necessarily the opposite pole to the market for corporate 
control. An active internal monitoring is a good choice during peaceful years as it is 
more assuasive and less destructive than the external monitoring of the market for 
corporate control. However, the potential loss arising from the failure of the internal 
governance scheme is so grave, as what happened in the Enron and WorldCom cases, 
that a total reliance on it is inadvisable. Given these considerations, some other 
mechanisms to discipline those unscrupulous directors are still in need.  
 
Indeed, if an over-reliance on the court or the regulatory authority is not 
preferable, a reliance on the market for corporate control can be an expedient. For one 
thing, the threat and the replacing effects of the market for corporate control are non-
comparable. For another, institutional activism and the market for corporate control 
can well function complementarily as monitoring tools of the discretion of the 
management.  
 
In addition, the market for corporate control has other functions than 
monitoring, such as the entrance to another market or the merger of another 
competitor in the same line, which cannot be substituted by the internal governance 
scheme. Hence, as for the relationship between the rise of institutional shareholders 
and the market for corporate control, Carleton et al. provide us with a rather fair view: 
“Institutional activism …… is not a substitute for the hostile 
takeover market …… that results in large operational changes, but rather 
a way in which institutions spend small quantities of resources to achieve 
modest goals.”130 
 
3. Sources of Gains for Offeree Shareholders  
Gains or losses for shareholders are usually assessed in terms of the change of 
stock prices. An undisputed fact is that takeovers generate substantial gains to offeree 
shareholders. 131  All studies, whatever the time period or acquisitive form, find 
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statistically significant positive abnormal returns to offeree shareholders on the 
announcement of an offer. In comparison, the evidence on returns to offeror 
shareholders is less clear-cut: depending on the time period and the company sample, 
offeror shareholders experience positive, negative, or statistically insignificant 
abnormal returns. Several studies of offeror companies in the US and UK have found 
that offeror shareholders exhibit a negative drift in their abnormal returns in the post 
merger period over the long-run.132 In the UK, the study by Sudarsanam et al. shows 
that offeree shareholders report a general gain of 30% while those of offeror 
companies report losses around 5% and that shareholders in general are reported with 
an overall return at 2%.133  Given the usually bigger size of the offeror company 
compared with that of the offeree company, the net gain to shareholders in general, if 
any, is small.134  
 
However, explanations for the potential sources of gains for offeree 
shareholders are diverse and indeterminate. Positive studies indicate that the gain 
derives from the reduction of agency costs, or from synergistic effect of takeover 
activities.135 In contrast, other studies show that gains for offeree shareholders are 
merely wealth redistribution among participants. For example, some scholars have 
posited that takeover gains may be a wealth transfer from labour.136 Alternatively, 
Cosh and Guest notice that the significant improvements in profit returns in the post-
hostile-takeover period are associated with significant asset disposals, potentially 
prejudicing the interests of creditors, or employees who are employed for the reason 
of the existence of those assets.137  
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In terms of contracts, negative evidence almost all points to the externality 
effect of the contracts between offeree shareholders and the offeror company. Still, the 
co-existence of the losses suffered by different participants and the gains for offeree 
shareholders is too weak a support for the theory of wealth transfer theories. In fact, 
gains for offeree shareholders may only be a response of the securities market to the 
management efforts, the end result of which cannot be predicted accurately but can 
only be reflected in the short term fluctuation of share prices. Such gains may not 
necessarily come from other stakeholders in the offeree and/or the offeror company 
but from arising demands of the shares of the offeree company (for example, merely 
due to the speculation of the shares of the offeree company on the securities market). 
In other words, gains for offeree shareholders may just be the result of a reallocation 
of assets in society as a whole rather than a wealth transfer or redistribution between 
offeree shareholders and stakeholders within either the offeree company or the offeror 
company.  
 
So we need more sound and direct empirical evidence to support the causal 
relationship. To negate the positive effects of the market for corporate control on the 
basis of the co-existence of gains for shareholders and loss of stakeholders may 
unduly exaggerate the conflict between shareholders and other stakeholders at the 
company level and thus may only be misleading.  
 
B. THE ROLE OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
1. Shareholders of the Offeree Company 
(a) Shareholders’ Decision Making Power 
i) Justifications for Shareholders’ Decision-making Power 
In essence, the rules settle the conflicts of interests between shareholders and 
the board by putting the decision right in the hands of shareholders. If the offer 
succeeds, it is the private contracts between individual offeree shareholders and the 
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offeror company that will take effect. Indeed, such a legal scheme sidesteps the usual 
decision-making process by directors, a process in which stakeholders may have 
opportunities to claim their interests. Shareholder primacy at least partially supersedes 
director primacy in case of takeovers.   
 
However, would a sharing of decision-making power between shareholders 
and other stakeholders in case of takeover be more efficient? Here, we should refer to 
the inhuman nature of shareholders. 138  The rather uniform interests among 
shareholders simplify their decision making processes, aligning well with the rapid 
nature of takeover transactions. In comparison, other participants do not have similar 
efficient voting systems to make decisions for the company in cases of takeovers. In 
fact, considering the customary contents of the company law and the routine decision 
making process, stakeholders’ direct intervention in decision making is not the norm 
even when companies are going concerns. Thus, an abrupt intervention by 
stakeholders in takeovers may not seem consistent. For this, the argument of Davies is 
pertinent: 
“Probably, effective stakeholder protection requires general 
corporate mechanisms for building their interests into the governance of 
the company, which mechanisms continue to operate into the bid situation, 
rather than ad hoc amendments to the principle of shareholder control 
which are triggered only when a takeover is in prospect.”139  
 
On the other hand, while it is right to say that the ultimate objective of the 
interests of shareholders is financially orientated, it is hardly so to say that the 
decision making process is a purely financial one. It should be remembered that the 
interests of all stakeholders may have to be considered by directors when they present 
their view on the takeover offer to the decision makers, i.e., shareholders. Moreover, 
even though mere consideration of financial concerns for shareholders may be 
feasible in some individual transactions, it may not be the case if a series of 
transactions occur or if the effect on the stakeholders as classes in society is so grave 
that such transactions may engender intensive social political conflicts in the wider 
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society.140 In other words, shareholders’ pure financial decision making process is 
largely not possible in modern society.  
 
ii) The Receding Status of Directors 
In stark contrast to the great discretion usually conferred on directors through 
Article 70 in Table A, General Principle 3 of the Takeover Code, in combination with 
the more concrete contents in Rules 21, retain in the hands of offeree shareholders the 
decision making rights of the takeover bids. Moreover, anti-takeover measures are 
extremely restricted by the Takeover Code and no such steps can be taken by the 
board of the offeree company without prior approval from its shareholders.141 This is 
the case even when the board of the offeree company has reason to believe that a bona 
fide offer is imminent. Also, the non-frustration principle must be understood bearing 
in mind that it is the effects, rather than the intention or the reasonableness, of the 
directors’ action that the Takeover Code regulates. 
 
In addition, the non-frustration principle for directors must be considered with 
the proactive role of directors to seek professional advice on the takeover offer and 
provide offeree shareholders with a fair and objective view of the offer. 142  The 
preliminary review of directors’ response to the offer by offeree shareholders as a 
class largely reduces the complex relationship between the offeror company and the 
offeree company into that between the offeror company and the offeree 
shareholders.143 Viewed from this perspective, the implication of the non-frustration 
principle for directors is that directors are relegated to the status as information-
providers or proposal persuaders.144  
 
Contrariwise, anti-takeover measures are not without benefits to shareholders. 
It is true that anti-takeover measures adopted after takeover bids can significantly 
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lower the probability of the success of an offer.145 However, it has also been observed 
that the market for corporate control plays its due role of monitoring as successful 
resistance in takeover battles is usually followed by measures to remove inefficiency 
in the internal governance structure.146 If this is the fact, anti-takeover measures may 
in some cases be adopted for the mutual benefits of both shareholders and the 
incumbent management, or in other words, a kind of coalition between shareholders 
and incumbent management may in fact be a possible projection.  
 
Still, anti-takeover measures in the UK must be considered with the dominant 
promotive attitude to takeover transactions. It is the strong monitoring role of the 
market for control that compels internal governance improvements. Alternatively, the 
potential coalition between shareholders and the incumbent management may only be 
a reflection of the lack of confidence of shareholders in the management in general. In 
such cases, newcomers may not be better than the acquaintances for existing 
shareholders. Thus, except for an attractive financial gain through the gimmick of 
takeovers, shareholders may instead prefer incumbent management to the newcomers. 
 
iii) Shareholders’ Information Right 
Even though directors are required to provide valuable information to 
shareholders in takeovers, information flow to shareholders is in fact a continuing 
process, as evidenced by the continuing obligation of the company to communicate 
information to shareholders by circulars as set out in the Listing Rules.147  Thus, 
shareholders can decide the fate of an offer on the basis of a chain of information 
disclosed by the company. Besides, shareholders are also granted adequate time to 
make informed decisions.148  
 
On the whole, it is clear that corporate rules in the UK aim to facilitate the 
occurrence of takeovers in the first place. To lay the decision rights in the hands of 
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shareholders, rather than the other stakeholders, is to limit the discretion of directors 
and to meet the requirement of economic efficiency. In other words, shareholders’ 
decision-making rights in cases of takeovers are parts of the mechanism to strengthen 
the accountability of directors rather than to establish the superiority of shareholders 
to other stakeholders. Moreover, shareholders’ decision making process should not be 
bluntly identified with a pure financial decision making process. In fact, a due 
consideration of the potential feedback from other stakeholders may well transform 
shareholders’ decision-making process into a mutli-criteria decision making process.   
 
(b) Minority Shareholder Protection 
 Once a person controls a company when he, and his concerted party, holds 
“an interest, or interests, in shares carrying in aggregate 30% or more of the voting 
rights of a company, irrespective of whether such interest or interests give de facto 
control,”149 General Principle 1 of the Takeover Code requires that “the other holders 
of securities must be protected.” Protections for shareholders are thus of special 
importance in the Takeover Code. 
 
i) Equality Principle in the Takeover Code 
Since takeover offers are actually made individually to each offeree 
shareholder, the resulting atomized decision-making process provides the offeror 
company with opportunities to differentiate shareholders by offering different terms of 
transaction to shareholders in different classes. On the other hand, even though the 
majority rule can decide the fate of the offer, minority shareholders should have equal 
opportunities to tender their shares and acquire their parts of the premium. We thus 
observe another principle central to the Takeover Code, i.e., the equal treatment of 
shareholders in the same class, the aim of which is to preclude exploitation of 
minority shareholders.150  
 
The equality principle is indeed a ‘sharing’ rule, which requires premiums 
payable for the transfer of the control of the offeree company to be shared 
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proportionately among different classes of shareholders.151 Within the same class, this 
principle dictates equality among all class members. Hence, in case of takeover offers, 
all members of the same class must be offered the same terms, both as regards price 
and methods (the availability of the cash alternative or share alternative). This applies 
equally to shareholders who decline the original offer but later sell as a result of the 
exercise of squeeze-out rights by the offeror or sell-out rights by minority 
shareholders of the offeree company. Through these stipulations, minority 
shareholders are given a chance to exit from the company with a fair compensation. 
 
The equality principle can also be reflected in the cautionary attitude of the 
Takeover Code to the partial bid.152 A partial bid may transfer the control of the 
company secretly, with the result that outside shareholders have no knowledge of such 
a transfer or have to receive less benefit at a later stage, or have to accept the status as 
minority in the company under a new control. Thus, a strict vetting by the Panel will 
be expected and a prior approval from the Panel is required. For example, a partial bid 
made after a secret stake building within the preceding 12 months which grants the 
offeror company a strategic advantage on the corporate control will be denied by the 
Panel as the Panel assumes that the ensuing partial bid to the outside shareholders is 
unfair.153  
 
ii) Mandatory Bid Rule 
The Takeover Code imposes on the offeror company a mandatory duty to 
make an offer for all the other shares in the company if the offeror company acquires 
30% or more of the voting shares in the offeree company.154 In case of a mandatory 
offer, the price must be at least as high as the price at which the offeror company 
acquired the shares over the past twelve months. If there are different classes of 
offeree shareholders, the Code requires of a separate and comparable offer for each 
class of shareholders.155  This may entail a compulsory bid for shares in different 
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classes on totally different acquisition terms.  
 
The mandatory bid rule is important for those minority shareholders who do 
not accept the offer. 156 According to this rule, disaffected minority shareholders will 
still enjoy a unilateral exit right at fair terms for their shares if they do not want to 
retain in the new company as minority under the new control. More broadly, the 
mandatory bid rule is also beneficial to the interests of the whole company. Since the 
mandatory bid rule targets the transfer of control over the whole assets of a company 
by acquiring only a proportion of shares, it can effectively curb the discretion of 
controllers to misuse their control status for private purposes and also help to 
distribute the control of the assets to better users. 
 
iii) The Duty of Controlling Shareholders 
Moreover, as control is defined in the Takeover Code in terms of voting 
rights,157 the role of the fund managers, who usually control a special block of voting 
rights through their control of several institutional shareholding in the offeree 
company, is of special importance in takeover transactions. In order to constrain the 
discretion of fund managers, voting rights under the control of a fund manager are 
calculated cumulatively. 158  Thus, coalitions among institutional shareholders are 
under strict review of the Takeover Panel. 
 
iv) Other Regulations 
Minority shareholders in takeovers are protected not only by the Takeover 
Code but also by the Companies Act 2006. Once the offeror accumulates 90% in 
value of the offer, the offeror has a right to purchase the 10% remaining. 159 
Correspondingly, a minority shareholder may also ask the offeror company to buy out 
his shares once the offeror company has accumulated 90% of the value of all the 
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shares of the company or that of all the shares in the class the minority shareholder 
belongs to.160 Such stipulations thus provide minority shareholders a chance to select 
to stay put or to exit.  
 
Besides, a dissenting shareholder who receives a compulsory acquisition 
notice can also, within six weeks from the date of the sell-out notice, apply to the 
court for an order that the offeror should not be entitled and bound to acquire the 
shares or request the court to specify terms of the offers.161 Since the court usually do 
not reduce the consideration of the offer, a dissenting minority shareholder who can 
successfully show that the offer value is unfair can accordingly apply for a 
consideration above the offer value.162 An offeror who receives a notice from such 
applicants may in fact stop the squeeze-out as the offeror has to inform such a 
situation to the other shareholders being squeezed out or who are exercising their 
selling-out rights.163 
 
(c) Stake Building in Offeree Companies 
Balanced with the promotive attitude to takeover transactions is the stringent 
disclosure requirement of the stake building of potential offeror companies. With the 
abolition of the Substantial Acquisitions of Shares in late 2006, the speed of 
acquisition of voting rights with a result of less than 30% of the total voting rights is 
largely out of the control of the Takeover Code.164 However, a change of voting rights 
to 30% or over 30% of the total voting rights is still in need of prior approval of the 
Takeover Panel. 165  Besides, such offers must normally be conditional on having 
received acceptance, including agreement to be acquired, of over 50% of the voting 
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rights not held by the offeror and persons acting in concert with it.166 If the offeror 
already holds a significant voting right in the company before the offer, the effect of 
the abovementioned requirement will be very stark because the higher percentage of 
voting the offeror already holds, the considerably higher degree of positive actions 
from outside shareholders is needed.  
 
As prescribed in the definition of control, the threshold of 30%, which is lower 
than 50% as the majority rule implies, “to a large extent stops the management being 
hamstrung by a large shareholder who obstructs without controlling.”167 Indeed, this 
threshold is just the threshold which initiates the mandatory bid rules. The chilling 
effect of the mandatory bid rule on stake building is apparent as empirical evidence 
has documented that some shareholders just limit their control stake right below the 
threshold in order to avoid the initiation of the mandatory purchase bid.168 
 
In addition, legal rules on the maintenance of the percentage of the shares in 
which a person has already been interested is still in place. Indeed, any change of 1% 
or more of any class of relevant securities of an offeror or offeree company during an 
offer period is required to be disclosed.169 Thus, the speed of stake building is still 
subject to disclosure, though no longer control, during the offer period. 
 
The exposed and restricted stake building in the UK can in fact work as 
deterrents to the occurrence of takeovers. Additionally, special consideration—cash or 
cash alternative in transactions may also impose a further financial impediment on 
offeror companies.170 Thus, the disclosure scheme in takeovers in reality provides the 
offeree company an opportunity to identify potential offeror companies and also in 
some way an opportunity to seek self-defence or favourable white knights.  
 
Alternatively, the stringent restriction on stake building can substantially 
increase the cost of block holding, a situation which may help to form the dispersed 
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shareholding. 171  Thus, stringent disclosure of interests and that of the change of 
interests in shares in takeovers not only constrain the observed pro-takeover stance 
widely recognized in the regulation of takeovers but also help to shape the dispersed 
shareholding structure in the corporate sector in the UK. In other words, regulations 
specific to takeover transactions may produce ripple effects on corporate governance 
practices when companies are in their normal life.   
 
2. Shareholders of the Offeror Company 
Empirical evidence in the second chapter has shown us that even though 
takeovers may bring a premium to offeree shareholders, returns to offeror 
shareholders are modest or negative. As Gregory summarized, post-takeover 
performance is ‘not compatible with shareholder wealth maximising behaviour on the 
part of acquiring firms’ management’.172 Thus, it is precarious to draw the conclusion 
that takeover transactions help to align the interests of the management with those of 
shareholders at least from the perspective of the offeror company.  
 
Generally, the Takeover Code does not pay attention to offeror shareholders. 
However, general corporate rules on shareholders’ approval of the issued share capital 
incremental and any delay of the payment of dividends declared173 may be relevant. 
Moreover, company law stipulations on financial assistance for purchases of own 
shares may be of special importance if the takeover transaction is made on a share-
for-share transfer.174  
 
Besides, if the offeror company is of a similar size to or a smaller size than 
that of the offeree company, i.e., when a “reverse takeover” arises, the offeror board 
may face conflicts of interests if there are significant cross-shareholdings between the 
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two companies, or an overlap of directorship, or if a person has a substantial interest 
in both companies.175 The Takeover Code accordingly requires the offeror board to 
obtain competent independent advice on such issues. In addition, financing for the 
offeror company may be inevitable in reverse takeovers. If the offeror company 
further wants to raise capital through a rights issue, existing shareholders may enjoy 
the benefits of the mandatory pre-emptive rights if such rights are not defaulted.176 
Accordingly, minority shareholders can be protected in proportion to their original 
shareholding.  
 
Alternatively, Listing Rules also stipulate that shareholders’ approval is 
required if the transaction may lead to a reverse takeover or if the value of the assets 
of the proposed acquisition or disposition exceeds 25% of the assets, profits, turnover, 
market capitalization, or gross capital of the offeror company.177  
 
C. SHAREHOLDERS IN GOING PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS 
Once an offeror acquires or agrees to acquire 75% or more of the voting rights 
of the offeree company, the offeror must notify the circumstance to offeree 
shareholders so that remaining offeree shareholders can decide whether to continue 
their holding of the shares of the company. 178 As the percentage of the shares of the 
offeree company in public hands falls below 25%, the listing status of the offeree 
company will be cancelled.179 The end result of such transactions is usually that the 
public company will be transferred into a private company. We will discuss this type 
of transactions in this section. 
 
1. Vote Trading 
The current resurgence of private equity and hedge fund backed ‘going 
private’ transactions has already changed the vista of shareholders’ voting activities. 
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Taking advantage of creative financial derivatives, such funds can exercise abnormal 
voting rights at shareholders’ meetings. For example, by using short selling, pension 
funds can borrow shares and the attached voting rights before the meeting and 
exercise those voting rights for their specific strategic purposes.180 Thus, these funds 
are distinctively active compared with traditional institutional shareholders.181  
 
The essence of vote trading is the transfer of voting rights which are separated 
from the co-existing cash flow rights. In practice, some votes are even sold for zero, 
indicating that some sellers just want to transfer the vote to others, who may exercise 
them more effectively and efficiently due to, for example, buyers’ information 
advantage.182 Given the recent success of such funds, an important implication of vote 
trading is the potential widespread action in concert among other shareholders.183 As a 
result, shareholders with disproportionate voting rights may distort the vote control 
structure of a company as implied in the one-share-one-vote and dispersed 
shareholding norm.  
 
The Takeover Panel, after consultation, decided not to deem share borrowing 
and lending per se as dealings for the purpose of acting in concert though a person 
will be treated as interested in the securities he has lent but not in those securities he 
has borrowed.184 Such regulations, again, prioritize the self-regulatory role of market 
itself. The end result of such regulations is still too early to tell. 
 
                                                 
180
 FSA, Short Selling, (2002), Discussion Paper 17. Short selling usually involve four transactions 1) 
securities are sold short; 2) same number of securities is borrowed to meet the requirement of the buyer; 
3) same number of securities are purchased at some later date; and 4) the purchased securities are 
returned to the lender. The artificially designed separation of the shares with voting rights from the 
economic owner may help borrower achieve its own agenda on the shareholders meeting. See Geczy, 
C. , et al., Stocks Are Special Too: An Analysis of the Equity Lending Market, (2002), Journal of 
Financial Economics, 66:241-269; and Hu, H., and Black, B., Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the 
Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 
(2006), Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(2-3):347-367, also available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=874098. 
181
 Kahan, M., and Rock, E., Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, (2006), 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 155(5): 1021-1093, also available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=919881. 
182
 This is testified by the less vote trading in the UK (compared with that in the US) where governance 
standards warn of misuse of votes. See Christoffersen, S., et al., Vote Trading and Information 
Aggregation, (2007), Journal of Finance, forthcoming, ECGI Working Paper No.141/2007, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=686026. 
183
 FSA, Private Equity, para.4.35. 
184
 Takeover Code r. 8, also see the Takeover Panel, Dealings in Derivatives and Options, PCP 2005/2, 
issued on 13 May 2005, para.6.37. 
Chapter 3. Shareholders 
January 2008 114 
2. Fair Treatment of Shareholders in Going Private 
Transactions 
The proactive role of hedge funds and private equity can be apparent on both 
the selling side and the buying side. With their voting rights, such funds can either 
argue for a much better price by rebuffing an offer so that other offeree shareholders 
can benefit from the premium or facilitate a takeover offer to displace the incumbent 
management. Alternatively, if they hold shares of the offeror company, they may force 
the offeror company to reconsider an excessive bid price.185  
 
Despite the positive evidence on going private transactions, fair treatment of 
dissenting shareholders is of special importance in such transactions. It is true that 
dissenting shareholders in such transactions can get a fair price for their shares. Still, 
the disapplication of relevant Listing Rules may deprive them of the benefits of 
mandatory information disclosure and much worse their shares can no longer enjoy 
the liquidity provided by the stock exchange. Accordingly, it may be more advisable 
for dissenting shareholders to exit than to remain in the private company. However, 
the justice of this process is worthy of a second thought since the positive financial 
gains may well be achieved through alternative routes.186  
 
Moreover, buyout transactions are also a menace to the check and balance 
mechanism implicit in the governance scheme. 187  For one thing, minority 
shareholders are deprived of a right to pursue their own economic benefits. Vote-
controlling shareholders can take advantage of their legal control of the board to 
influence the biding policies. Viewed from this perspective, vote-controlling 
shareholders’ exercise of their voting rights impinge upon the property rights of the 
minority shareholders and lead to unfair dealing by breaching the free consent rule. 
For another, even though directors are agents of the company, their fiduciary duty to 
the company is dramatically distorted by the existence of the vote-controlling 
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shareholders, who can re-elect board members to their own interests. In other words, 
“the controllers’ powers defeats the system of checks and balances established in the 
system of corporate governance.”188 
 
D. SHAREHOLDER SUPREMACY IN TAKEOVERS? 
It is true that the City Code did state that “it is the interests of shareholders as 
a whole that directors shall take care of”.189 This focus created by the City Code and 
other rules relevant to takeovers has been challenged by scholars with a stakeholder 
orientated view of corporate governance. Even though the evidence regarding the 
overall effect of hostile takeovers is still inconsistent, “What can be said with some 
confidence is that the City Code sets up a regime that focuses director attention in the 
conduct of a bid on the immediate question of whether it is in shareholders’ best 
interests to accept a tender offer.”190 
 
However, the City Code does not compare supremacy of the interests of 
shareholder with those of the other stakeholders. Furthermore, it is necessary to 
understand the difference between the means and the ends. What the Code stated was 
not the objectives of the regulation but the means to regulate the behaviour of 
directors. To take care of the interests of shareholders as a whole has special meanings 
in the City Code: 1) equal treatment among shareholders, i.e., shareholders should not 
be treated differently within the same class, and 2) directors are required to put the 
interests of shareholders, collectively, before their own interests. Since the former 
point is to avoid the potential coalition between some shareholders and directors, it 
can be concluded that the promotion of shareholders’ interests in takeovers is a 
safeguard against the discretion of self-interested directors.  
 
Recently, in alignment with s172 of the Companies Act 2006, the General 
Principles of the Takeover Code restate that “the board of the offeree company must 
act in the interests of the company as whole” and the board of the offeree company 
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must also present its own view on the potential effects of the bid on “employment, 
conditions of employment and the locations of the company’s places of business.” In 
other words, even though shareholders are still the cynosure of the Takeover Code, the 
Takeover Code expressly states that shareholders are not the only consideration for 
offeree boards, more or less mitigating the claim of supremacy of shareholders in 
takeovers. This is, however, largely a legal recognition of the management reality of 
directors’ multi-criteria decision making process.   
 
PART V. SHAREHOLDERS IN INSOLVENCY 
Shareholders’ interests in insolvency are clearly determined by the stance of 
corporate insolvency law. A legal scheme which aims to save a company as a going 
concern is totally different from a legal scheme that aims to wind up a distressed 
company so as to distribute anything left. With the former being the objective of 
insolvency law, it will be hard to deny the role of shareholders in the rescue process. 
This is especially the case where a strong pro-management attitude is adopted. For 
instance, the insolvency procedure under Chapter 11 of the US bankruptcy law is 
initiated by the incumbent management, with whom shareholders can accordingly 
press creditors to accept some compromised terms either by delaying the legal 
procedure or by asking for a judicial evaluation, the result of which may be different 
from that made by the creditors alone. Indeed, according to one study, shareholders in 
the US actually never end up with nothing.191  
 
For an insolvency system with the latter objective, the liquidation scheme is 
accentuated and the interests of creditors are prioritized. Interests of shareholders are 
considered with the ultimate objective to safeguard the interests of creditors. However, 
a promotion of the corporate rescue culture with adherence to the pro-creditors 
principle can also benefit shareholders. This is because on the one hand shareholders 
will not be in a worse condition than otherwise if the company goes into liquidation 
while on the other hand, if the company is saved, the increasing share price will 
reflect the real value of the company, benefiting shareholders. 
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In the UK, the current insolvency scheme is still forcefully pro-creditor even 
though corporate rescue is promoted.  Rights of shareholders have to be considered 
bearing in mind the predominance of the interests of creditors, an overriding principle 
of corporate insolvency law in the UK. Indeed, except for the Company Voluntary 
Arrangement under the Insolvency Act 1986 and the statutory arrangement under s425 
of the CA1985,192 shareholders in the UK are subject to stringent statutory restrictions 
and enjoy less discretion compared with their counterparts in the US. For example, in 
the quite often adopted Administration, shareholders have no decision-making rights 
in approving the administrator’s proposal. 
 
A. THE ROLE OF CONTRACTS 
As said, the role of insolvency law is to provide a statutory mechanism to 
govern the interests of insolvency participants. Contractual rights of participants, 
including shareholders, are strictly constrained. Still, insolvency may not only be 
initiated when the company is in distress but also when the company is still healthy as 
a going concern. In law, both the Company Voluntary Arrangements under Part I of 
the Insolvency Act 1986 and statutory arrangements under s425 of the Companies Act 
1985 are initiated without the requirement that the company falls into insolvency. 
Shareholders can accordingly play an important role through voting rights attached to 
shares in these two rescue processes.  
 
However, to discuss the role of contracts in insolvency, we may have to 
include arrangements under s110 of the Insolvency Act 1986. Since arrangements 
under s425 of the Companies Act 1985 and s110 of the Insolvency Act 1986 are both 
statutory arrangements, this author will categorize them under a separate rubric. This 
said, it must be realized that contractual arrangements in insolvency, either relevant to 
shareholders directly or indirectly, are stringently regulated by law. Besides, due to the 
strong negotiating power of institutional shareholders in corporate rescue especially 
when a company can still be deemed as a going concern, institutional shareholders in 
insolvency is discussed as a separate issue in this section.  
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1. Company Voluntary Arrangement 
Section 1(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides that if the company is a 
going concern and neither an administration order nor an order of winding up is in 
force, directors can initiate such arrangements. Under this condition, shareholders’ 
proposal to initiate a CVA may only be meaningful if they can persuade the board to 
do so.  
 
However, directors must acquire approvals from both shareholders and 
creditors. While a three quarter approval by creditors voting by proxy or in person, 
with reference to the value of their claim, is required,193 a minimum of 50% approval 
is needed of members who vote in person or by proxy.194 Once approved by both the 
shareholders and the creditors, the arrangement is binding on all parties who in 
accordance with the rules had notice of, and who are entitled to vote at, the 
meeting. 195  The discrepancy of the minimum quota thus indicates that interest 
conflicts among creditors are prioritized rather than those among shareholders in 
CVAs.  
 
In the case of any arising conflicts between the decision of creditors and that 
of members, the former prevails over the latter though shareholders entitled to vote at 
the meetings may challenge such a decision at the court on the basis of “unfair 
prejudice” or “material irregularity”.196 Moreover, the right of secured creditors to 
enforce their security cannot be compromised by a CVA.197 It can thus be seen that 
although shareholders’ voting rights function as constraints on the discretion of the 
directors, they are effectively constrained by the interests of creditors.  
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2. Institutional Shareholders in Insolvency  
In exercising their contractual voting rights, fund managers of institutional 
shareholders must ensure that they meet their trust law duties to their beneficiaries. In 
Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Company Ltd., 198 the beneficiaries of a trust fund 
successfully sued the trustee who held shares of a company for its approval of the 
bankruptcy of the company without due consideration of the prospects of the company. 
Though the company in that case was a private company where shares do not have a 
liquid market to exit, a similar line of reasoning can be extended to institutional 
shareholders in public companies due to the lock-in effect of institutional investment. 
Thus, fund managers of institutional shareholders in exercising their voting rights in 
insolvency must take due care of their duty under the trust law.199 
 
Still, it must be realized that corporate rescue may also be carried out without 
recourse to creditors. Instead of negotiating with creditors, a company may 
alternatively make a rights issue to existing shareholders for the continuing operation 
of the company. Unless the pre-emptive rights of existing shareholders are defaulted, 
shares thus issued must first be issued to existing members of the company. But in 
such cases, institutional investors may require in the first instance a shake-up of the 
incumbent management before agreeing to participate in the rescue efforts.200 In other 
words, institutional shareholders can take advantage of their negotiating power to 
improve the governance efficiency.  
 
B. THE ROLE of LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
1. Shareholders in Administrative Receivership and 
Administration 
Even with the modification of the Enterprise Act 2002, administrative 
receivers are assigned mainly for the interests of floating charge holders though with a 
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due consideration of the interests of the company.201 Shareholders have little say in 
administrative receivership.  
 
Alternatively, corporate rescue can be pursued through administration. The 
court order of administration can only be made for one or more of the following 
purposes: 1) to save a company as a going concern; 2) to achieve a CVA; 3) to achieve 
an arrangement under s425 of the Companies Act 1985; 202  and 4) to more 
advantageously realize the assets than otherwise under a winding up. 203  The 
appointment of an administrator is accordingly intended to turn around the distressed 
company, interests of which overlap those of shareholders.  
 
The statutory framework does stipulate that shareholders may claim to have an 
interest in the company so that their opinions can be heard on the petition regarding 
the appointment of an administrator.204 However, shareholders may find it hard to 
establish their locus standi in challenging the appointment of an administrator. In Re 
Chelmsford City Football Club (1980) Ltd., 205  such a claim was refuted, as the 
interest claimed by the shareholders is an interest in the future if the company goes on 
satisfactorily, rather than a “tangible interest”206 in the company.  
 
Interests of shareholders in administration are further marginalized as 
shareholders are generally not involved in approving the administrator’s proposal. 
Indeed, the decision power is given to creditors alone207 though the law does stipulate 
that shareholders have the right to be informed of the potential changes208 and may 
apply to the court if they find that the proposal of the administrator, if implemented, 
will compromise their interests either generally or partially.209  
 
The marginal consideration of the interests of shareholders in administration is 
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largely made out of a concern of fairness.210 Considering the usual assumption that 
interests of shareholders usually give way to those of creditors in insolvency, the 
procedural protection set up for shareholders is especially important in establishing an 
environment of co-operation, which ‘an efficient system of administration vitally 
requires.’211 Nevertheless, the role of shareholders in administration is supplementary 
to that of creditors and, as said, is largely marginalized.    
 
2. Shareholders in Liquidation 
Liquidation in law includes the winding-up, the gathering of assets and the 
ensuing distributions though it is usually identified with the winding up. The law 
stipulates that liquidation can happen in three forms 1) Members Voluntary 
Liquidation (MVL), 2) Creditors Voluntary Liquidation (CVL), and 3) Compulsory 
Liquidation (CL). A CL is mainly made from the perspective of the creditors’ interest 
and the result is often the dissolution of the company. In CLs, courts play a 
predominant role in the whole process and distribution to shareholders is rare since 
CLs occur almost always when there are not enough assets to meet the company’s 
liability. Thus, CL will not be the main topic in the following discussion. 
 
(a) Shareholders in MVLs and CVLs 
Member’s Voluntary Liquidation (MVL)212 allows a solvent company to end 
its life and distributes its surplus assets to its members either through paying final 
cash dividends or by distributing in specie of the assets. An MVL may happen when 
the purpose of the company has been achieved or the conflicts among shareholders 
develop to the extent that only liquidation of the company is appropriate to exploit the 
value locked in the company.  
 
Generally, an MVL is member focused and controlled and thus is beneficial to 
the members. Creditors are excluded from the decision making process but fully 
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protected because an MVL is initiated on the basis that any debt will be repaid in full. 
Also, strict rules are imposed on the declaration of solvency.213  
 
Furthermore, if the liquidator finds the company cannot pay its debts in full 
within the stated period, he has the right to convert an MVL to a CVL.214 Given the 
strong role of reputation played among insolvency practitioners, it will be rare that 
liquidators will not make an announcement of a CVL once the legal conditions are 
met. Again, shareholders’ discretion in MVLs is under strict control of insolvency 
practitioners directly and that of creditors indirectly.  
 
In comparison, it is usually directors who initiate the proposal in a CVL 
though approvals from both members and creditors are necessary.215 Moreover, even 
though both shareholders and creditors can appoint the liquidator, it is the creditors’ 
appointment which has the priority in CVLs.216 Accordingly, a CVL is an end result of 
negotiations between the company and its creditors. Shareholders may have their 
interests considered by the incumbent management but it is creditors who decide the 
fate of such proposals.    
 
(b) Shareholders’ Liabilities in Liquidations 
In liquidations, shareholders who have subscribed to shares have to pay up 
their subscription if any amount remains outstanding. 217  In addition, shareholders 
may also bear responsibilities to third parties even after the dissolution of the 
company. For example, if a later judgment (as in a tort case involving product liability) 
requires the company to compensate for the loss of the third parties, shareholders may 
be sued for their shares of the distribution of the dissolved company. Shareholders’ 
liabilities, in such a situation, may “[arise] because the shareholders possess the 
distributed assets to which an equitable lien has attached.”218   
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(c) Distribution to Shareholders in Liquidation  
The law expressly states that shareholders are the group that will share any 
assets left after the company meets its liabilities owed to the other non-shareholder 
stakeholders. 219  In fact, shareholders are unlikely to get anything in compulsory 
liquidations.  
 
While shareholders in their capacity as shareholders are legally put at the end 
of the queue, it is possible that shareholders may still claim something in other 
capacities. An interesting issue is whether shareholders who are promised declared but 
unpaid dividends can be seen as unsecured creditors. On the one hand, dividends are a 
distribution to shareholders in their capacity of shareholders, whose claims thus 
should be met last. But on the other hand, common law has also established that 
shareholders can sue the company for any unpaid but declared dividends.220 In that 
case, are unpaid declared dividends shareholders’ loans to the company?  
 
Case law tells us that to succeed in such claims shareholders must provide 
additional evidence that such dividends have been employed by the company as such. 
In Re L. B. Holiday & Co. Ltd.221, the argument by the main shareholder that unpaid 
declared dividends which have been used as working capital should be deemed as a 
loan to the company was denied. Though the company’s account had labelled the 
unpaid dividends as working capital, the court still found that the evidence was not 
conclusive as there was no interest paid on these “loans”. However, in Re Rural and 
Veterinary Requisites Pty Ltd.222, the court accepted the evidence contained in the 
company’s accounts and tax returns as sufficient to support the claim that unpaid but 
declared dividends can be deemed as loans to the company and shareholders 
accordingly enjoy a similar protection to that for unsecured creditors. Thus, to claim 
unpaid declared dividends as loans to the company, shareholders must provide 
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additional evidence to show that such dividends have been employed as loans rather 
than merely labeled as loans. Otherwise, it is hard for shareholders to get paid. 
 
The specific case of dividend distribution in liquidation in effect further 
sidelines the consideration of the interests of shareholders. In fact, declared dividends 
should be seen as a contract between the company and shareholders and unpaid 
dividends are deferred contractual debts of the company. The intentional 
marginalization of shareholders’ claim for the declared but unpaid dividends is thus “a 
rare example of a deferred debt arising in corporate insolvency law.”223  
 
3. Shareholders in Statutory Arrangements  
(a) Section 425 of the Companies Act 1985 
The low rate of adoption of s425 of the Companies Act 1985224 has long been 
attributed to its prolonged and complex procedure.225 However, the scheme under 
s425 of the Companies Act 1985 has its own merits in that incumbent management 
may still be in control of the company.226 Under such arrangements, a company can 
make compromises or arrangements with either creditors or shareholders, or classes of 
them. Still, intervention from the courts is mandated to ensure a “fair and reasonable” 
scheme.227 An approval at meetings is required from 75 percent in value of members, 
creditors or classes of them.228 Moreover, the law also requires the company to notify 
debenture holders of the company if the interests of the latter are affected.229 In other 
words, shareholders’ decision making rights are subject to the court approval and a 
consideration of the interests of debenture holders under the arrangement of s425 of 
the Companies Act 1985.  
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Considering that the management in distressed companies may more often 
lose interests in any recovering activities,230  the constraints by either creditors or 
shareholders are important. Again, shareholders’ contractual voting rights are 
employed to constrain the discretion of the board. Moreover, the law clearly 
prioritizes the interests of debenture holders. Thus, the grant of decision-making rights 
to shareholders is still considered within the general pro-creditor stance of insolvency. 
 
Alternatively, minority shareholders may get relatively better protection under 
s425 of the Companies Act 1985. It is true that shareholders’ apathy is advantageous 
to the offeror company in the statutory arrangement because only shareholders present 
and voting at the meeting or those voting by proxy are calculated. However, holders 
of 25% or more in value of the shares can effectively initiate opposition to the view of 
the majority. In comparison with the usual requirement of 50% or more in value under 
the other types of transactions, arrangements under s425 of the Companies Act 1985 
thus provide minority shareholders a better opportunity to uphold their own interests.  
 
2. S110 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
In conjunction with a voluntary winding up, a sale or a transfer of a company’s 
undertaking may be proposed. Such transactions are covered under s110 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986. If such a transaction is the result of a MVL, a special resolution 
of the company is required. Alternatively, if such a transaction is the result of a CVL, 
the approval of the court or the creditors is required.231 Such arrangements are binding 
on all members of the company. Nevertheless, power authorized in the memorandum 
cannot be designed in such a way to avoid compliance with s111 of the Insolvency 
Act 1986,232 which aims to protect disaffected minority shareholders. Thus, it can be 
seen that once interests of shareholders are considered, minority shareholder 
protection is almost always an accompanying concern. 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter starts with the discussion of social political issues relevant to 
shareholders. The implication of social political issues is multifarious. First, since a 
company as an organizational form developed from partnership, shareholders are 
historically vested with rights to appoint members on the board and to vote on 
corporate strategic issues in law. Second, the promotion of social democracy in the 
UK paves the way for protecting minority shareholders. Third, despite the dispersed 
shareholding structure and the one-share-one-vote business norm at the company level, 
the institutionalized shareholding structure indicates that voting power controlled by 
institutional shareholders in the corporate sector as a whole is of importance. However, 
we should note the difference between shareholder activism in individual companies 
and that in the corporate sector. The observed nonchalance of institutional 
shareholders in the governance practice in individual companies is not a surprise but a 
cost-efficient option which is selected partly due to the diversified investment policy 
and partly due to the agency costs inherent in the management of institutional 
shareholders in individual companies. The role of institutional shareholders’ activism 
is more likely to be expressed in the general governance issues across all the 
companies rather than in any specific individual company even though the potential 
legal intervention can partly explain the current activism of institutional shareholders.  
 
We then discuss how interests of shareholders are protected in the life cycle of 
corporate governance. In general, shareholders establish a legal relationship with a 
company through contracts by purchasing shares. Interests of shareholders are in 
essence the interests attached to shares. Our discussion shows that the interests of 
shareholders can be distinguished into internal and external parts. For the internal part, 
I mean the conflict between majority shareholders or block voting rights holders and 
minority shareholders. In this regard, legal protection for minority shareholders is 
highly promoted in the UK though shareholders’ litigation has long been constrained 
by the principles established in Foss v Harbottle. For the external part, we see that the 
right of shareholders to vote differentiates them from the other stakeholders. This 
however can be justified by shareholders’ rather unified profit oriented objective and 
the inhuman nature of shareholders, characteristics which facilitate their decision 
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making process. Admittedly, the right to displace directors with no reason can lead 
directors to prioritize interests of shareholders in practice. However, we must realize 
that this right must first be understood as a counterbalance to the discretion of 
directors. Moreover, shareholders only exercise this right when the performance of the 
company is far below the benchmark of peer companies. The performance of a 
company, however, is determined by several factors, one of which is the use of other 
kinds of inputs, including those from both creditors and employees, in the company. 
This in turn refers to the multi-criteria decision making process of directors and also 
that of shareholders. In other words, shareholders’ single-minded settlement on 
financial interests does not indicate that their decision making process is also a purely 
financial matter. In sum, shareholders’ decision rights should be seen more as a 
counterbalance to the directors’ discretion than as a tool to prioritize the interests of 
shareholders among those of the stakeholders. 
 
In Part III, I discuss shareholders in flotations. In flotations, existing 
shareholders in private companies going public play their governance role mainly 
through their voting rights. The main governance issue for companies going public is 
rather outward than inward due to the conflict between the strong role of outside 
capital providers through their prior contractual arrangements with the company and 
the founders’ intention to retain the control. Moreover, by discussing the contractual 
activities in share allotment in the flotation process, I argue that financial 
intermediaries such as underwriters, in coalition with institutional shareholders, may 
transfer wealth from the existing shareholders in private companies and directly make 
a difference to the resulting shareholding structure in the public company. Thus, 
despite strict mandatory information disclosure requirements, the institutionalized 
shareholding structure of public companies may have already been in place before the 
birth of such companies. Another implication of the share allotment process is that 
minority shareholders may suffer from the combined effect of underpricing in the 
share allotment process and the underperformance after flotation. However, the 
interests of minority shareholders are not particularly protected by law in flotations 
but by laws applicable to those companies in the normal life. Still, once companies go 
public, they are subject to more stringent governance rules than rules for private 
companies. Interests of shareholders can partially be enhanced by more stringent 
information disclosure and the requirements of the Combined Code.   
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Part IV covers the issue of shareholders in takeovers. In general, the UK 
adopts a pro-takeover stance, which, however, must be considered bearing in mind the 
stringent disclosure of changes in interests in shares and voting rights. Shareholders in 
takeovers are intentionally prioritized under the Takeover Code despite a modification 
in alignment with the enlightened shareholder value model in company law. The dual 
principles of the Takeover Code, i.e., the non-frustration of the offeree board and the 
equality principle among offeree shareholders, ensures that offeree shareholders 
receive due and fair protection. However, shareholders’ primacy in takeover rules may 
have to be discounted by directors’ blockholding.  
 
Also discussed in Part IV is the source of financial gains for offeree 
shareholders. The widely observed gains for offeree shareholders, however, cannot 
simply be explained by the co-existent losses for some other stakeholders. Other 
factors such as the synergistic gain or simply the fad for target shares may all 
contribute to the increasing price. To employ such evidence to claim for better 
protection for other stakeholders or to change the current governance structure is 
inadvisable.  
 
In addition, I also examine vote trading activities in the recent resurgence of 
going private transactions backed by private equity and hedge funds. While vote 
trading can strengthen the negotiation power of funds, such activities also attract 
similar voting in concert among other shareholders. Given the non-interventionist 
view of the Takeover Panel and the FSA, the end result of such transactions is hard to 
tell. Moreover, though minority shareholders also share the premium arising from 
such transactions, they are passive followers in such transactions and are deprived of 
opportunities to exercise their voting rights. The implication of such transactions on 
the check and balance scheme implied in the governance institution is important. 
 
I then discuss shareholders in insolvency in Part V. Given the strong pro-
creditor insolvency scheme in the UK, shareholders are largely and effectively 
marginalized by laws and regulations. However, when corporate insolvency is 
initiated when the company is a healthy going concern, shareholders can play an 
important governance role through their voting rights. Where a company cannot be 
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deemed as a going concern, protection for shareholders is minimal. Nevertheless, the 
current corporate rescue culture may partly demand proactive participation of 
shareholders. However, again, we observe that they are employed as the 
counterbalance to the discretion of directors and interests of shareholders are still 
constrained by the interests of creditors.  
  
In sum, by employing their unique voting rights throughout the life of the 
company, shareholders can be differentiated from the other stakeholders. However, as 
observed, corporate governance rules relevant to all these three thresholds do not 
compel or require the supremacy of shareholders among stakeholders. But rather, “the 
rule has been directed solely at constraining the impetus for decision-making, not at 
prescribing the outcome.”233  
 
What these arguments boil down to is that shareholder primacy may not be an 
accurate description of the internal governance structure. In fact, more evidence 
supports the view that shareholders’ voting rights are set up as a mechanism to 
constrain the discretion of directors. Viewed from this perspective, shareholders’ 
voting rights are only a means to the end—to promote the interests of the company as 
a whole. In other words, shareholders may not be different from other stakeholders in 
that their main function is to constrain the discretion of directors. 
 
Moreover, consideration of the social political issues introduces new elements 
into the understanding of the relationship between law and contracts. As background 
information, social political issues, as discussed, influence both the contractual 
process and the extent of the legal intervention. Still, the legal recognition of the 
contractarian view informs corporate rules relevant to shareholders. This device is 
important as “little scope is given for the government intervention to protect 
shareholders.” 234  Law should only intervene when the market and the social 
institution do not work effectively. This said, the author does not intend to deny the 
distributive effects of law, which is not only an integral part of justice but also a 
precondition for economic efficiency. However, distributive effects of law should be 
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achieved by the legal institution as a whole rather than in any specific law. Thus, 
shareholder-oriented corporate rules cannot be simply identified with a shareholder-
oriented governance institution. A holistic approach to the corporate governance study 
is thus entailed. 
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CHAPTER 4. CREDITORS  
INTRODUCTION 
In addition to shareholders, creditors are also important finance providers. 
However, the role of creditors as stakeholders in the discussion of corporate 
governance is often understated. Indeed, creditors are often ignored other than in 
insolvency law.  
 
One possible explanation is that creditors may well protect themselves through 
contractual arrangements when companies are going concerns. Once companies go 
into distress, interest conflicts intensify among different groups of stakeholders and 
different subgroups of creditors, a situation which necessitates strong legal 
intervention. Thus, the combination of contractual arrangements and contingent 
control rights in insolvency is a feature of the constraints on the interests of creditors.  
 
As usual, I will discuss first in Part I the social political issues relevant to 
creditors. And then I put the protection of creditors into the perspective of the life 
cycle of corporate governance from Part II to Part V. A conclusion is given at the end 
of this chapter. 
 
PART I. SOCIAL POLITICAL ISSUES 
A. DISPERSED SHAREHOLDING BUT CONCENTRATED 
DEBTHOLDING  
In the UK, the system of dispersed shareholding did not develop in tandem 
with the debt-issuance market. Even though dispersed shareholding can arguably be 
claimed to have come into shape in the UK in the years following the end of WWII,1 
the inflationary economic environment around that time made preferable bank loans 
                                                 
1
 See discussion in the former chapter.  
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with a floating interest rate. 2 High interest rates until the end of the 1990s further 
entrenched the primary status of banks in corporate finance by “compelling companies 
to resort increasingly to borrowing from banks.”3 In comparison, the bond market has 
not developed to the same degree. It is true that concentrated bank loans are not the 
norm for public companies. However, the syndicated bank loans still cannot be 
comparable to the dispersed debt holding structure. Thus, the relatively limited 
development of the public debt market in the UK highlights the dominance of bank 
lenders as the main external financial source.  
 
The end result of this historical development is that the usually observed 
dispersed shareholding in co-existence with dispersed debt structure is not the case in 
the UK.4 Rather, dispersed shareholding at the level of individual companies co-exists 
with concentrated debt holding by banks. Such a concentrated debt holding by banks 
enhances the negotiating power of bank creditors both at the company level through 
private contractual arrangements and as a social class in the society to claim their due 
legal rights. For instance, an immediate effect of the concentrated debt holding 
structure is the outgrowth of a pro-creditor and management-displacing insolvency 
scheme. This is not only true in law in general but also the case in privately arranged 
corporate rescue efforts. In practice, the so-called “London Approach” can only be 
initiated by banks, who, rather than the management with the coordination of the 
creditors, have the right to approve the work-out plan proposed by the management 
and to decide the fate of the company and the incumbent management.5  
 
B. THE STRONG MONITORING ROLE OF BANKS IN THE UK 
Even though the UK and the US are similar in their dispersed shareholding 
structure, the financial market in the UK is comparatively less open and less market-
                                                 
2
 Decisions to issue debentures are usually made on the basis of a fixed interest rate. A fluctuating 
interest rate, as in an inflation period, will bring too much uncertainty and unbearable loss to the 
corporate debtor on the public debt market. This in effect led to a preference for bank loans with 
floating interest rates. See Armour, J., et al., Corporate Ownership and the Evolution of Bankruptcy 
Law Lessons from the UK, (2002), Vand. L. Rev., 55: 1699-1786, at 1772-4.  
3
 ibid., at 1773. 
4
 ibid. 
5
 Brierley, P., and Vleighe, G., Corporate Workouts, the London Approach and Financial Stability, 
(1999), Fin. Stability Rev., 7:168 and discussion in Part V of this Chapter. 
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oriented. In fact, companies seeking capital more often resort to the debt market for 
funds rather than raising new equity capital.6 Thus, the strong stock market in the UK 
has often overshadowed the fact that debt is a more important financial source for 
companies than share issuance.7  
 
One important characteristic of such reliance on banks is that UK companies 
rely very heavily on banks’ short-term loans.8 The usage of short-term loans indicates 
more frequent renegotiation and recontracting, which may help outside banks monitor 
the performance of the company on a continuing basis. As a bad reputation on the 
debt market will increase the cost of capital for the debtor company, the company 
must be careful about its credit history and avoid a reputation for imprudence.9 It is in 
this sense that some argue that market discipline plays a more important role in 
protecting the interests of creditors than those of shareholders.10  In consequence, 
where creditors have long-term interactions with a company, it is justified that 
creditors should be included in the corporate governance structure.11 
 
                                                 
6
 Bevan, A., and Danbolt, J., Dynamics in the Determinants of Capital Structure in the UK, (2000), 
University of Glasgow Dept. of Accounting & Finance, Working Paper Series, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=233551; Cosh, A. and Hughes, A., British Enterprises in Transition, (2000) 
ESRC Centre for Business Research, available at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/BEITexec.pdf;  Franks, 
J., and Sussman, O., Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium Size UK 
Companies, (2005a), Review of Finance, 9(1):65-96, also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=428042.  
7
 Prowse, S., Corporate Governance in an International Perspective: A Survey of Corporate Control 
Mechanisms Among Large Firms in the US, UK, Japan and Germany, (1995), Fin. Markets, 
Institutions, and Instruments, 4:1. 
8
 Spencer, P., The Structure and Regulation of Financial Markets, (2000), OUP, Ch12. 
9
 Morris, R., Directors’ Duties in nearly Insolvent Corporations: A comment on Creditor Lyonnais, 
(1993), Journal of Corporation Law, 19:61, at 66.  
10
 Tauke, D., Should Bonds Have More Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate over Corporate 
Bondholder Rights, (1989), Colum. Bus. L. Rev., 1-136, at 30.    
11
 Stiglitz, J., Credit Markets and the Control of Capital, (1985), Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
17:133-52. 
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PART II. CREDITORS IN THE NORMAL LIFE  
A. THE ROLE OF CONTRACTS 
1. Contractual Terms 
The formulation of debt contracts in the UK is normally standardized.12 The 
standardization is effective in maintaining coherency in loan contracts and saving 
costs of financial management for both sides.13 However, it must be realized that the 
standardized boilerplate in the debt contracts can only be seen as a balance reached 
between the contractual parties in the long-term development of market practice. A 
loan contract with a worse protection to the creditors than that provided generally by 
the market may well be forced out of the market. 
 
In practice, debt contractual terms can largely be categorized into three groups. 
Terms in the first group are regarding the mechanics of the debt itself, including the 
term, the amount, the interest, etc. of the loans to be issued. These technical terms are 
case-sensitive and market-dependent and are thus out of the scope of this thesis. 
Terms in the other two groups are about the legal protections and legal liabilities of 
the creditor and the corporate debtor respectively. Important for creditors are 
covenants to constrain the discretion enjoyed by the debtor and various forms of 
security.14 We will discuss them in sequence.  
 
                                                 
12
 Day, J., and Taylor, P., Evidence on the Practices of UK Bankers in Contracting for Medium-term 
Debt, (1995), Journal of International Banking Law, September: 394-401; Bankers’ Perspectives on the 
Role of Covenants in Debt Contracts, (1996a), Journal of International Banking Law, 5:201-205; Loan 
Contracting by UK Corporate Borrowers, (1996b), Journal of International Banking Law,8:318-325; 
Loan Documentation in the Market for UK Corporate Debt: Current Practice and Future Prospects, 
(1997), Journal of International Banking Law, 1:7-14.   
13
 Kahan, M. and Klausner, M., Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The 
Economics of Boilerplate”), (1997), Virginia Law Review, 83(4):713-770. 
14
 Lehn K., and Poulsen, A., Contractual Resolution of Bondholder-Stockholder Conflicts in Leveraged 
Buyouts, (1991), Journal of Law and Economics 34: 645-673; Smith, C., and Warner, J., On Financial 
Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, (1979), Journal of Financial Economics, 7:117-130. 
Chapter 4. Creditors 
January 2008 135 
(a) Covenants 
Covenants are widely used in debt contracts in the UK.15 Generally, covenants 
can be distinguished as negative covenants and positive covenants. 16  Negative 
covenants preclude debtors from doing something that will dilute the interests of 
creditors, like the disposition of the debtor’s assets. Positive covenants are those 
covenants through which a certain situation of the debtor must be maintained. This 
category may include keeping the legal status of the company, keeping certain staff, or 
some other positive performance by the corporate debtor. Both are important in 
protecting the interests of creditors.  
 
The constraining effect of covenants functions mainly through the potential 
exit of creditors in cases of defaults of covenants. Creditors’ exit can take multiple 
forms: they may stop any further financing; they may accelerate the maturity of any 
existing debt contracts, or enforce its security imposed on the assets of the company. 
By threatening to enforce these multiform exits, a company debtor may either strive to 
avoid any default of the contract or to redress any deficiency in existence in order to 
retain these capital providers. The impact of bank exit upon management, as one 
scholar has already observed, “is a function of the amount of indebtedness to the bank 
and the abruptness of the bank’s exit.”17 Indeed, this effect may be amplified if a 
company has more than one major creditor since the exit of one creditor may 
engender a chain of exits from the other creditors, thus accelerating the speed of the 
collapse of the company. As initiating events in the covenants are always less serious 
than the judging criteria of solvency status employed in insolvency law, covenants 
first work as signals and then grant creditors with real power in renegotiating and 
designing new contractual terms. 
 
Debt financing can thus be seen as a way to implement contingent control 
allocation, by which the control of the company will be transferred to creditors under 
                                                 
15
 Day and Taylor, (1995). 
16
 Day, J., and Taylor, P., The Role of Debt Contracts in UK Corporate Governance, (1998), Journal of 
Management and Governance, 2:171-190, at 174. 
17
 Triantis, G., and Daniels, R., The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, (1995), 
California Law Review, 83:1073, at 1085. 
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certain conditions such as defaults or insolvency of the debtor.18 The effectiveness of 
such covenants, however, is constrained by the incompleteness of the contract due to 
the substantial cost of writing, monitoring and enforcing the contract. Nonetheless, as 
creditors’ interests are single-mindedly settled on the financial interests, a premium 
charged by creditors can thus help to mitigate or even cover all these potential 
concerns or dilution of their interests. For instance, one study finds that “[A]ll the 
interviewees confirmed the existence of an unquantifiable but systematic relationship 
between covenants (and the stringency of their values) and the size of the risk 
premium incorporated in a loan’s interest rate.”19 Indeed, some corporate debtors can 
even buy out these financial covenants.20 In other words, there are clear indicators that 
risks involved in debt contracts can be compensated in financial tangibles. Therefore, 
covenants can be accredited as an effective method to safeguard the interests of 
creditors. 
 
(b) Security  
Creditors can also protect their own interests by setting up collaterals on their 
loans. Collateral has at least three legal functions for secured creditors.21 First, it 
limits the debtor’s property right over the collateral, encumbering the free transfer of 
the collateral in concern. Second, the secured creditor has priority to the other 
creditors on the collateral in meeting his particular debts. Third, the existence of 
collateral also provides an efficient and cheap enforcing method regarding the secured 
debt. Thus, a security not only grants secured creditors the control on the assets of the 
property but also entitles the secured creditors a first claim on the collateral in cases of 
insolvency or defaults and a right to the proceeds of the disposition of the collateral. 
As a result, the setting up of collaterals separates secured creditors from the collective 
distribution regime that usually controls the individual claims of unsecured debtors in 
insolvency.22  
                                                 
18
 Aghion, P., and Bolton, P., An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, (1992), 
Review of Economic Studies, 59:473-494. 
19
 Day and Taylor, (1995), at 398. 
20
 ibid. 
21
 Lopucki, L., The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, (1994), Virginia Law Review, 80:1887. 
22
 But, secured creditors’ claims may be suspended under CVAs and administrations under the IA1986. 
For a more detailed discussion, see Part V of this Chapter. 
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In a word, by inserting covenants and establishing security, creditors can 
effectively safeguard their interests at least for those emergencies expected ex ante. 
Given the fact that such clauses are usually written with the acceleration of the debt 
and/or a prohibition on any further financing, interests of creditors may have to be 
seriously considered by corporate debtors who keep reverting back to the credit 
market for additional financial support.  
 
(c) Others 
Creditors may also have a contractual right to nominate directors to the board. 
This is especially the case where creditors occupy a disproportionate negotiating 
power, such as venture capitalists in entrepreneurial financing. However, it should be 
noticed that even though creditors have the right to appoint directors to the board, 
shareholders have the right to remove them. Moreover, directors nominated by 
creditors, like other directors, can only act for the interests of the whole company 
rather than for their nominators. Besides, as will be discussed, legal prescriptions on 
the liabilities of shadow directors may well constrain creditors’ active voice in 
corporate governance. Thus, even though contractual arrangements can grant banks 
opportunities to play their governance role either by voice, i.e., active participation in 
the governance mechanism or by a threat to exit, the governance role of creditors’ exit 
through contingency clauses and covenants in the loan contracts is worthy of special 
attention.  
 
2. The Efficacy of Contractual Protection 
(a) The Positive Side of the Argument 
i) The Monitoring Role of Bank Creditors 
Monitoring by bank creditors has several benefits. Usually banks make loans 
to their existing depositors or may require corporate debtors to open an account with 
them. By keeping a record of the current account, banks may notice both positive and 
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negative signals of the financial situation of the company earlier than the other 
stakeholders.23 For example, a delay of payment to customers or employees is an 
indicator of potential financial distress of the company. In addition, bank creditors 
usually invest in certain specific industries, a situation which makes them a good 
evaluator of the performance of a company within the industry. Thus, banks’ 
possession of the credit history of potential debtors helps creditors to locate potential 
abnormal changes and to alert the company to improve its governance practice.24  
 
Moreover, as a financial intermediary, a bank can act as a delegated monitor 
for other investors.25 Covenants in debt contracts can effectively restrict the discretion 
of the management either for their own benefits or for the benefits of the shareholders 
at the cost of the other stakeholders, as happens in discretionary dividend payment or 
in takeovers. Also, creditors’ exit from the company may send a negative signal to and 
thus enhance the opportunity and power of the voice of other stakeholders in the 
company. The signaling to other stakeholders of the reaction of creditors to company 
debtors may thus facilitate to set up an interactive governance structure,26 benefiting 
all stakeholders.  
 
In addition, compared with the mandatory public disclosure on the public debt 
market, private disclosure within the context of loan contracts may be preferred by the 
company debtors. For one thing, contractual parties can sign confidential agreements 
on relevant information corporate debtors do not want to disclose to the public. For 
another, banks have long owed a common law duty to keep confidence of their 
customers’ account information. 27  Viewed from this perspective, information 
disclosure with the private creditors may be more efficient than mandatory disclosure 
on the public debt market. 
 
                                                 
23
 Stiglitz, (1985).  
24
 Black, F., Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market, (1975), Journal of Financial Economics, 
2:323. 
25
 Campbell, T., and Kracaw, W., Information Production, Market Signalling, and the Theory of 
Financial Intermediation, (1980), Journal of Finance, 35:863.  
26
 Triantis and Daniels, (1995). What the theory of interactive corporate governance refers to is that the 
voice and exit decision of any one stakeholder may work as either a positive or negative signal to the 
other stakeholders, thus the relationship between stakeholders may not necessarily be in conflict but 
may be complementary. 
27
 Tournier v. National Provincial & Union Bank of England, 1 K.B. 461 (1924). 
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ii) Intentional Ambiguity and Lacuna in Incomplete Contracts  
Admittedly, contracts cannot be complete. However, the admission of the 
incompleteness of contracts is not in conflict with the recognition that incompleteness 
may be intentional and preferable in practice.28  
 
On the one hand, such ambiguity or incompleteness may be required or 
intentionally approved by contractual parties. For one thing, doing so may leave room 
for trust and reputation building. In fact, contractual parties seldom use all the extreme 
powers granted under the contracts. Terms granting such rights may more rightly be 
seen as threatening than penalizing. For another, some lacuna in contracts only reflect 
the reluctance of both contractual parties to negotiate and reach a contractual term 
either because of the low possibility of a distant happenstance or because of the 
extremely high negotiation costs compared with the potential benefits which might be 
achieved from such efforts. In such cases, contractual parties rationally approve such 
incompleteness in the contracts. For example, a credit ceiling, which is usually 
inserted in loan contracts to set a boundary to the potential loss to creditors normally 
co-exists with a clause of renegotiation between creditors and the debtor company. 
This is because exceeding the credit ceiling is not necessarily a bad indicator for 
creditors. For an expanding company, such exceeding can only be interpreted as a 
higher growth rate the company. Thus, a renegotiation of the contractual terms keeps 
both sides in a dynamic and mutually beneficial relationship.  
 
On the other hand, designing other routes to eliminate the potential loss arising 
from incomplete contracts may also bring similar or even more costs. A pragmatic 
approach may be to improve the existing alternatives. The loss so incurred by the 
contractual parties or the wider society should be deemed as the cost we have to suffer, 
i.e. the loss is a deadweight loss.29  A relevant example is the current debate on 
directors’ fiduciary duty to creditors as an alternative to the current contractual 
protection to creditors. Admittedly, imposing on directors a fiduciary duty to creditors 
may help to strengthen the current protection for creditors. However, it may also bring 
similar or even more costs, such as the delay in decision making process, the disguise 
                                                 
28
 Tauke, (1989), at 45. 
29
 This economic term has been widely used to describe permanent losses of well being to society if 
there is an inefficient distribution of resources, or the Pareto standard of efficiency is not met. See 
Posner, R., Economic Analysis of Law, (6th edn), (2003), Aspen Publishers, at 278-281. 
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of directors to claim the interests of creditors for their own interests, and possible 
restraints on reasonable risk taking by the companies, etc. Accordingly, improving the 
current contractual protection is preferable in most jurisdictions to imposing an 
additional fiduciary duty on directors.  
 
iii) Neo-Classical Interpretation of the Ambiguities by Courts 
Alternatively, improper protections for creditors arising from the 
incompleteness of contracts may more or less be redressed by the courts, which play a 
more important role than before in filling the gaps of incomplete contracts when 
interpreting the contractual terms.30 Traditionally, courts follow the classical approach 
of the “four corners of the contract”, within which parties have expressed their 
intentions, and cannot impose contractual terms contradictory to the intentions of the 
parties. Recently, the neo-classical approach predominates, which requires “good 
faith” from the contractual parties to achieve a result of fairness so that the contract 
will not destroy or injure the rights of contractual parties.31 The invocation of good 
faith in the modern approach to the interpretation of contracts thus extends far beyond 
the literal language meaning of contractual terms as adopted by the traditional 
approach.  
 
Indeed, except for the deadweight loss of the incompleteness of the contracts, 
the concern of the incompleteness of debt contracts for creditors centres on 
unexpected emergencies, against which the court will have to decide how creditors 
can be fairly protected on the basis of the existing contractual terms. Accordingly, by 
considering the entire context, courts will reconsider the ambiguity or lacuna in the 
debt contracts and imply terms into the contract, where necessary, for the underlying 
purpose of fairness to contractual parties and the wider public interest. That is, by 
interpreting the contracts to meet the fairness requirement, modern courts will at least 
relieve some concerns of the protection to creditors arising from the incomplete 
                                                 
30
 Tauke, (1989), at 78-9 and Smith, S., Contact Theory, (2004), OUP, at 278-9. 
31
 Smith argues: “…part of the context in which many (though not all) contracts are formed is a set of 
(objectively) shared normative expectations about the fairness of the parties’ respective obligations. It 
is part of the public meaning of many contracts, in other words, that vague terms should be reading a 
way that treats both parties according to ordinary ideas of fairness. The extent and significance of such 
expectations depends on the context in which the contract is signed; … In most contracts, however, 
such understandings are at least a part of the shared public meaning of the contract.” See Smith, 
(2004), at 279. 
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contracts.  
 
(b) The Negative Side of the Argument 
i) The Incompleteness of the Contract 
A contract cannot be complete at least because contractual parties cannot 
predict every exigency or happenstance in the future. Moreover, even if agreed in the 
contract, creditors’ contractual protection, however, can still be subject to various 
limitations in performing the debt contract. For example, the difficulty in assessing 
the materiality of the defaults, which is usually stipulated as initiators of the 
acceleration of the maturity or the stoppage of further financing, may attenuate the 
intended protection provided by these covenants. Besides, information asymmetry 
between corporate debtors and creditors may engender ‘hold-up’ problems at the end 
of corporate debtor, who fails to disclose relevant information, exacerbating the 
situation of creditors.32  
 
On the other side of the coin, the incompleteness of contracts also indicates 
that debt contracts have their own costs, such as the investigating, negotiating, 
monitoring, and performing costs. In order to safeguard their interests, creditors 
usually ask for a higher interest rate to compensate for such costs.33  Thus, debt 
contracts suffer from their inherent deficiency of the incompleteness and the 
accompanying costs. 
 
ii) The Competition on the Credit Market 
Usually, companies resort to banks or other lenders when the accrual of their 
own profits cannot meet the demand of the development of the company, or if no 
alternative financial resources are available. In both cases, lenders enjoy a negotiating 
                                                 
32
 Simply put, the hold-up problem will arise where investors tend to underinvest once they realize they 
only receive a partial return of their investment. See Grossman, S., and Hart, O., The Costs and Benefits 
of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, (1986), Journal of Political Economy, 
94:691-719 and Tirole, J., Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?, (1999), Econometrica, 67:741-
81. 
33
 Titman, S., and Wessels, R., The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice, (1988) Journal of 
Finance 43:1-20 and Smith Jr., C., and Watts, R., The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate 
Financing, Dividend and Compensation Policies, (1992), Journal of Financial Economics, 32:263-292. 
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advantage, as it is the company who asks for help and accordingly the monitoring role 
of creditors may be apparent or easily achieved.  
 
However, this advantageous position enjoyed by the lenders is not always the 
norm. Lenders with idle capital may be eager to lend it out since capital within their 
own hands will have costs. Companies with a prosperous future, for example, in a 
given industry or market, or well-established companies with a commendable 
historical record may thus be targets of these lenders. A creditor may thus often be 
trying to stand in the front of the queue of potential creditors. Overconfidence in the 
performance of the company among creditors may overshadow the inefficiency in the 
corporate debtor. As a result, the intensive competition on the credit market will make 
a difference to the relation between companies and financial institutions34 In such 
situations, it is hard to be optimistic about the negotiating advantages of the creditors 
to insert effective covenants to safeguard their own interests. 
 
iii) Special Cases of Involuntary creditors  
In contrast with voluntary creditors, involuntary creditors get involved in the 
contractual relationship with a company passively rather than actively. Two often 
cited examples are tort creditors and employees. For tort creditors, the usual 
contractual protection is out of the question because they do not have the chance to 
negotiate, to monitor, and to avoid the risk. 35  Alternatively, employees may be 
involuntary creditors of the company when their wages are not paid in time and when 
their firm-specific human capital investment is not duly compensated. Contractual 
protection for involuntary creditors is thus far from satisfactory. 
 
In sum, the freedom of the contractual parties to design their own contractual 
terms is one of the main benefits of the contract. By contracting, parties “could adjust 
the legal framework to the content of their economic arrangements, rather than 
                                                 
34
 Mayer, C., New Issues in Corporate Finance, (1988), European Economic Review, 32:1167-89; and 
Petersen, M. and Rajan, R., The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships, (1995), 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110:407-443. 
35
 Leebron, D., Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, (1991), Columbia Law Review, 91:1565; 
Villiers, C., Employees as Creditors: A Challenge for Justice in Insolvency Law, (1999), Comp. Law. 
20(7):222-232; and Keay, A., Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to 
Efficiency and Over-Protection of Creditors, (2003), M. L. R., 66:665-699. 
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having to adjust their transaction to the requirements of the law.”36 However, such 
discretion of the parties must be considered bearing in mind the information 
asymmetry and disproportionate negotiating power existing between contractual 
parties. In both cases, distorted contractual terms may prejudice the interests of one 
contractual party. Moreover, an uncontrolled contracting may also bring about 
externality, economic inefficiency imposed on a third party. Such considerations thus 
entail the public authority intervention, an issue to be covered in the following section. 
 
B. THE ROLE OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
1. Company Law Related 
(a) Limited Liability and Separate Personality 
The limited liability and the separate personality of a company as a legal 
organizational form play an important role in attracting investment.37 However, the 
scheme can intentionally be employed by incorporators to avoid any future known 
risks because a company incorporated with a separate legal personality will be 
responsible for any liability only to the extent of its own assets rather than those of its 
incorporators.38  
 
However, counterbalancing the limited liability and the separate personality of 
a company is the general safeguard for the protection of creditors. Such protections 
not only include statutory protections for creditors in company law and insolvency 
law but also common law rules on lifting the veil of the company, rules which can 
extend liabilities to individuals standing behind the veneer of the company.39 However, 
cases initiating such a rule are not many and most of them involve only small private 
companies. In fact, for creditors of public companies or big private companies, veil 
                                                 
36
 Collins, H., Regulating Contracts, (1999), OUP, at 47. 
37
 The introduction of limited liability by the Limited Liability Act 1885 facilitated the development of 
large transportation companies and bridge building companies, etc.  
38
 Mr Salomon effectively took advantage of the limited liability of the separate legal entity to protect 
his own assets in Salomon v A Salomon & Co. Ltd, [1897] AC 22.  
39
 Morse, G., et al., (eds), Palmer’s Company Law, (25th edn), (1992), London: Sweet & Maxwell, at 
para. 2.1521. This is a tricky issue in cases involving corporate groups, see Adams v Cape Industries 
Plc [1990] Ch 433. 
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piercing is not feasible due to the widely accepted separation of control and ownership 
in public companies. 
 
(b) Capital Related 
Relevant to the interests of creditors are corporate rules on the minimum 
capital and the maintenance of capital.40 The former provides some kind of credit 
worthiness to creditors by stipulating a threshold of capital for establishing a company. 
This is because legal capital has little practical sense after the establishment of the 
company as the market value of the company changes during the life of the company. 
A claimed minimum capital at the time of foundation may only be a veneer for 
creditors. Instead, such an arbitrarily imposed threshold may only unduly restrict 
competition by tightening the requirements of market entrance. Moreover, it is true 
that public companies, since the implementation of the Second Company Law 
Directive,41 have been required to have allotted shares with a minimum nominal value 
of £50,000, one quarter of which have to be actually paid over to the company, to set 
off their business. However, it is also the fact that public companies are well-
established companies with good historical records and future prospects. In 
comparison, private companies in the UK have never been required to raise some 
amount of money for their establishment. 42  In other words, creditors for most 
companies are not protected by such corporate rules. Thus, corporate rules on the 
minimum capital have limited effects in safeguarding the interests of creditors.   
 
Alternatively, creditors are also protected by corporate rules on capital 
maintenance, which is mainly achieved by imposing restraints on capital reduction. 
Indeed, capital maintenance is a long-established common law rule in the UK.43  The 
main point is that shareholders’ paid-up capital should not be returned to shareholders. 
                                                 
40
 Armour, J., Legal Capital: An Outdated Concept?, (2006), European Business Organization Law 
Review, 7:5-27, who argues for the potential over-regulation of such rules. 
41
 Formation of Public Companies and Maintenance and Alteration of Capital, 77/91/EEC, (1977), OJ 
L26/1.  
42
 See CA 1985 s117, to be replaced by CA 2006 s761. 
43
 MacDougall v Jersey Imperial Hotel Co Ltd (1864) 2 H&M 528, 71 ER 568 per Lord Watson; 
Guinness v Land Corporation of Ireland (1882) 22 Ch D 349, CA per Cotton LJ; Berner v General and 
Commercial Investment Trust [1894] 2 Ch 239 CA 264 per Lindley LJ; Ammonia Soda Co Ltd v 
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The purpose is to protect creditors, who may deem the fund as their resource of 
repayment. In addition, capital maintenance is also an important part of the Second 
EC Company Law Directive.44 In the UK, section 656 of the Companies Act 2006 
requires that a shareholders’ meeting should be convened where the net assets of a 
public company are half or less of its called up share capital. However, the effects on 
creditors of such a meeting, if held, are hard to tell. First, it is hard to tell the specific 
time when such situation comes into being. The reasons may spread from the highly 
changeable business environment to simply the difficulty in evaluating certain assets, 
such as intellectual property. Second, such a meeting sends a negative signal to other 
stakeholders, even though it is highly possible that it is still not certain whether such 
deduction is a temporary one or a permanent one. Given that the value of a company 
in distress is usually less than that of the company as a going concern, the situation 
may be disastrous to creditors.  
 
In addition, capital maintenance can also be achieved through legal restrictions 
on dividend distributions, share buy-backs and redemption.45 Also, creditors have a 
statutory right to object to capital reduction at the courts.46 Still, the Companies Act 
2006 permits a wide range of payment methods for the acquisition of shares. 47 
Moreover, a private company no longer needs a court sanction for its capital reduction, 
making capital maintenance a weak rule for private companies.48 Thus, the cushion 
effect provided by such a legal institution to creditors should not be overestimated.  
 
                                                 
44
 But see the recent proposal to regulate the ability of public limited companies to alter the size, 
structure and shape of their capital. See DTI Consultative Document, European Company Law and 
Corporate Governance—Directive Proposals on Company Reporting, Capital Maintenance and 
Transfer of the Registered Office of a Company, (2005b), available at 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file14584.pdf. Also, these proposals have now been agreed and Directive 
2006/68/EC, with an implementation date on 15 April 2008. 
45
 Part 17 (changes to share capital), Part 18 (acquisition by limited company of its own shares) and 
Part 23 (dividend policy) of the CA 2006. But note that private companies may resort to a simple 
solvency-based procedure to reduce capital without approval, see CA 2006 s642. 
46
 See CA 2006 s646, replacing CA 1985 s136. 
47
 Shareholders can pay for their shares with non-cash consideration, ranging from good will, know-
how, to an undertaking to perform service. Undertaking to perform a service, however, is only available 
to private companies, see CA 2006 s585 and Chapter 5 of Part 17 of the CA 2006 generally. 
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 CA 2006 s641 permits a private company to reduce its capital with a solvency statement. In 
comparison, CA 1985 ss135-138 required that courts confirm such reduction. 
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(c) Information Disclosure 
According to the Companies Act 2006, limited liability companies must state 
clearly their limited liability nature in their documents.49  A failure to do so may 
impose personal liabilities on those signing the document or authorizing such 
signatures.50 Also, companies are required to publicize their profit and loss account 
and the balance sheet, both of which have to be audited by outside professionals 
though there are some relaxations for small private companies. 51  Moreover, any 
corporate group is further required to produce accounts of both the whole group and 
those individual subsidiaries within the group.52 The legal mechanism of mandatory 
disclosure can thus assist creditors to enter into loan agreements, a role which is in 
contrast to the role of private information disclosure in contractual arrangements for 
creditors’ strategy to exit.53 
 
Still, in contrast to stringent regulations on public companies, relaxations exist 
for small companies which can provide abbreviated accounts and delay their reports 
for 10 months after the accounting year. Such relaxations do release small companies 
from a heavy regulatory burden but meanwhile do increase the monitoring cost of 
creditors.54 The difference in legal treatment can be justified by cost-benefit analyses 
of the different situations of public companies and small private companies. 
Admittedly, public companies usually have good historical records and enjoy good 
reputations on the market. However, the market is not so efficient that it can dispense 
with a compulsory accounting disclosure. Indeed, potential losses to creditors of 
public companies are so grave that no authority wants to bear the risk. Conversely, the 
imposition of a compulsory disclosure duty may enhance both the creditworthiness of 
big companies and the integrity of the whole market in general. Thus, a cost-benefit 
analysis justifies the imposition of mandatory information disclosure for public 
companies. 
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 See CA2006 s82. 
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In contrast, for small companies, the concern of flexibility overtakes that of 
the potential loss to creditors. This may also be reasonable in practice, as creditors 
may ask for more stringent security or ask for the guarantee from the owner or 
directors or more timely information disclosure. These financial safeguards may more 
effectively protect the interests of creditors than those compulsory disclosure 
requirements. More importantly, relaxations on small and medium sized companies do 
not necessarily mean that they are insufficiently regulated. In fact, “the UK has the 
best record of enforcing the disclosure rules governing these [small] companies and 
sanctioning directors who breach their duties to creditors.” 55  In other words, 
relaxations for small companies can also be understood as a cost-benefit efficient 
selection. 
 
Still, accounting figures are a presentation of what happened in the past, which 
is in stark contrast to what creditors need to know—the future solvency of the 
company. Moreover, creditors may require the disclosure of similar information in 
their contracts with the company. Indeed, a debt market is more often than not a 
capital supplier market, in which debtor companies may well prepare these documents 
themselves to acquire the loan needed. Nevertheless, a total reliance on the efficient 
function of the market is too risky. In other words, given the current situation, 
mandatory information disclosure of relevant accounting information is still a 
preferred solution to protect creditors’ interests.   
 
(d) The Relevance of Shadow Directors  
i) General 
The concept of directors in company law includes that of shadow directors, 
who are “those in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of a 
company are accustomed to act.”56 The implication of such prescription is that a 
proactive creditor who intervenes by making his voice heard, however, must bear the 
risk of being treated as a shadow director in law. The additional liability of directors 
may thus frustrate creditors’ active voice and press for a violent exit. Indeed, as long 
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 Hertig and Kanda, (2004), at 98. 
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as the threat of exit is real, creditors can perform their monitoring role with immunity 
from being regarded as an insider, thus avoiding legal liabilities which otherwise have 
to be taken. Thus, it may be legally wise for creditors to adopt a strong stance in 
establishing “exit” rights in the contract while at the same time restraining the 
discretion to voice.     
 
The potential identification of the status of creditors with that of directors 
should be understood with the fact that the court has long been reluctant to second-
guess the management decision ex post. Thus, to be identified as a director does not 
necessarily signify to bear the responsibility of a business decision, the correctness of 
which can only be reviewed ex post. This indicates that creditors can tactfully 
influence the management for their own benefits.   
 
ii) The Special Case of Corporate Groups 
The legal stipulation on shadow directors may have another implication for 
creditors. Since directors are not limited to individuals as a legal personality can be a 
director as well, a parent company or a creditor company, if it is covered by the legal 
definition of shadow directors, may be legally recognized as a director. This device in 
the UK company law can accordingly play a parallel role to that of the veil piercing so 
that creditors’ loss can be compensated through other routes.  
 
In a corporate group, it is a usual practice that the parent company nominates 
the directors of the subsidiaries. The separate legal personality of the subsidiary from 
that of the parent company requires of directors of the subsidiary to make decisions in 
the interests of the subsidiary only. Directors of a subsidiary may accordingly breach 
their fiduciary duty to the subsidiary company if they sacrifice the interests of the 
subsidiary company for those of the parent or the group as a whole. However, it is 
also true that there is no legal constraint on subsidiaries’ support of the activities of 
the group, whose failure may prejudice the interests of the subsidiary. Whether the 
influencing parent or the other company in the group57 can be deemed as a director is 
a matter of fact. But, one thing is certain. If directors of a subsidiary company can 
successfully argue that the decision is for the interests of the subsidiary company, it 
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will be hard to establish the parent or the other company concerned as a shadow 
director.58 Under this situation, the overlap of the interests of the subsidiary and those 
of the group can be appropriately explained as a coincidence. Indeed, s251(3) of the 
Companies Act 2006 expressly states that a parent company is not to be deemed as a 
shadow director only on the condition that “directors of a subsidiary company are 
accustomed to act in accordance with its directions or instructions.”59 
 
However, provided that the parent company has been successfully argued as a 
director of the subsidiary, can the directors of the parent company also be identified as 
shadow directors of the subsidiary and assume corresponding responsibilities? This 
issue was considered in Re Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd.60 While the judge held that if the 
parent company gave directions to the board of the subsidiary and it is also a practice 
that the latter observes the direction, the parent company can be identified as a 
shadow director. However, as for the claim of the plaintiff to hold also as shadow 
directors the two directors on the board of the parent company, the judge rejected the 
application of a similar line of reasoning. This is because the directors are acting on 
behalf of the company and their actions can only make the parent company liable.  
 
2. Others 
As we will discuss, insolvency law in the UK has long been recognized to be 
pro-creditors by providing detailed protection for creditors in several statutory 
insolvency procedures. However, statutory protection for creditors in insolvency law 
can only be initiated when a company is in the vicinity of insolvency or insolvency is 
unavoidable. The inability of creditors to initiate litigation against a company when 
the company is a going concern may actually incite creditors to ask for a winding up 
order rather than endure the potentially unsuccessful rescue procedure.61  Still, s213 of 
the Insolvency Act 1986 renders any person who deals with the company with the 
intent to defraud creditors liable for the loss of creditors if the company is liquidated. 
Creditors may accordingly have a bigger size of company's assets to be distributed.  
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Other statutory protection relevant to creditors may include the regulation on 
the public debt market. Public debts like listed shares are financial products on the 
exchange. To protect the interests of these public investors is to maintain the integrity 
and the investors’ confidence in the market. Thus, debenture holders on the public 
security market enjoy parallel legal protections to those offered to equity holders on 
the public securities market.62 I will discuss these issues in the following Part.  
 
PART III. CREDITORS IN FLOTATIONS 
Our discussion in this Part will centre on one specific example of creditors—
venture capitalists. While creditors for companies going public also include bank 
creditors and trade creditors, the role of VCs are more specific to and more active 
around the specific juncture of flotations. Moreover, in the previous chapter, we 
limited the concept of flotations to share issues. In this chapter, the concept will also 
include flotations of debt. We will discuss creditors in flotations of shares and 
flotations of debentures separately.  
 
A. FLOTATIONS OF SHARES—VENTURE CAPITALISTS (VCS) 
AS AN EXAMPLE 
1. The Role of Contracts  
(a) Information Asymmetry and Information Disclosure 
Entrepreneurs usually only have the human capital needed by the inchoate 
company. Pressed for financial resources, they may resort to venture capitalists at the 
price of a high return to venture capitalists. However, disproportionate information 
asymmetry can still be projected as the norm between entrepreneurs and VCs. First, 
since the enterprise is usually a high-risk project to which entrepreneurs may have a 
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settled psychological or emotional attachment, entrepreneurs may well entrench 
themselves in the company by providing distorted information. Second, VCs can be 
disadvantaged by information asymmetry of both management and technical 
potentiality. On the one hand, as it is the entrepreneurs who will take control of the 
daily management of the new company, it is highly possible that entrepreneurs will 
misuse the credit for their own benefits. On the other hand, the intangible nature of 
most of the venture assets also brings high risks to VCs. Tangible assets at least can 
act as a form of security with a rather stable and detectable value. In comparison, 
intangible assets, such as patents, know-how, and the reputation of the innovator, are 
easy to transfer underhandedly and their value is more fickle than that of tangible 
assets. 
 
In order to redress the information asymmetry, information disclosure by the 
entrepreneur is usually the main concern of the negotiation.63  For example, it is 
usually stipulated in contracts that VCs have the right to review the accounts of the 
debtor company. Information disclosed may also be changed according to the staged 
review processes in venture capitalists’ standard practice of staged financing. It is by 
these requirements of information disclosure that venture capitalists keep their due 
monitoring role in corporate governance of companies they invest in.   
 
(b) Constraints on the Discretion of the Management 
It is widely known that VCs not only provide necessary financial support to 
entrepreneurs but also widely participate in their management. The proactive 
involvement in the management of the company includes recruiting key new 
employees, replacing unsuccessful founders with professional CEOs on the board, 64  
introducing and negotiating with suppliers and customers, and advising on mergers, 
acquisitions, and flotations. Contractual terms achieving these objectives actually vest 
                                                 
63
 Chan, Y., et al., Learning, Corporate Control and Performance Requirements in Venture Capital 
Contracts, (1990), International Economic Review, 31:365, at 366. 
64
 Hellman, T., and Puri, M., Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-up Firms: Empirical 
Evidence, (2002), Journal of Finance 57:169-197; Rosenstein, J. et al., How Much Do CEOs Value the 
Advice of Venture Capitalists on Their Boards?, in Babson College, Frontiers of Entrepreneurship 
Research, (1990), 238-249, and Lerner, J., Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms, 
(1995), J. Fin., 50:301. 
Chapter 4. Creditors 
January 2008 152 
a great control right in the hands of VCs to constrain the discretion of entrepreneurs. 
 
Alternatively, VCs can disarm the conflicting interests by introducing stocks 
or stock options into the compensation scheme for directors and key employees of the 
company. By binding the directors’ and key employees’ compensation with the 
performance of the company, such compensation schemes can align the interests and 
incentives of the management and key employees with those of the investors. 65 
Further constraints on the discretion of management include the imposition on the 
management of a term to hold stocks or a specific period not to perform the stock 
options. Moreover, a pre-emptive right by VCs is usually inserted in the venture 
capital contracts to avoid the potential dilution of the control of VCs. Such measures 
not only constrain the discretion of the management but also strengthen the bonding 
effects between the management and investors.  
 
(c) Control by Covenants 
VCs usually insert many positive and negative covenants to constrain the 
discretion of entrepreneurs. For example, entrepreneurs are usually required to issue 
certain financial statements as well as other information for VCs to evaluate the 
development of the venture. Moreover, entrepreneurs are typically prohibited from 
changing the nature of the company. Self-dealing transactions, unauthorized dividend 
payments, substantial sales of stake in the company or merger with another company 
are all commonly included in the covenant clauses. 
 
Besides, once VCs make their investment, entrepreneurs may threaten to quit 
if their new terms cannot be satisfied. This strategy by the entrepreneurs will be very 
effective if the return of the venture capital depends heavily on the entrepreneurs 
remaining in the venture. For these reasons, penalties for potential exit by the 
entrepreneurs and non-competing clauses are normal in venture capital contracts. 
 
Empirical studies have found that the frequency of the use of covenants in 
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venture capital loan contracts is decided by several factors, including the size of the 
fund, the reputation of the venture capitalists, the compensation scheme for venture 
capitalists, the types of the investment, and the sophistication of the investors.66 A 
general underlying assumption is that the bigger the agency costs, the greater the 
frequency of the use of the covenants to safeguard those potential defaults.  
 
(d) Two Specific Features of Venture Capital Financing 
i) Staged Financing 
Staged financing has been widely employed in venture capital contracts.67 
Simply put, under such an investment method, VCs will disburse funds over time in 
succeeding stages. At each stage, new interim information has to be disclosed by the 
debtor company to the VCs for the latter to evaluate the progress of the company and 
make decisions regarding further investments. By threatening to stop further finance, 
perform the option to sell and liquidate the inchoate company, staged financing 
effectively minimizes the discretion of entrepreneurs to misuse the venture capital.68 
One scholar has argued that: “the role of staged capital infusion is analogous to that 
of debt in highly leveraged transactions, keeping the owner/manager on a ‘tight leash’ 
and reducing potential losses from bad decisions.”69 
 
Moreover, staged financing grants venture capitalists opportunities to stop and 
see and accordingly change the intensity of their monitoring. By studying various 
financial covenants in venture capital loan agreement, one scholar observed that 
“decreases in industry ratios of tangible assets to total assets, higher market-to-book 
ratios, and greater R&D intensities lead to more frequent monitoring.” 70  Such 
changing monitoring, either more intensive monitoring with a reduced or reserved 
                                                 
66
 Kaplan, S., and Strömberg, P., Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical 
Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, (2002a), Review of Economic Studies, 70(2):281-315.  
67
 Sahlman, W., The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations, (1990), Journal of 
Financial Economics, 27:473-524.  
68
 Power of the VCs can be further strengthened if stage review is held when the entrepreneurs’ 
working capital is almost completely exhausted, and/or insert a provision of the off-limit to the other 
financial sources. See Utset, M., Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory 
of Venture Capital Financed Firms, (2002), Wisconsin Law Review, 45-168, at 66. 
69
 Gompers, P., Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital, (1995), J. Fin., 
50:1461-1490, at 1462. 
70
 ibid. 
Chapter 4. Creditors 
January 2008 154 
investment in response to the adverse information or more lenient financial 
investment in case of rosy prospects, can only be achieved by contractual terms. 
 
ii) Convertible Securities 
In combination with the staged financing, VCs also employ convertible 
securities to enhance their governance rights. By holding convertible securities, VCs 
are granted with an option to become the shareholders of the company at their own 
discretion if certain events occur. Accordingly, VCs who hold convertible securities 
can select at their own discretion either the benefits of debt or those of shares.  
 
The beauty of convertible securities is that renegotiation is instituted into the 
contracts of the securities. Once the conditions for the conversion are met, convertible 
securities holders are in effect provided with another chance to review the specific 
situation and decide whether they are going to maintain or convert status. Convertible 
securities holders can thus have a contingent control around the occurrence of those 
moments they deem crucial. An exercise of the option to convert, however, can send 
important messages to the market. This is because VCs usually exercise the option to 
convert either when the company is in an upbeat health status, making a debt holding 
uneconomic compared with holding shares, or when a strong hand is necessary from 
outside as shares converted into by convertible debt holders usually carry the right to 
vote. Both may send positive signals to outside investors. Thus, the option to convert 
is important not only in showing the intention of involvement from the VCs but also 
in enhancing the control of VCs by mitigating the initiatives of a debtor company to 
look only at its own short-term interests without due consideration of the interests of 
VCs.  
 
These two tools, convertible debt and staged financing, combined together can 
efficiently deal with the information asymmetry between debtors and creditors.71 
Moreover, the tools themselves imply flexibility as negotiations and renegotiations 
according to the requirement of the changing business environment are instituted in 
the tools. Thus, by a better information channel and a predetermined procedure to 
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negotiate or renegotiate according to the newly acquired information, efficiency can 
be achieved.72   
 
2. The Role of Laws and Regulations 
While venture capitalists play an important role in transforming a private 
company into a public company, they may have to require such a change through or as 
shareholders. It is usually shareholders who decide, at least from the perspective of 
legal procedure (but an important and insurmountable step), to go public.73 Directors 
may acquire such authorization but subject to stricter statutory limitation.74 Indeed, if 
venture capitalists intervene in the management to such an extent that they are deemed 
as directors, either shadow directors or de facto directors,75 they may additionally 
assume fiduciary duties of directors, a situation which may conflict with their 
investment policy. In that sense, it should be conceded that under current institutions 
of governance, at least some creditors’ demands may have to be realized through 
shareholders in the meetings. But, considering the preponderant negotiating power of 
venture capitalists, the contractual binding force of the venture capital investment 
contract and other possible relations in the future between venture capitalists and the 
company, the importance of shareholders in deciding the interests of venture 
capitalists may have to be discounted. 
 
In addition to company law, securities regulation is also relevant. In the UK, 
the grant of venture capital is often made in the form of trust.76 If financing is made in 
the form of Venture Capital Trust (VCT), additional regulations in the Listing Rules 
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have to be observed.77 Moreover, if convertible securities are issued, Listing Rules 
require that convertible debt holders receive a parallel legal treatment to that for 
shareholders.78  In essence, such regulations target issuers of securities rather than 
providing protection to creditors.  
 
In addition, information disclosed to shareholders in the public securities 
market can also be taken advantage of by creditors. For example, a public company is 
required by the Listing Rules to disclose to shareholders any transaction involving 
25% or more of the assets or turnover of the company.79  Creditors may well be 
informed of such information to safeguard their own interests. However, viewed from 
this perspective, the protection of securities regulations to creditors in flotations of 
shares is only of a general and indirect sense.  
 
3. The Role of VCs in Corporate Governance around 
Flotations 
Contractual control by VCs includes greater access to information and 
multiple channels to penalize errant entrepreneurs. Empirical evidence has already 
shown that VCs have the necessary power to insert into contracts clauses vesting them 
with complex control rights at the time of their investment and more importantly to 
establish an extensive monitoring system once they make their investment in the 
company.80  
 
As stocks of private companies usually lack liquidity, VCs may find it difficult 
to exit by transferring their stocks. Moreover, even if VCs can find a possible exit on 
the open market once the company goes public, an immediate sale or transfer of their 
shareholding may be disastrous to their own interests. This is because they are often 
deemed as insiders by public investors, and a sale of their stakes in the company itself 
may accordingly be deemed by some investors as clear evidence of their lack of 
confidence in the future of the company. In turn, a sale or transfer like this may 
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precipitate the price of the stocks of the company in concern. 
 
To solve these concerns, VCs usually retain their equity holding in the 
company for some years after the company goes public. 81  For VCs, since the 
liquidation of their interests in the company and the flotation of the company do not 
necessarily happen at the same time, they may well accept such an obligation in their 
contracts with the entrepreneur. For outside investors, VCs’ retention of shareholding 
may send positive signals that VCs hold confidence in the company going public. In 
addition, as said, VC’s retention of shareholding may help to keep share price, a result 
beneficial to all shareholders including VCs.  
  
Still, a noticeable by-product of VC’s retention of shareholding is that the 
interests of VCs are in close alignment with those of shareholders. As observed by 
Hochberg, it is easier for venture-backed companies than those non-venture-backed to 
adopt a pro-shareholder governance scheme.82 Indeed, due to the wide adoption of 
convertible securities by VCs, it is hard to deny the cohesion of the interests enjoyed 
by one person. Moreover, since empirical evidence from both the US and the UK 
shows that venture capital-backed companies do outperform their counterparts 
(comparable non-venture-capital-backed companies), 83  there are good reasons to 
argue that the mutual beneficial result may in the end help to establish a sound and 
lasting relationship among financial capital providers.  
 
As VCs are usually locked up in the company going public for several years, 
the finance oriented governance structure set up by the VCs may persist long after the 
VCs exit from the company. In other words, we may observe a strong blue-print effect 
of the financial oriented corporate governance around flotations at the company level. 
Accordingly, a change of this financial oriented governance structure may at least be 
                                                 
81
 Barry, C., et al., The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public Companies, (1990), Journal of 
Financial Economics, 27:447-471. 
82
 Hochberg, Y., Venture Capital and Corporate Governance in the Newly Public Firm, (2002), 
unpublished paper, available at http://people.cornell.edu/pages/yvh3. 
83
 For the US, see Brav, A., and Gompers, P., Myth or Reality?: Long-run Underperformance of Initial 
Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture Capital and Nonventure Capital-backed IPOs, (1997), 
Journal of Finance, 52:1791-1821; for the UK, see Espenlaub, S., et al., Conflicts of Interest and the 
Performance of Venture Capital backed IPOs: A Preliminary Look at the UK, (1999), Venture Capital, 
1(4):325-349. It is also worth noting that the short-term performance of the companies after flotation is 
more related with the prestige of the sponsors rather than with others. 
Chapter 4. Creditors 
January 2008 158 
traced back to the period before flotations. An abrupt change of the governance 
structure of public companies alone is thus inadvisable.   
 
B. FLOTATIONS OF DEBENTURES 
1. The Role of Contracts 
(a) Debenture Holders  
Companies with a good credit history can lower their cost of capital by 
resorting to the public debt market rather than by asking loans from banks.84 In the 
UK, a debenture issuance usually involves four parties: the company, the underwriter, 
the debenture trustee company and the debenture holders. Contractual terms of the 
debenture are negotiated by the issuer, i.e., the company, and the underwriter. 
Debenture holders do not directly take part in the contractual relationship which the 
debenture intends to set up. Thus, some scholars have argued that the debenture 
contract is more appropriately to be understood as a contract that constitutes one party 
assigning terms rather than two parties negotiating terms. 85  Within this context, 
debenture holders are passive recipients of the contractual terms even though they 
have the selection between purchases and non-purchases.86 It is thus doubtful that 
such a debenture contract can have a due consideration of the interests of the ultimate 
debenture holders. Moreover, due to the privity of the contracts, remedies available 
for the usual negotiating contractual parties may appear to be inadequate to protect the 
interests of the debenture holders.  
 
In addition, compared with bank lenders or the other financial institutional 
lenders or specialist lenders, public debt holders may at least suffer the following 
problems in negotiating their rights under the debenture contracts: 87  1) a lack of 
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financial expertise; 2) the difficulty in setting up an appropriate monitoring 
mechanism to investigate possible opportunistic behaviour by the debtor company; 3) 
the potential free rider problem as happens in case of a large number of negotiators on 
one side; 4) contractual protection as the main method to safeguard their interests; 5) 
courts’ traditional rigid interpretation of the debt contracts and their reluctance to 
imply broader terms than expressed in the contracts. While the first three factors relate 
to the hardship or impossibility of writing in advance a complete contract which 
envisions all the possible defaults, the latter two factors leave debenture holders in a 
more difficult situation even when they want to protect their unduly protected 
interests under the contract they signed. 
 
(b) The Special Role of Underwriters 
Admittedly, an argument can be made that monitoring through trustees without 
even a contractual participation by debenture holders is precarious due to the agency 
problem. However, underwriters play a totally different role in flotations of shares 
from their role in flotations of debenture stocks. In flotations of shares, underwriters 
almost play no role in the drawing up the contractual terms attached to shares while in 
the latter situation it is the usual practice that underwriters negotiate with the debt 
issuer, i.e., the company, on the terms of the debt contract.  
 
Underwriters, in this process, need to balance at least two competing interests. 
On the one hand, underwriters have to attract the attention of the management. After 
all, it is usually the power of the management that will decide which underwriter the 
company is going to select. On the other hand, underwriters must be attentive to the 
marketability of the securities. Since it is not the intention of these underwriters to be 
debt holders of the company, the terms negotiated by underwriters must be attractive 
to the ultimate debt holders. Indeed, underwriters in debt issuance can be vividly 
compared to the agents of the future debt holders, as their interests are closely linked 
with their reputation established in sequential transactions. In other words, 
underwriters’ financial stake in negotiating an optimal contract surely provides future 
debt holders a shield of protection.  
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The decision-making process of underwriters is thus a delicate balance-
striking process. It may be too hasty to say that underwriters’ incentive to attract the 
management to conclude the contract of underwriting will easily override their 
objective to attract the ultimate debt holders to buy the debt they agree to underwrite. 
Alternatively, to satisfy the favour of the management is not necessarily in conflict 
with the requirement of the marketability as it is hard to argue that the management 
team, which is eager to attract capital, will not consider the suggestion of the 
underwriters. 88  Thus, the abovementioned pessimistic understanding regarding the 
less-respected debenture stockholders overlooks the role of the decision-making 
process of underwriters in protecting public debt holders.  
 
(c) Special Features of Debenture Stock Contracts 
Two prominent features of contractual terms of debenture contracts require 
further discussion. One feature is that negative covenants, which are usually employed 
in the private debt contracts, are not similarly evidenced in debenture contracts. 
Viewed from this perspective, it is tempting to conclude that debenture holders can be 
less protected than bank creditors.  
 
Nevertheless, the lack of financial covenants cannot be cited as evidence that 
public debt holders have been insufficiently protected.89 First, such deficiency may 
well be understood as a cost-efficient solution to the potential renegotiation with 
numerous debenture holders.90 In fact, empirical evidence indicates that there is no 
positive relationship between the number of financial covenants and financial 
gearing.91 Second, the reputation of the corporate debtor plays a more important and 
apparent role on the public debt market than on a private debt market. A debtor with a 
bad reputation can only exit the public market or increase the cost of raising capital on 
the public market. Third, few public debt holders are not portfolio investors, who can 
diversify their investment risk through other methods than merely through inserting in 
the contract those financial covenants. Fourth, the lack of financial covenants may be 
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justifiable considering the thresholds already set up in the public capital market. 
Companies issuing public debt have either a good profit history or a recommendable 
profit expectation. Thus, if companies issuing debentures publicly are doing well, the 
covenants may seem unnecessary. And if they are doing poorly, these negative 
covenants may just exacerbate the bad situation by limiting the financial flexibility 
which may otherwise be available to the company.92 
 
Another feature of the debenture contracts is that the contents of such 
contracts are almost standardized due to the widely adopted boiler-plates. An 
immediate response may be that rigidity implied in the standard contracts may destroy 
the flexibility provided by contractual negotiation. However, standard contracts do not 
necessarily indicate rigidity and cost-benefit-inefficiency.93 In fact, standard contracts 
can avoid repetitive negotiation and save transaction costs. They may let the 
contractual parties pay attention only to those core contractual terms and solve their 
main disputes quickly. A standard contract also avoids some concerns of interpretation, 
as business practices in the industry will be highly regarded by the court. Moreover, 
the boilerplate may just be the market response to the specific situation of debenture 
holders, implying that a significant underlying review is performed by the market. For 
one thing, the market may be strong enough to address the abovementioned agency 
concerns.94 For another, professional financial market intermediaries, such as credit 
rating agency and underwriters, will surely review these terms in order to decide their 
pricing or rating. Other individual investors can accordingly free ride on this market 
review process. What all these indicate is that non-mandatory standard contracts do 
provide the flexibility demanded by the real world business life.  
 
Therefore, even though debenture holders do not have a parallel protection to 
that for bank creditors, the public debt market plays a strong monitoring role through 
reputation of underwriters and corporate debtors, business norms in debenture stock 
contracting and the monitoring of other financial intermediaries. Moreover, self-
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protection through portfolio investment also diversifies the risk for debenture holders. 
Besides, according to the theory of interactive corporate governance, the inefficiency 
of debenture stock holders’ monitoring can more or less be redressed by the 
monitoring of other creditors, like that of bank creditors.95 In other words, protection 
for debenture holders must be considered within the context of the specific features of 
the public debt market. 
 
2. The Role of Laws and Regulations 
Debenture issues on the open market are subject to strict information 
disclosure as required in the issue of new shares.96 Importantly, s80 of the FSMA 
2000 requires of disclosure of any information which the market reasonably needs and 
expects to receive in order to make an ‘informed assessment’ of information of the 
issuer. In addition, an approved prospectus may also be required if transferable 
securities are to be offered to the public or traded on a regulated market in the UK.97 
Criminal liabilities may arise if there is contravention of the statutory requirement of 
prospectus.98 Any misstatement or omission in the prospectus may also give rise to 
civil compensation to those investors.99 Public debenture holders are thus protected as 
investors, the protection of whom is to enhance the integrity of the whole capital 
market.   
 
Moreover, until quite recently, there had long been a legal requirement that at 
least one trustee company was needed for listed debt securities.100 The interposition of 
a trust company between the company debtor and the ultimate debenture holders may 
more or less disarm the concern of the free rider problems among numerous debenture 
holders. For one thing, the trust company can more easily be charged with a 
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monitoring role for dispersed debenture holders. For another, a small number of trust 
companies can also facilitate the establishment of charges on a company debtor’s land 
or the creation of a floating charge,101 providing additional protections for debenture 
holders. 
 
Thus, protection for public debenture holders may well be a combination of 
contractual arrangements, legal stipulations and commercial norms. On the one hand, 
market discipline through reputation and practice norms may mitigate the agency 
concerns involved in the public offer of debentures. On the other hand, the legal 
stipulation of public information disclosure and the formation of a trust company can 
also help to redress the information asymmetry and the free-rider concern among 
debenture holders. 
 
PART IV. CREDITORS IN TAKEOVERS 
Creditors’ financial support in takeover transactions is indispensable. Indeed, 
few takeover transactions cannot be called leveraged. The difference is really an issue 
of degree rather than that of kind. Moreover, due to the current resurgence of LBOs, 
especially those supported by private equity and hedge funds, we will discuss 
creditors in such transactions as a separate issue.  
 
A. THE ROLE OF CONTRACTS 
1. Covenants Related 
(a) Covenants Employed 
Debt holders have long been inserting “change of control covenants” to avert 
the potential loss relevant to a change of corporate control. Triggering points for these 
covenants may spread from a certain percentage of the share acquisition by a third 
party to a merger of two companies into either one existing company or a newly 
                                                 
101
 Morse, et al., (1992), paras. 13.020 and 13.147 and Davies, (2003a), at 810. 
Chapter 4. Creditors 
January 2008 164 
created company. Once these conditions are triggered, creditors may require an 
acceleration of the maturity of the loan contract, or sell back these debts to the 
corporate debtor, or ask for a revision of the contractual terms especially the interest 
rate so that additional risks will be appropriately considered.  
 
Other covenants relevant to takeover activities include the maintenance of 
financial condition and engagement in the same business. To maintain a certain 
financial condition is usually achieved by keeping certain financial ratios above a 
certain threshold. For example, the debt/equity ratio is often employed to safeguard 
any potential wealth transfer from creditors to equity holders. Thus, additional debt 
may be strictly prohibited or reviewed. Alternatively, to stay in a certain line of 
business is also very important at least to small companies, which may otherwise 
dispose of their main assets without the approval from the creditors.     
 
Or, creditors may select a decline of credit rating as the main trigger of the 
remedy. This trigger starts from the basics of the interests of the creditors and may 
thus provide ideal protections for creditors in takeover transactions. However, a 
categorical acceptance of the usefulness of such a clause is also dangerous as a 
decline in rating may well be caused by some other factors unrelated with takeover 
transactions. For example, a covenant linked with a decline of credit rating will only 
aggravate the distress suffered by the company when the drop of the credit rating is 
caused by intensive competition on the market rather than by the impending takeover 
transactions. In such cases, such covenants may only do a disservice to the interests of 
creditors. 
 
(b) Protections Provided by Covenants 
Debt holders are offered many choices in cases of defaults of the above 
contractual terms. They may either sell debts back to the company at a predetermined 
price or continue their holding of the debt but at a revised interest rate for the decline 
of the credit rating. Furthermore, remedies can also be provided in tandem with the 
development of the takeover transaction. 
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The effectiveness of these covenants especially those control covenants largely 
depends on the specific contents of such covenants. In fact, debt holders with strong 
covenant protection may not suffer loss but rather acquire gains in cases of takeover 
transactions.102 One American study further reveals that convertible security holders 
earn extremely large and significant wealth gains in stock-for-stock mergers.103 While 
financial gains to offeree shareholders partially contribute to the gains to convertible 
security holders, the main driving force, however, is favourable contractual 
conversion terms, or the attached option values, in such debentures. 
 
On the other hand, covenants can never cover all situations. For instance, in 
order to raise as much capital as a company can, a corporate debtor may be extremely 
creative in designing a complex structure of debts. Creditors may accordingly bear 
some initial sufferings as covenants may not cover such financial innovations. 
However, it is hard to believe that such inequality may last long in commercial 
practices. This is because the market may have not prepared fully for a new financial 
innovation the time when it arises. The insertion of a covenant in the debt contract 
around this time may thus seem repulsive to both contractual parties or may be at 
odds with market practices thus inducing reluctance from either side of the contractual 
parties. However, if similar losses occur to other participants, or potential losses are 
perceived real by more participants as the market develops, a due introduction and 
assessment of a corresponding covenant may be rightly made or be readily accepted 
by all contractual parties on the market.  
 
The law largely stands outside this process unless the bottom-line — fairness 
— is touched. For Tauke, the concept of fairness, an important principle in contract 
formation ex ante, is indirectly identified by reference to unfairness. He argues: 
“What is needed to establish unfariness is a demonstration that 
investors are not compensated ex ante for the extra risks they bear as a 
result of the debtor corporation’s retention of the ability to engage in 
many types of actions detrimental to the debenture holders’ interests. 
Unless there is some reason to believe that investors are unaware that a 
bond contract lacks protection, it is hard to understand why investors are 
not compensated by a market price determined in light of the absence of 
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the contractual protections.”104 
 
In other words, unfairness cannot be established if no contractual party has the 
prior knowledge of the occurrence of the later event or either party, who already 
projects the rare existence of the possibility, reasonably disregards it. Only when one 
party intentionally take advantage of the opportunity that the other party has no 
knowledge of can unfairness be established. Accordingly, if financial innovation is 
created after the contracts are in place, it may be too hasty to conclude that such 
contracts are doomed to be unfair to creditors.  
 
Control covenants in takeover transactions, however, may help entrench the 
incumbent management. This is especially the case where management can exercise 
its discretion in deciding the fate of takeover bids, as what happens in the US.105 In 
such a context, debt holders do not have the opportunity to touch the trigger. Instead, 
the initiation of the trigger is predominantly decided by directors, who may well serve 
their own interests by staving off hostile bids.  
 
In comparison, boards in the UK do not enjoy a similar advantage as defensive 
measures against an impending takeover offer must be approved by shareholders. The 
prior review of shareholders however does not target those covenants in existence 
long before the impending takeover transactions. In that case, the existence of control 
covenants can increase the cost of takeover transactions, thus decreasing the initiative 
of those potential bidders to initiate such transactions in the first place.106 Accordingly, 
covenants for the purpose of protecting creditors may indirectly entrench the 
incumbent board. 
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2. The Differentiation between Existing Creditors and New 
Creditors 
(a) Existing Creditors 
Protection for existing creditors depends on their pre-takeover contractual 
rights. For pre-takeover secured creditors, they at least have some proprietary claim 
against the assets of the company.107 For unsecured creditors, we may have to separate 
trade creditors from the other unsecured creditors.108 This is because trade creditors 
can still control the upstream or downstream of the production of the company. Since 
a company in takeover transactions almost always wants to be transferred as a going 
concern for a better price, directors usually permit payments to trade creditors. In 
other words, the pre-takeover contractual rights of secured creditors and the special 
strategic position of trade creditors to the company in takeovers may provide them 
due protection.  
 
However, in contrast with creditors in the above two categories, other pre-
takeover unsecured creditors may suffer the most. They are not voluntary high risk 
takers. Nor are they compensated with a high return. Companies thus do not have 
incentives to care for their interests as they are not essential for the company’s 
running. Usually, pre-takeover unsecured creditors can only accept one of the two 
results: either to accept a substituting equity stake but still bear the risk of being worth 
nothing if the transaction fails, or to sell their debt at a substantial discount.     
 
Nevertheless, protection of pre-takeover unsecured creditors must be viewed 
in perspective. The high occurrence rate of takeover transactions may invalidate any 
claim that takeover transactions are not taken into consideration in creditors’ 
autonomous decision-making process. Moreover, it is highly possible that an 
unexpected takeover transaction is not the reason for the downgrade of the credit 
status of a company in the takeover transaction.109 In addition, unsecured creditors can 
still rely on control covenants or simply the decline of credit rating as initiators for 
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potential remedies or to have a chance to renegotiate their contractual terms.  
 
(b) New Creditors 
Capital needed in takeover transactions may also come from new creditors. 
These newcomers join the transaction with due consideration of the risk of their 
credits. The conclusion of their loan contracts is more often than not a result of their 
evaluation of the investment opportunity, a result which is an outgrowth of their long-
term expertise in a specific line of industry or just their individual reliance on the 
management of the company. In practice, most creditors of this group also perform a 
comprehensive prior investigation before their investment. For example, an objective 
and comprehensive audit report is usually a necessary document needed for their 
investment decision. Moreover, a strict continuous monitoring is also ensued. More 
detailed disclosure in shorter periods and more stringent observance of the contractual 
terms than normal are also required. Last but not least, their assumption of the high 
risk is usually compensated by the higher interest rates. In sum, their decision to bear 
the risk is a result of their own business judgment. This realization is important in that 
laws and regulations usually do not want to interfere in the business judgment process 
by market participants, much less the reluctance of the court to second guess the 
business judgment ex post.  
 
While new creditors join just for the purpose of the intended takeover 
transactions, their participation may, however, menace the interests of existing 
creditors. Still, existing creditors can stipulate that no other loan can be made with the 
same order as or superior to theirs in getting repayment (i.e., the negative pledge). 
 
In sum, contractual protections can largely play their due role in safeguarding 
the interests of creditors in takeovers. For existing creditors, the adoption of such 
covenants as control covenants and a decline of credit rating may provide them with a 
due protection. Even though unsecured creditors may suffer from a relatively 
disadvantaged negotiation position compared with secured creditors and trade 
creditors, their interests may either be justified by their own decision or be protected 
by contractual laws. For new creditors, their investment decision is made with the 
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potential high risk in mind. So, given the strong negotiating positions of most 
creditors and the high occurrence rate of takeover transactions, contractual 
arrangement can fairly protect the interests of creditors.  
 
B. THE ROLE OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
Laws and regulations specifically targeting creditors in takeovers are rare. 
However, we still can find some relevant. Indeed, the law on capital maintenance is a 
relevant example. The initiation for legal constraints on financial assistance to share 
buybacks originated from the concern that the offeror may raise huge debts to buy the 
offeree shares on the basis of the assets and credit rating of the offeree company and 
then sell the assets of the offeree company to pay back their loans.110 If no covenants 
restricting such transactions exist in the contracts between existing creditors and the 
offeree company, existing creditors may find themselves ‘suddenly exposed to a firm 
whose controllers have much greater incentives to gamble with their money than the 
one they lent to.’111  The law on financial assistance can thus fill the gap of the 
incomplete contracts. 
 
Moreover, if a takeover transaction leads to the insolvency of a company, 
insolvency law will come into play when the company is in the vicinity of insolvency. 
The underlying theme of relevant laws is that it is illegal and void to make any 
transfer for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or defrauding creditors.112 Besides, if 
convertible debentures are issued, as often occurs in MBO transactions, relevant laws 
on convertible debentures must be observed. In that context, creditors may well enjoy 
the protection provided to shareholders.   
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C. CREDITORS IN BUY-OUT TRANSACTIONS 
Given the gravity of the moral hazard problem, it is not strange that MBO loan 
agreements were observed to have more covenants than general corporate lending 
agreements.113 For example, dividend restrictions are more likely to be found in loan 
contracts in MBOs and MBIs114 than in other types of bank loans, where the existence 
of relevant statutory stipulations on dividend distribution in the UK may already 
provide creditors with sound protection.115 Moreover, cash flow restrictions are also 
often located in loan contracts of MBOs and MBIs. 116  These covenants at least 
indicate that creditors have accepted the negotiating cost in order to avoid the 
potential larger loss arising from agency costs. 
 
Empirical evidence has shown that over 60% of the secured creditors who 
provide finance for MBO/LBO transactions may recover their debts.117 In comparison, 
unsecured creditors may not be as lucky as secured creditors. However, it should still 
be noted that buyout transactions are usually made at a time when the company is a 
going concern. The disposition of assets or the insolvency of relevant companies is 
more often than not a step after compensations for creditors of the offeree company 
have already been met.118 In other words, the implications of MBO transactions on 
unsecured creditors should not be overrated. 
 
Alternatively, creditors in the current resurgence of buyout transactions have 
new features. Indeed, one important factor contributing to the current wave of buyout 
transactions is the existence of large amount of institutional capital which provides 
financial sources for private equity fund managers and hedge fund managers.119 The 
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availability of such a large amount of idle capital produces two important implications. 
On the one hand, it makes possible the high gear ratio in the current buyout 
transactions. In fact, empirical evidence reveals that among the five largest LBO 
transactions in the 12 months to June 2006, the average share of equity was just 
21%.120  
 
But on the other hand, the existence of so large amount of idle capital implies 
intensive competition among creditors for good projects. In turn, it is not a surprise to 
find in practice relaxations of contractual terms, such as covenant waivers, 
amendments and short-term refinancing. 121  Moreover, debts in going private 
transactions are designed in very complex structures and are also distributed to other 
market participants.122 In turn, the increased use of variety of financial derivatives has 
already resulted in unclear ownerships of the credit risks involved in private equity 
deals.123  
 
The incompleteness of loan contracts, either individually or collectively, may 
in the end lead to a systemic disaster in the capital market and compromise the 
interests of creditors in general. In fact, if the current low interest rate is no longer the 
case, the increasing short-term exposure in the current private equity backed LBO 
transactions may result in numerous defaults of the current loan contracts, impairing 
the stability of the whole capital market. In a word, the potential losses to creditors 
and the implications on the capital market may be too large to be overlooked.124 
 
However, the Financial Services Authority also acknowledges that the market 
has responded to that risk by “setting up distressed investment funds” and “staffing 
restructuring teams”.125  Moreover, although short-term exposure is increasing, the 
medium and long-term exposure is decreasing or becoming widely distributed. 
Accordingly, the dark side of these transactions may well be mitigated by the market. 
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Besides, creditors involved in such transactions are mostly active capital market 
participants with incomparable and sophisticated financial expertise. It is hard to deny 
that no other participants can provide better protection than themselves. In other 
words, the effectiveness of the dominant contractual protection for creditors will still 
be evident. 
 
PART V. CREDITORS IN INSOLVENCY 
Financial pressures from creditors, especially when companies are in financial 
distress, can have a positive effect on productivity growth. 126  In other words, 
creditors’ pressure in insolvency may in turn produce positive governance effects 
when companies are going concerns, indicating that insolvency can be understood as 
just a part of the continuum of the development of corporate governance.  
 
A. THE ROLE OF CONTRACTS 
To understand the role of contracts in protecting the interests of creditors, we 
may have to start from the role of insolvency law in creditors’ contract design prior to 
insolvency. A creditor-orientated insolvency legal institution may facilitate debt 
finance, decreasing the debt cost to the company and increasing the ratio of debt in the 
capital finance structure. In contrast, a debtor-orientated insolvency legal institution 
may first frustrate the initiatives of creditors to lend. If loans are made in this context, 
higher interest rates will be expected to compensate for the potential defaults of the 
company debtor and the difficulty in enforcing creditors’ rights. Once defaults do 
occur, renegotiations can solve some conflicts though many cases may have to go to 
courts, which have a strong propensity to enforce the pre-insolvency negotiated 
contracts between debtors and creditors in the UK.127   
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(1) Small Companies 
According to the review of the Association of Business Recovery Specialists, 
insolvency predominantly affects small companies. 128  A study of corporate 
governance of small companies in insolvency is thus of special importance in the UK. 
 
Small companies in the UK rely more on debt finance through a main bank 
creditor along with many trade creditors. 129  Compared with bank creditors, who 
usually have a substantial control of the company in distress through their highly 
collateralized debt, including setting up a floating charge, trade creditors are at a 
disproportionate risk. However, the existence of a leading bank creditor also 
facilitates the rescue process because small companies as going concerns are of 
special importance for banks’ future profits. Banks’ lending to small companies is 
usually made at lower rates with the hope that future growth of small companies will 
generate more business for the bank.130 Alternatively, the liquidation of a company 
will affect the level of customer deposits and other business for a regional bank.131 In 
addition, a bank active in liquidation may have a reputation among potential 
customers, who may simply avoid it and go for other banks. In turn, such factors may 
accumulatively produce a pro-rescue culture among creditors for small companies.  
 
Within this context, the leading bank creditor can play an important role in 
corporate rescue. Indeed, the normally inserted restrictive covenants and collateral 
rights can grant bank creditors a meaningful control in distressed companies.132 In 
addition, such pre-insolvency contractually designed control rights in the hands of 
creditors are further enhanced by the contractualist-oriented courts in the UK.133  In 
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fact, banks in the UK often adopt a tough attitude in rescuing a company in distress134  
as about 75% of the cases studied turnaround without going through the legal 
insolvency procedures.135 Private rescue through contractual arrangements thus plays 
an important role in rescuing small companies in distress in the UK.  
 
(2) Large Companies 
The debt structure of large companies is different from that of small 
companies. Due to the size of the loan and the specific banking regulations, loans to 
large companies are generally syndicated. However, compared with diffused public 
bond holders, bank creditors in syndicated bank loans are still relatively concentrated. 
Thus, private corporate rescue efforts through contractual arrangements are still a 
possible solution for large companies in distress in the UK.136  
 
In fact, private contractual ‘workouts’ for large UK companies have long been 
established in the banking community as the “London Approach”, which has been 
described as: “a non statutory and informal framework introduced with the support of 
the Bank of England for dealing with temporary support operations mounted by banks 
and other lenders to a company or group in financial difficulties, pending a possible 
restructuring”137 Two phases are involved in the rescue process. First, a standstill 
agreement among lending banks is reached. An unpromising report after investigation 
will initiate the administrative process. If a viable business is still within reasonable 
hope, the second phase comes in. Coordinated efforts are organized by the lead bank 
with the largest exposure in order to reach a work out plan for the company in distress. 
Either debt will be restructured or the operation of the company will be reorganized at 
this stage.   
 
Work-out plans in the London Approach are usually negotiated in private with 
confidential agreements being signed among rescuing banks. The secrecy in effect 
saves the potential loss in reputation once the distress of the public company is leaked 
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to the market.138 Given the strong role of the Bank of England and the culture in the 
City, work-out contracts may have a strong power of enforcement and binding 
commitment from the participating banks.139 In fact, a survey in 1999 showed that 
large UK based companies rarely entered legal insolvency proceedings.140  
 
It is true that changes in the commercial environment have already 
destabilized the original context within which the London Approach operated. For 
example, one important implication of the current resurgence of buyout transactions is 
that the traditional syndicated bank loan with a leading bank is no longer the case. 
Rather, the broadening institutionalization of the debt market means that a broad and 
diverse creditor base is more often observed in current leveraged transactions. The 
implication is that the traditional private rescue efforts through the London Approach 
may no longer be feasible.141 However, the commercial norm of the London Approach 
may not disappear quickly,142 and contractual workout plans may still be a feasible 
solution for public companies in distress for some time.  
 
B. THE ROLE OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
While contractual solutions are feasible, there are still many companies 
entering into legal insolvency proceedings. Private solutions through contractual 
arrangements suffer their own shortcomings of privity as only contractual parties are 
bound by the contracts signed.143 Moreover, since private rescues are usually made in 
secrecy, creditors outside the workout plans may have to price their terms for the 
worst-cases. As a result, transaction costs as a whole may be large. 144  Legal 
intervention is thus necessary. 
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The pro-liquidation insolvency law in the UK has long been deemed as 
creditor-favorable. Empirical studies also show that creditors are provided with more 
favorable protection in the UK than they are in other developed economies. 145 
However, the current promotion of corporate rescue has important implications for 
creditors, whose interests may at least be suspended for the purpose of corporate 
rescue.  
 
1. Legal Procedures 
(a) CVA 
In order “to make company rescue simpler, cheaper and more accessible, 
particularly for the smaller company,”146 a moratorium is introduced to provide the 
distressed company with a breathing space, during which no proceeding or execution 
or legal process can commence without a court’s leave.147 A court’s leave will only be 
granted if the proposed action is in the benefit of the company.148 Once the proposal 
initiated by the director is passed at the meeting of creditors, the voting result is 
binding on those unsecured creditors who had received the notice.149 However, there 
must be a majority of more than 75% in value of the creditors present in person or by 
proxy and voting for the proposal.150 Even though secured creditors are not bound by 
such a proposal, floating charges cannot be crystallized as the moratorium, which may 
last up to 28 days and possibly be extended for another 2 months,151 is binding on all 
creditors. 
 
In this process, the court plays an important role in supervising the process and 
implementing the agreement. Moreover, fresh funds are also available through the 
DTI’s Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme or through negotiation with existing 
creditors to dispose of assets or to rearrange for new credit. However, the end result of 
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such corporate rescue procedures may just be to postpone the inevitable—the 
liquidation of the company. In this context, protection for creditors is subjugated to 
the superior objective of the rescue of the company.  
 
(b) Administrative Receivership and Administration 
The current marginalized receivership in the UK can be seen as a virtual 
abolition of the contractualist insolvency system in the UK.152 The administrative 
receivership has long been criticized for its favours to floating charge holders, who 
had the right to appoint an administrative receiver only for the interests of the 
appointer. Such a legal result has its justification because an administrative receiver 
acquires his rights from the debenture deed and he thus must act for the interests of 
the creditors without considering those of the other stakeholders or shareholders of the 
company. Since a floating charge is only feasible for small and medium sized 
companies, administrative receivership is mainly applicable to small and medium 
sized companies. The concentrated debt structure and the priority of floating charge 
holders in appointing administrative receivers may produce an efficient insolvency 
scheme because the decision making by a privately appointed administrator on the 
basis of the property right attached to the floating charge can be more efficient than 
that by an insolvency practitioner who may have to spend time in collecting 
information about the debtor. Thus, the intentional marginalization of receivership in 
the UK has arguably deprived companies in distress a benefit from private contractual 
arrangements with the bank or the leading bank in negotiating for favourable outside 
finance.153 
 
Nevertheless, the predominant concern for the interests of the appointing 
debenture-holder led the Cork Committee to worry about administrative receiver’s 
lack of consideration of the interests of the other stakeholders, e.g., unsecured 
creditors, company members, and the wider public interests.154 Under the new scheme 
introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002, Qualifying Floating Charge Holders (QFCHs), 
                                                 
152
 Armour, J., and Frisby, S., Rethinking Receivership, (2001), Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
21(1):73-102. 
153
 ibid. 
154
 Cork Report, Cork Advisory Committee, Bankruptcy: Interim Report of the Insolvency Law Review 
Committee, (1980), Cmnd 7968, paras. 437-9. 
Chapter 4. Creditors 
January 2008 178 
the company and the directors all have the right to appoint an administrator without 
petitioning the court.155 This procedure has a strong accent of corporate rescue which 
is explicitly expressed in Schedule B1 of the IA 1986. Any application for an 
administration order cannot be withdrawn except with the approval of the court.156 
After the appointment of the administrator, a court officer, 157  there is a main 
moratorium, during which it is mainly the responsibility of the administrator to rescue 
the company. 
 
However, a member or a creditor of the company is also entitled to challenge 
the administrator’s conduct if he thinks that the conduct unfairly harms the interests of 
the applicant or that the administrator does not perform his functions as quickly or 
efficiently as is reasonably practicable.158 Accordingly, members of the company and 
unsecured creditors can contest an administrator’s unreasonable asset sale strategy or 
the decision not to rescue the company.  
 
Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that QFCHs have the final decision 
regarding the appointment of the administrator as they may replace the appointee of 
directors or other creditors.159 Moreover, if a receiver has already been in office as a 
private agent of the charge holder rather than that for the company, the court cannot 
intervene.160 Besides, once the process is underway, the end result for contestants is 
largely constrained by the subjective judgement of the administrator161 and the courts’ 
traditional deference to the expertise of the insolvency practitioners. 162  Thus, the 
newly reformed scheme may only represent ‘a small victory for unsecured creditors 
in marginal cases’.163 
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(c) Liquidation 
While corporate rescue efforts are worthwhile, the end result is uncertain. 
Indeed, a delay in liquidation may further place recoveries to creditors at a greater risk 
than a timely liquidation.164 This said, legal procedures of liquidation are also diverse. 
Protection of the interests of creditors thus entails separate considerations under 
different procedures.  
 
Liquidation can further be divided into Members’ Voluntary Liquidation, 
Creditors’ Voluntary Liquidation and Compulsory Liquidation. In a Members 
Voluntary Liquidation, a resolution of the members and a declaration of solvency are 
required. 165  Creditors’ interests in this situation are usually not prejudiced as the 
company must be a going concern and creditors’ claims must have been met before 
the liquidation of the company.  
 
In a Creditors’ Voluntary Liquidation, a meeting of creditors must follow the 
meeting of shareholders. Though shareholders have the right to choose their own 
liquidator, creditors on the later meeting of creditors can replace the shareholders’ 
choice with a nominator of their own.166 Since the appointment of the liquidator is 
decided by the majority value of the debt, creditors may have to sacrifice their 
interests voluntarily or compulsorily for their collective interests.  
 
Creditors’ interests are at serious risk if the company is in a compulsory 
liquidation, as it is usually in such a case that the company is at the end of its life. In 
such a situation, secured creditors may get something based on their qua property 
rights on the security while unsecured creditors may be left with nothing. The role of 
law in this case is to arrange a distribution order among different groups of creditors. 
Thus, creditors’ interests in such a situation may have to be discounted by the 
distressed financial situation of the company. Nevertheless, we may have to revert to 
the contractual arrangements of creditors, in which covenants or security interests, 
may well be triggered in advance of the occurrence of the compulsory liquidation and 
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provide creditors with a means to exit or sell secured property for their own benefits. 
 
2. Residual Claimants and Priority to Shareholders 
As expressed in Brady v Brady,167 in the vicinity of insolvency or the time 
when a venture can only be carried out by relying totally on the loan from the 
creditors, “the interests of the company are in reality the interests of existent creditors 
alone.”168 Similarly, in the leading case Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. 
Dodd,169 the court expressed the view that creditors’ interests overrode those of the 
shareholders when a company is insolvent. That is, after such a crucial point in the life 
of a company, creditors have supplanted shareholders as the residual claimants of the 
company.   
 
It is known that the nearer a company is to insolvency, the more intensive the 
conflict between shareholders and creditors becomes. Both shareholders and creditors 
will race to retain their shares of the assets of the company, the value of which is 
declining as the company comes to the end of its life. The race is, however, mutually 
detrimental to both shareholders and creditors as it can speed up the rate of the demise 
of the company.  
 
Insolvency law stipulations thus ensure that interests of creditors should be 
met before any consideration of shareholders can be taken in insolvency.170 However, 
the residual value of the company in distress is often not enough to meet the total 
claims of creditors. In other words, the priority rule does not provide a complete 
solution to the question of protecting the interests of creditors.  
 
Nevertheless, a creditor with a debt as little as £750 can petition a court to 
wind up the company.171 By setting up a threshold as little as £750, the law enhances 
the protection granted to creditors. Even if creditors may not take advantage of such a 
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right as often as they can, the existence of such a right can still be a real restraint on 
the discretion of company debtors to misuse their loan.    
 
Moreover, in the vicinity of insolvency, conflicts of interests exist not only 
between shareholders and creditors but also between secured creditors and unsecured 
creditors. Whereas most secured creditors can recover their investment through their 
security on the assets of the company,172 unsecured creditors may be no better than 
shareholders in recovering their financial investment. The differentiation has an 
important governance implication that only unsecured creditors can fill in the post of 
residual claimants in insolvency.  
 
3. Directors’ Duty to Creditors 
It has been widely accepted that directors owe a fiduciary duty to the interests 
of the company they serve. The real concern, however, is what the contents of the 
interests of the company are. When companies are going concerns, it can be argued 
that interests of shareholders are closer to those of the company. However, when 
companies are in the vicinity of insolvency, it is the interests of creditors that are 
closer to the interests of the company. Some scholars then argue that directors owe a 
fiduciary duty to the interests of creditors. We now turn to this issue in this section. 
 
(a) A Contractual View from Case Law 
In a series of cases, Lord Templeman tried to clarify the nature of the duty of 
directors to creditors. In Re Horsely & Weight Ltd,173 creditors sued over a grant of a 
pension policy to directors, which was made two years before the insolvency of the 
company. The Court of Appeal ruled that directors did not breach any duty to creditors. 
While Templeman L. J. (as he then was) agreed that directors do owe duties to 
creditors under some circumstances, he continued:  
“[I]f the company had been doubtfully solvent at the date of the grant to 
                                                 
172
 62% in MBO transactions in Citron, et al., (2003) and 70% for non-MBO small and medium sized 
companies in Franks and Sussman, (2000b). 
173
 [1982] 3 WLR 431 
Chapter 4. Creditors 
January 2008 182 
the knowledge of the directors, the grant would have been both a 
misfeasance and a fraud on the creditors for which the directors would 
remain liable.”174  
 
This decision shows the existence of a duty but with an “if” condition. The 
duty recognized in the hypothetical situation arises from an action termed as “both a 
misfeasance and a fraud.” It is not hard to follow the line of reasoning but it seems 
this opinion does not give us the answer to the question whether directors owe a 
general fiduciary duty to creditors. This question was further explored by Lord 
Templeman in Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co. Ltd.175 In that case, two 
director shareholders (a husband and wife) used the capital of the company to buy 
themselves a house. The House of Lords reached a unanimous decision against the 
directors. Lord Templeman stated that:  
“A company owes a duty to its creditors, present and future. The 
company is not bound to pay off every debt as soon as it is incurred and 
the company is not obligated to avoid all ventures which involve an 
element of risk, but the company owes a duty to its creditors to keep its 
property inviolate and available for the repayment of its debts. The 
conscience of the company, as well as its management, is confided to its 
directors. A duty is owed by the directors to the company and to the 
creditors of the company to ensure that the affairs of the company are 
properly administered and that this property is not dissipated or exploited 
for the benefit of the directors themselves to the prejudice of the 
creditors.”176  
 
According to this decision, we can safely draw the following conclusions: 1) 
the company owes a continuous duty to creditors; (2) but this duty is indirect as “the 
conscience of the company, … is confided to its directors.”  
 
But, is the duty owed by directors to creditors a fiduciary one? It is worth 
mentioning that the respected Lord did not express the duty as a fiduciary one, which 
he can easily and vocally employ if he thought so. While the failure to use the term of 
fiduciary duty is only a piece of negative evidence to the nonexistence of fiduciary 
duty, some positive evidence appears later in Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual 
Life Nominees Ltd.177 Lord Templeman concurred with Lord Lowry, who held that  
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“Although directors are not liable as such to creditors of the 
company, a director may by agreement or representation assume a special 
duty to a creditor of the company. A director may accept or assume a duty 
of care in supplying information to a creditor…”178 
 
Thus, it seems clear that the duty of directors arises not from a fiduciary 
relation but from agreements or representation. In other words, the duty is a 
contractual one.179  The complex relationship between the company, directors and 
creditors can be easily summarized as following: directors only owe a fiduciary duty 
directly to the company, which owes a contractual duty to creditors. In other words, 
the nature of this duty may more easily be described as a contractual duty with the 
recognition that directors only owe a fiduciary duty to the company as a whole. This 
understanding is, however, in conformity with the separate personality of a company 
in law. Directors only owe a fiduciary duty to the company, the interests of which 
overlap the interests of creditors. Moreover, the weight attached to the interests of 
creditors in deciding the interests of a company is linked to the different phases of the 
life cycle of corporate governance. In insolvency, the weight attached to the interests 
of creditors is superior to that for shareholders, but still the interests of creditors 
cannot be identified with those of the company. For this, we have observed that the 
interests of creditors can statutorily be constrained for the purpose of corporate rescue. 
In other words, directors’ duty to creditors has been filtered through the separate legal 
personality of a company. The link between directors and creditors is set up because 
the contractual relationship between creditors and the company rather than something 
like a fiduciary duty directors owed directly to creditors.  
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In sum, it is right to argue that “there is a continuum of regard for creditor 
interests from being one interest amongst many competing interests to being the prime 
consideration” 180  in the vicinity of insolvency. However, a duty to consider the 
interests of creditors is in stark contrast to a fiduciary duty to creditors.181 The former 
duty cannot create a substantive right, i.e., creditors can neither sue for the ignorance 
of their interests nor ask a court to enforce their rights, whereas the latter duty can. 
The above discussion can only tell us that directors owe a fiduciary duty to the 
interests of the company, which may in certain situations, such as insolvency or in the 
vicinity of insolvency, prioritize the interests of creditors among the other 
considerations. There is accordingly a big gap between the fiduciary duty to the 
interests of the company and the duty to creditors specifically.  
 
Under the Companies Act 2006, creditors are separately considered from those 
factors enumerated in the list under s172(1) because the law recognizes that the duty 
of directors to promote the success of the company can be modified when the 
company is near insolvency and displaced when the company is insolvent.182 Again, 
such expression is different from that of imposing a specific fiduciary duty to 
creditors. Indeed, the law intentionally leaves uncodified directors’ duty to creditors 
and calls for further development in this area of the law.183 The legal result of such 
expression is that it is directors who consider both the external and internal situation 
and will decide what the interests of a given company should be and interests of 
which stakeholders should be prioritized. As the above discussion shows, interests of 
creditors are prioritized in the vicinity of insolvency but they are never identified with 
the interests of a company. 
 
(b) S214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
S214 of the IA 1986 stipulates that directors are personally liable for the losses 
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of creditors unless they have taken every reasonable step to avoid the losses.184 This is 
a rather objective clause not only because of the introduction of a reasonable third 
person with the corresponding qualities and in a similar position but also because of 
the adoption of the concept of constructive knowledge. A real knowledge of 
insolvency may be too hard to establish. In contrast, it may be easier for a court to 
establish a constructive knowledge by an objective third party.   
 
Directors’ liabilities under s214 are joint and several, enhancing the deterrent 
effects by strengthening the incentives to perform peer monitoring among directors. 
The amount of the compensation by the directors to creditors is that by which “the 
company’s assets can be discerned to have been depleted by the directors’ conduct” 
after the date on which the directors should have recognized the unavoidable insolvent 
liquidation. Thus the maximum amount of such compensation from directors is the net 
loss to the creditors,185 the loss which arises from the misconduct of the director.186 
Such stipulations accordingly provide creditors with an additional resource for their 
compensation. 
 
It is important to realize that the lack of specific time in initiating s214 can be 
regarded as an intentional effort since “[t]he purpose of s214 is to reverse the 
structural bias in favour of the shareholders by internalizing the risks of loss, as well 
as the chances of gain, in directors’ decision-making process when their company 
nears insolvency.”187  In other words, the law extends the consistency of decision 
making power of directors during the solvency period to the insolvency stage and tries 
to structure the decision making process rather than designate an initiator. What the 
law here requires is that directors act with their skill and due care to make a decision 
that a reasonable third person would make. This good faith requirement also indicates 
the reluctance of the court to intervene ex post of the decision made by directors.  
 
The chilling effect of s214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, however, should be 
properly evaluated. Cautious directors may ask for a premature liquidation and 
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transfer the liability to the liquidator. This is not beneficial to develop a corporate 
rescue culture and much worse may dampen the initiatives of appropriate risk taking, 
which are necessary for the development of the whole economy. Thus, what this 
clause requires should be understood as asking the management to make a good faith 
assessment of the situation.  
 
Nonetheless, even this understanding may not be sufficient for practitioners to 
follow. Among the difficulties in making such decisions is the difficulty of deciding 
when is the specific time that the probability of solvency begins to be less than the 
probability of insolvency. A transition from a solvency status to an insolvency one 
may well occur rapidly. Also, even if the company is insolvent according to the 
balance sheet standard as prescribed in s214,188 it may well be commercially solvent 
since the company may still have the ability to pay the debts when they fall due. 
Discussed from this perspective, s214 can be understood at best as discretion enjoyed 
by the court, which with no better knowledge of business judgment than directors will 
have to make the tricky judgment ex post.     
 
While s214 provides creditors with an additional source of compensation, it 
must be noted that s214 of the IA1986 does not grant creditors a right to sue the 
company directly. It is the liquidator who has the right to sue directors for their 
misfeasance. However, a liquidator may be constrained by the already sliced pie to 
initiate such a suit.189 Furthermore, even though s212 does provides creditors with a 
right to apply for a court order requiring directors to compensate for creditors’ loss 
arising from directors’ breach of duty, this right can only be available when the 
company is wound up, a time which may be too late for creditors to get some 
compensation. 
 
                                                 
188
 IA1986 s214 (6). Debts and liabilities under this article include both present and future debts and 
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4. Recoveries for creditors 
(a) The Issue of Priority 
Within creditors, absolute priority among creditors has largely been observed 
in the insolvency as secured creditors are largely unhindered in performing their 
quasi-property rights to their collaterals which are not deemed as parts of the debtor’s 
assets.190 That means their claims will be first met by the proceeds of the security. If 
the proceeds are less than the amount of the credit, the discrepancy will join the other 
claims from the unsecured creditors on the pro rata basis. 
 
Alternatively, the pari passu principle is enforced among unsecured creditors. 
However, the pari passu principle should at best be understood as a pari passu share 
of distress when the value of the company may well be worthless. Thus, as far as the 
unsecured creditors are concerned, the important issue in distribution is how to make 
the cake big enough with something left for all of them. 
 
Nevertheless, the priority rule only “partially” decides the repayment order 
because English insolvency law does not adhere to a rigid priority rule. This is 
especially so in common law. Indeed, a strong consideration of distributive justice and 
fairness can be found in the relevant law. In Re Kayford Ltd.,191 a mail order company 
in distress tried to set up a separate trust fund for clients who paid in advance for 
goods not delivered by the company. Upon liquidation, it was held that the trust did 
not constitute a part of the realizable assets of the company. While this case is special 
in that it is to protect the wider public consumers, what Megarry J. said in this case, 
however, may be applicable to other stakeholders in case of insolvency: 
“Different considerations may perhaps arise in relation to trade 
creditors; but here I am concerned only with members of the public, some 
of whom can ill afford to exchange their money for a claim to a dividend 
in the liquidation.”192 
 
                                                 
190
 Re David Lloyd & Co. (1877) 6 ChD 339. Indeed, except for a CVA and an administration order 
which may suspend the performance of the rights of secured creditors but only for a limited period, no 
other stumbling block exists for secured creditors in insolvency law. 
191
 Re Kayford Ltd [1975] 1 W.L.R. 279. 
192
 ibid., at 282 but for a criticism, see Goodhart, W., and Jones, G., The Infiltration of Equitable 
Doctrine into English Commercial law, (1980), M. L. R., 43:489, at 496-7. 
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In other words, interests of stakeholders can also be included to achieve the 
distributive justice and fairness in the special juncture of insolvency. 
 
(b) The Source and Distribution of the Recovery 
Apart from the issue of priority, distribution of recoveries around liquidation 
also depends on whether the recovered damages are vested in the company or not. If 
they are, the value of the insolvent company will be swollen. Since such recoveries 
are vested in the company, they are chargeable and in turn floating charge holders 
have seniority to other creditors regarding the recovery. Real world examples include 
the recoveries from voidable transactions within a certain period of the liquidation193 
or the disgorgement from a misplaced preferential creditor.194   
 
However, the problem is a little tricky if the recovery is not vested with the 
company but instead with some other sources. One example is recoveries from 
directors who are personally liable for the loss of the company if they breach s214 of 
the IA 1986. Remedies recovered from actions initiated by the liquidator against 
directors on the basis of wrongful trading were originally held to be assets for the 
benefit of the general floating charge holder first.195 Such a decision is apparently 
disadvantageous to unsecured creditors who seem to be real losers in case of directors’ 
wrongful trading. Later cases show an opposite view on this issue. It has been held 
that recoveries under s214 of the IA 1986 are not a part of the property of the 
company 196  and accordingly secured creditors cannot claim seniority on such 
recoveries. Indeed, such recoveries will be assets for unsecured creditors, the 
distribution of which will be subject to the pari passu principle.197  
 
The discussion in this section thus tells us that creditors enjoy a contingent 
control right in insolvency both in law and in contract. What insolvency law further 
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 See IA1986 s127 o and also Mond v. Hammond Suddards [1996] 2 BCLC 470. 
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stipulates is the distribution scheme among different groups of creditors. However, the 
current promotion of corporate rescue culture in the legal institution may unduly 
constrain or delay the protection originally available to creditors. Still, contractual 
protections for creditors may function well before the insolvency criteria are met. The 
key element is thus the information disclosure when a company is still a going 
concern. It is reasonable to infer that given the negotiating power of creditors and the 
current improvement on information disclosure, contractual protection for creditors 
can play an undeniably important role. 
 
5. Creditors in Statutory Arrangements 
(a) S425 of the Companies Act 1985 
According to a scheme under s425 of the CA1985,198 creditors’ original rights 
may be altered with the sanction of the court. The beauty of this arrangement, 
compared with that under s110 of the IA 1986, is that consideration of the interests of 
minority creditors or minority shareholders may be overcome. This is because a 
decision made with a required sanction of the court by a three quarter majority will 
bind the remainder minority of the creditors or any class of the creditors.199  The 
implication of this section is that dissenting creditors may not have an opportunity to 
initiate a compulsory liquidation if the arrangement under s425 is made with a court 
sanction.   
 
The fairness of the abovementioned majority rule thus depends on how the 
court makes the sanction. The usually adopted dual criteria include both procedural 
and substantive requirements. In detail, a resolution must first be passed with a 
statutory majority of three-quarters, and second, an honest and intelligent man, in 
capacity of either a creditor or a person representing his interest, might reasonably 
approve.200 Moreover, if there is any change to the rights of the debenture holders of 
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 To be replaced by CA 2006 Parts 26 and 27.  
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 See s425(2), to be replaced by CA 2006 s899. 
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the company, a statement must be made to explain the potential effects.201 
 
(b) S110 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
If a company is in contemplation of or after the commencement of a voluntary 
liquidation, reconstruction can be made through arrangements under s110 of the IA 
1986. A liquidator under s110 of the IA 1986 may be authorized to dispose of the 
assets of the company. 202  Consideration for the arrangement may include “cash, 
shares, policies or other like interests (or in addition thereto) participate in the profits 
of, or receive any other benefit”. 203  If creditors agree to receive shares of the 
transferee company, they may further rely on s110(6) for redressing any unsatisfactory 
treatment to them within 12 months after the special resolution provided that the 
voluntary winding up of a company has been commenced. This means that protection 
for creditors under this section may be extended for another year after the special 
resolution. In effect, this protection may be important for dissenting minority creditors, 
who may well ask the court for a compulsory liquidation within one year. However, it 
must be remembered that s110 does not necessitate as much intervention of the court 
as in arrangements under s425 of the Companies Act 1985. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this Chapter, I have discussed how the interests of creditors are shaped by 
the social political context and how they are protected by different combinations of 
legal regulations and contractual arrangements in the life cycle of corporate 
governance. We first discuss creditors in the social political context. We notice that 
the dispersed shareholding co-exists with a concentrated debtholding structure, a 
situation which historically granted creditors, especially bank creditors, a strong 
political power. Such a power is reflected not only in their legal interests as protected 
in the insolvency law but also in their strong negotiating power throughout the whole 
                                                 
201
 CA 2006 s897(3), replacing CA 1985 s426(4).  
202
 But, in case of a creditors’ voluntary winding up, either the sanction of the court or the approval of 
the liquidation committee is required; in case of a member’s voluntary winding up, only a special 
resolution conferring authority on a liquidator. See IA 1986 s110(1) and s110(3).  
203
 See IA 1986 s110(4). 
Chapter 4. Creditors 
January 2008 191 
life cycle of corporate governance.  
 
We then discuss creditors in the four capsules of the life cycle of corporate 
governance. In Part II, I discuss creditors in the normal life of corporate governance. I 
argue that creditors can effectively take advantage of their negotiating power to 
safeguard their interests through private contractual arrangements. The wide use of 
covenants and security in loan contracts may notify creditors of crucial points for the 
purpose of safeguarding their interests. Initiators for such covenants and security are 
usually triggered well before solvency criteria in insolvency law are met.  
 
While it is true that contracts cannot be complete, however, it is also the case 
that such incompleteness may be intentionally taken advantage of by contractual 
parties. Moreover, competition on the credit market may also weaken the negotiating 
power of creditors, but this is uncommon in the corporate sector as a whole. What is 
noteworthy however is that contractual protection is not a good weapon for 
involuntary creditors to safeguard their interests. Legal intervention for involuntary 
creditors is thus necessitated. 
 
Alternatively, legal stipulations work to counterbalance the implications for 
creditors of the introduction of the limited liability and the separate legal personality 
of a company in law. Still, the law emphasizes the information disclosure and does not 
prescribe the specifics of directors’ decision-making process. Also, creditors’ interests 
may be indirectly protected through legal stipulations on directors’ liabilities to the 
company. Viewed from this perspective, the legal institution provides a set of default 
legal protections for creditors regarding the implication of limited liability and 
separate legal personality of a company. 
 
In Part III, we subdivide the concept of flotation into flotations of shares and 
flotations of debentures. In both cases, we find that covenants in debt contracts play a 
prominent role in protecting the interests of creditors. By a further review of how 
Venture Capitalists (VCs) protect themselves through financial covenants, convertible 
debenture and staged financing in their contracts, we find that contractual protection 
does provide a valuable protection for creditors. In contrast, debenture holders in 
flotations of debentures may have a seemingly worse situation as debenture holders 
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have no direct contractual relationship with the company debtor. However, this 
deficiency can largely be redressed by the market. In fact, due to the high financial 
stake of underwriters in the issuance of debenture, their short-term holding and their 
status as specialist investors, and the importance of reputation to their financial 
interests, and the role of debenture holders as ultimate consumers are all factors that 
cannot be overlooked. In addition, even though individual debenture holders may be 
too weak to protect themselves, they may well free ride with strong institutional 
investors with sophisticated expertise on the market, and also, as portfolio investors, 
they are stronger than some imagined. Besides, all these factors must be considered 
with the fact that public debenture holders also receive additional legal protection for 
investors in the public capital market. Thus, for VCs, they are mainly protected by 
private contractual arrangements with legal protection filling the gaps. For public 
debenture holders, they are protected more in the sense of public investors than in the 
sense of stakeholders of the company. 
 
A notable observation of VCs is that financial oriented governance practices at 
the company level may begin at a very early stage when VCs make their investment 
decisions. The wide adoption of convertible securities by VCs in this stage in effect 
aligns the interests of creditors with those of shareholders. Empirical evidence also 
shows that such governance practices may persist for a reasonable period of time even 
after the company goes public. We thus observe a blueprint effect of the development 
of corporate governance. An inference can be drawn that governance reform targeted 
at big public companies may have to keep an eye on the governance practices around 
the birth of such a company. 
 
Next, we discuss creditors in takeovers in Part IV. Strictly speaking, few 
takeover transactions cannot be called a leveraged transaction since debt has already 
been a necessary part of takeover transactions though with different importance. 
Creditors usually use, again, financial covenants and convertible debenture to protect 
their interests in takeover transactions. However, what is special in takeover 
transactions is that conflicts exist between existing and newly joining creditors. Such 
a differentiation duly provides us with an opportunity to explain the concept of 
fairness, which is important in the modern interpretation of contracts. We argue that 
unfairness cannot arise when both parties cannot project or intentionally and 
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reasonably overlook the later occurrence of takeover transactions.  
 
The strong role of private contractual arrangements overshadows the role of 
laws and regulations in protecting creditors in takeover transactions. In fact, legal 
protection for creditors in takeovers is mainly of an indirect nature or through contract 
laws. We mention the role of insolvency law and the potential role of company law 
and capital markets laws and regulations on creditors in takeover transactions. 
However, as said, the legal protection for creditors in takeover transaction can largely 
be marginalized.  
 
Besides, we also discuss the role of creditors in the current wave of buyout 
transactions supported by private equity and hedge funds. The availability of large 
amount of idle capital searching for profitable projects has already modified the 
negotiating power of creditors in such transactions. In fact, we observe relaxations of 
traditional covenants and securities, indicating the contractual flexibilities in meeting 
the highly developing commercial practice. However, the complex structure of such 
financing has brought concerns to the stability of the capital market as a whole. We 
observed that the FSA stops short of further regulation but instead relies on traditional 
contractual arrangements and the market to counterbalance the potential risk.   
 
In Part V, we discuss creditors in insolvency. It is here that the laws and 
regulations, and almost all in their mandatory form, play an important role in 
protecting the interests of creditors. It is argued that since creditors may become 
residual claimants in the vicinity of insolvency, mandatory protection is accordingly 
initiated from that point, the specific timing of which can only be an issue of fact. 
Moreover, we discuss that insolvency law not only decides the superiority of creditors 
to shareholders in such a crucial juncture but also provides rules regulating creditors 
from within. Such a differentiation is important from the perspective of governance as 
different groups of creditors play different governance roles. In addition, we discuss 
whether directors should owe a general fiduciary duty to creditors. The general 
principle that directors owe a fiduciary duty to the company is still applicable here. A 
fiduciary duty to creditors is in conflict with this general principle and also 
contravenes the case law. In turn, directors’ duty to creditors in the vicinity of 
insolvency can only be understood as indirect through directors’ duty to the interests 
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of the company as a whole. We then explore the issue of how much creditors can get 
at the end of insolvency. Such a discussion further indicates the intensive conflicts 
among creditors. Indeed, given that only unsecured creditors are at serious risk in 
insolvency, the claim that creditors in general are residual claimants in insolvency 
may be an inaccurate description without due consideration of such intensive conflicts 
within the creditor group.  
 
The above analyses thus illustrate that contractual protection for creditors, 
although not complete, is wide-ranging and effective in most of the time of the life 
cycle of the company. It is true that their interests may be jeopardized by the financial 
and other commercial innovations. However, given their expertise and commercial 
judgment, creditors are no worse than others to safeguard their own interests 
regarding these innovations. 204  Furthermore, the modern approach to contract 
interpretation and other legal techniques may further enhance contractual protection 
for creditors. It is safe to say that the scheme of contractual protection for creditors is 
generally responsive and effective.  
 
Still, the Achilles’ heel of the contractual protection is that contracts cannot be 
complete. But the problem is more how we can control and allocate that risk than how 
we can eliminate the risk. A complete contract may be unnecessary or more costly 
than the business world dictates. For companies in need of finance infusion, creditors 
really enjoy a special advantageous bargaining position. It is the heavy demand of 
finance that strengthens and the intense competition among financial providers that 
mitigates the control of creditors. Such considerations thus revert to the power of the 
market. That is, the market decides the negotiating power of the participants in certain 
phases of the life of a company. This power, in turn, decides the contractual terms 
reached at last. The ensuing question is whether legal regulation of contracts can solve 
all the problems in the contracting processes.  
 
Viewed from this perspective, the law can only be deemed complementary to 
the role contracts play for the interests of creditors. As argued, the law at least 
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provides a background basic expectation of contractual parties.205 The law has the 
potential to meet (1) those gaps in contracts which have happened so often that 
standard contractual terms may thus save negotiation costs (through default rules); (2) 
those gaps in contracts which come into being due to the lack of sufficient negotiation, 
either because of naivety or because of disproportionate negotiating powers of the 
contractual parties (through mandatory rules to achieve fairness or social justice); (3) 
those gaps in the contracts arising from a potential prejudice to the collective interests 
by conflicting individual strategic behaviours within one side of the contract, for 
example, the mandatory disclosure of certain financial information or the registration 
of security, such as the floating charge, or the distribution in insolvency law in the UK. 
Still, it is worth reminding that undue regulation involves additional costs of writing 
and performing those rules, those of increasing litigation and those of the ensuing 
judgment-making and judgment-performing. Thus, legal intervention must be prudent 
with due consideration of arguments on both sides.  
 
On the whole, even though legal intervention in the UK is generally very 
cautious, creditors still enjoy strong contingent control rights in insolvency law. More 
importantly, under the current (most common) situation where financial capital still 
dominates the other concerns, creditors’ self-protection through contracts cannot be 
underestimated.  
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CHAPTER 5. EMPLOYEES  
INTRODUCTION 
While the interests of shareholders and creditors can simply be categorized in 
financial terms, the interests of employees include both a financial component and a 
non-financial component. The former is the financial compensation for employees’ 
firm specific investment in the company. The latter refers to fair treatment for 
employees both physically and psychologically due to their status as citizens with 
dignity in a welfare state. Discussion of the interests of employees entails 
considerations from both perspectives. 
 
We first discuss the social political issues in Part I. We will see how workplace 
democracy makes a difference to the governance rights of employees. Also covered in 
this Part are the issue how the social policy within the EU makes a difference to the 
legal development in the UK and how finance, corporate governance and labour 
relationships interact with each other. 
 
We then discuss how the combination of contractual arrangements and laws 
and regulations protect the interests of employees throughout the life cycle of 
corporate governance. As usual, employees in the normal life, flotations, takeovers, 
and insolvency are discussed in sequence. A conclusion is given at the end. 
 
PART I. SOCIAL POLITICAL ISSUES  
A. WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY  
Employees as human persons with dignity should have a right to decide what 
will make a difference to their own interests. Accordingly, employees’ participation in 
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corporate decision-making process is an end itself.1 As Allan writes:  
“A person’s participation in a decision affecting his interests 
affirms his dignity as a citizen—one whose cooperation is sought with the 
public purposes in view, rather than someone treated essentially as an 
object of administration.”2  
 
The complete form to achieve workplace democracy is employee ownership, 
which, however, due to the financial constraints, high monitoring costs arising from 
the peer review and the lack of liquidity of the membership in employee-owned-firms, 
exists across different industries but never dominates any given industry. 3  The 
importance of this form of employee participation is thus of little importance and will 
not be further discussed.  
 
Except employee ownership, employee participation can also be achieved at 
two levels in other organizational forms. One is the operational participation, which 
refers to employees’ involvement in the daily working operation, whereas the other is 
the strategic participation, which refers to employees’ participation in corporate major 
policy issues. Because employees’ operational participation does not prejudice the 
shareholder primacy while at the same time a company can make the most use of 
employees’ firm specific investment, it can safely co-exist with the predominant 
shareholder orientated corporate governance. In contrast, employees’ strategic 
involvement will inevitably dilute the control of shareholders, so this is an issue 
which deserves our discussion.  
 
1. Employees’ Participation  
(a) Employees’ Board Representation 
One important method to materialize employees’ strategic participation is 
through sitting on the board. Since the legal fact in the UK is that employees’ 
participation in decision making process is neither promoted nor negated by the 
                                                 
1
 Budd, J., Employment with a Human Face: The Author Responds, (2005), Employee Responsibilities 
and Rights Journal, 17:191-9, at 193. 
2
 Allan, T., Fairness, Equality, Rationality: Constitutional Theory and Judicial Review, in Forsyth, C., 
and Hare, I., (eds), The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord, (1998), Clarendon Press, 15-38, at 30. 
3
 Cheffins, B., Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation, (1997), Clarendon Press, at 556. 
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company law, a transplant of the legal codetermination experience in Germany is 
widely claimed for the purpose of promoting workplace democracy. This view, 
however, entails a reconsideration of governance practices within the wide social 
political context. 
 
It is true that employees in Germany, through representatives on the 
supervisory board, have much greater decision making rights than their counterparts 
in the UK. However, employee representation is of sense and importance in Germany 
in that employees are represented, as required by law, on the supervisory board, which 
is entitled with a veto right over management board decisions, and they are 
represented as employees. 4  Moreover, the mandatory employees’ participation in 
corporate decision making must also be understood within the specific social political 
context of Germany, where labour has enjoyed a much better political position than its 
counterpart in the UK ever since World War II. 5  Indeed, employees’ status in 
corporate governance in Germany can only be rightly understood as an outgrowth of 
the political process, in which “it was not intended to produce improved employee 
attitudes or greater productivity, but rather to redistribute power within firms, putting 
labour on a more equal footing with managers and shareholders.” 6  Besides, 
cooperation between employees and managements is the norm at the company level in 
Germany. All these factors are in harmony with the two-tier board structure in 
Germany. 
 
Conversely, we cannot observe a similar picture in the UK. In the UK, 
employees are excluded from the decision making process not by law but in practice. 
Employment relationship has been more of an adversarial and antagonistic nature than 
of cooperation. 7  In fact, opposition to employees’ board representation from 
conventional directors and company financial capital providers can readily be 
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 Hopt, K., The German Two-Tier Board: Experiences, Theories, Reforms, in Hopt, J., et al., (eds), 
Comparative Corporate Governance – The State of the Art and Emerging Research, (1998), OUP, 225-
258, at 228. 
5
 Davies, P., Introduction to Company Law, (2002b), OUP, at 274. 
6
 Bainbridge, S., Corporate Decision Making and the Moral Rights of Employees: Participatory 
Management and Natural Law, (1998a), Vill. L. Rev. 43(4):741-828, at 795. 
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 Cheffins, (1997), at 592. A recent study also shows that monitoring employers’ obligations towards 
their employees has been documented as the main duty of workplace trade unions. Brown, W., et al., 
The Employment Contract: From Collective Procedures to Individual Rights, (2000), British Journal of 
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detected.8 Indeed, the failure of the proposed scheme of employee representation on 
the board in the 1970s9 has already been attributed to the specific “social structure 
and tradition of corporate finance”, which make it easy for shareholders and business 
interests to resist successfully such a proposal.10 Moreover, the historically established 
antagonistic relationship between employees and employers and the dominant market 
contracting approach to settle the conflicts between shareholders and employees only 
reinforces the governance practice of the single-tier board structure in the UK.11 A 
mandatory replacement of the current single-tier board with a two-tier board or other 
forms of employee codetermination may be disastrous in that the change of the 
decision making scheme may destabilize the current economy. 
 
Such considerations thus place in doubt a mandatory board representation of 
employees in the UK at least for the time being. This said, it must be realized that 
board representation is not the only way to achieve workplace democracy. Employees 
may also participate in the decision making process through financial participation as 
will be discussed in the next section or through other routes outside the traditional 
scope of company law. To limit participation only to the board representation is a 
blind disregard of variety of the current governance practices and may only do a 
disservice. 
 
(b) Financial Participation  
The main methods of financial participation are Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans (ESOPs) and pension funds. 12   In ESOPs, employees hold shares of the 
company they work for and may thus enjoy the rights granted to shareholders in 
company law. In that sense, the governance function of ESOPs is to attach a 
shareholder status to employees.  
                                                 
8
 Hammer, T., et al., Worker Representation on Boards of Directors: A Study of Competing Roles, 
(1991), Industrial and Labor Relation Review, 44(4): 661-680. 
9
 See the Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy, (1975), Cmnd. 6706, i.e. the 
‘Bullock’ Report. The failed proposal advocated a parity representation of employees on the board. 
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 Davies, (2002b), at 274. 
11
 ibid., at 275. 
12
 In addition, financial participation by employees can also be achieved by profit sharing. Since tax 
free awards are no longer permitted after the end of 2002 under the current finance act, profit sharing 
will gradually be replaced by ESOPs and thus will not be discussed here. 
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Alternatively, employees’ long-term interests in the company are not only 
revealed in their dependence on the long-term job for their living but also reflected in 
their limited pension requirement long after they leave the company. Employee 
pension schemes can be divided into two separate categories, i.e., personal pension 
schemes and occupational pension schemes.13 Personal pension schemes are usually 
in the form of insurance policies purchased by individual employees, with or without 
the contribution from the employer and they are usually managed by fund managers in 
insurance companies.14 In comparison, occupational pension schemes are in the legal 
form of trust funds, which are subject to the regulation of trust law, and are managed 
by trust fund managers. As pensions for employees are either a mandatory 
requirement from law or a norm among employees, both company’s contributions and 
employees’ self-contribution to pension funds may thus make difference to the 
company’s remuneration policy and the corporate strategic decision making process.  
 
However, employees’ financial participation suffers from inherent deficiencies. 
Traditionally, employee shareholders do not enjoy the voting right conferred on 
shareholders. Nor can employees freely transfer their shares in ESOPs. Moreover, 
even if they have voting rights, employee shareholding is too small in most cases to 
make a difference in corporate decision-making processes. While it is true that ESOPs 
are statutorily promoted in the structure of trust,15 such structures are still not the 
norm of ESOPs in practice.16   
 
In addition, employers may fiddle the scheme by changing the payout formula 
or simply by redefining “profits” in order to downsize the award.17 Besides, employee 
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 Pensions Act 2004 s259. 
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 The establishment and running of the personal pension scheme is subject to the approval and 
authorization provisions under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The result is that the 
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Publishing Oxford and Portland, Oregon, at 132-5 
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investors with heavy investment in the company stock may also suffer 
disproportionately in finance for the reason of misleading communication between the 
management and the employee shareholders.18  Thus, even though ESOPs may be 
commended for locking in employees by inducing employees’ continuous efforts and 
work improvements, and continuous commitment to the company,19 the effect of such 
plans in enhancing employees’ governance rights and safeguarding employees’ 
interests is doubtful. 
 
Alternatively, employees’ participation through pension funds can only be 
indirect. Both insurance companies in personal pension schemes and trust funds in 
occupational pension schemes are institutional investors, who are quasi-index-
investors caring more about the general performance of the whole market than 
governance practices of any individual company. For instance, pension funds are often 
invested in companies that employees do not work for. Indeed, a fund which refused 
to invest in a competitor of a company those pension fund holders work for was 
judged to be in breach of its duty to its trustees.20 Thus, if there is any effect, it is 
likely to be indirect. 
 
Admittedly, employees may have their voice heard or even followed by taking 
part in the policy decision-making process of the investment of funds. For example, 
unions in the US have already advocated good labour standards to pension fund 
managers as one of the criteria to select target companies.21 However, these cases are 
few in number and with little consequence. Moreover, participation by influencing 
pension fund investment policy changes the status of employees into that of investors. 
In practice, employees’ support of their own interests can only be achieved indirectly 
through the general improvement of labour standards across industries. 
 
In sum, employees may influence the board decision-making process through 
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their financial participation but the effect is very limited. However, such creative 
arrangements are vivid examples that the inherent flexibility of the corporate 
governance institution can help to soothe the intensive conflicts between labour and 
capital.  
 
2. Workplace Democracy and the Hierarchical Structure of a 
Company 
The promotion of workplace democracy, however, may conflict with the 
hierarchical structure of a company. Within a company, the hierarchical structure and 
authority substitute for the free exchanges between subjects with equal status on the 
market.22 The hierarchy system can reduce role conflicts and ambiguity through a 
formalization process—the creation of written rules, procedures and instructions.23 
Additionally, compared with democracy, hierarchy can help to achieve an effective 
monitoring scheme and efficient information transmission channels in the company.24 
Thus, the hierarchical structure not only saves cost but also leads to predictability and 
order within the company.25 The hierarchical structure is accordingly a requirement of 
economic efficiency.  
 
However, with characteristics of coercion, bureaucracy, and domination,26 the 
hierarchical structure seems to be in conflict with employee control and may encroach 
on employees’ rights as citizens. Nevertheless, since employee democracy depends on 
the existence or the healthiness of the company, economic efficiency is 
complementary with workplace democracy at least to the extent that the financial 
existence of the company is not an impending headache.  
 
The above discussion shows that the widely promoted workplace democracy is 
still seriously constrained by the current finance dominated social context.  However, 
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whatever the result of such a discussion, it must be noticed that empirical evidence 
does not support a consistent relationship between employee participation and 
productivity improvement.27 Indeed, in some cases employee participation is found to 
be less effective than non-participation.28 Such findings, however, may be attributable 
to the facts that employees have heterogeneous preferences for participation29 and that 
personalities of workers and managers can largely decide the success of the 
participation program.30  Thus, it is worth noting that the promotion of workplace 
democracy or employees’ participation in the decision making process may not 
achieve what is intended. 
 
B. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
The employment relationship in the UK must be viewed within the wider 
background of the European Union, in which “the employment relationship is heavily 
regulated, through legislation that is influenced and shaped in turn by the European 
Social Policy.”31 In fact, 40% of employment regulations in the UK are imposed from 
the European Union.32  Under the joint influence of both the traditional collective 
laissez-faire and the EU-initiated principle of procedural justice for individuals, 
employment law in the UK has undergone huge development, the end result of which 
has already differentiated employment law in the UK from that in the US.33   
 
The overwhelming influence from the EU can be traced back to the social 
policy promoted within the EU. A communication paper in 1993 pointed out that 
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“much of Europe’s influence and power has come precisely from its capacity to 
combine wealth enhanced benefits and freedoms for its people.”34 Recently, the Social 
Policy Agenda document (post-Lisbon) clarifies the new strategic goal for Europe is 
to become the “most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion.”35 Moreover, the “essential linkage between Europe’s economic strength 
and its social model” has also been reiterated.36  
 
Within this background and given the persistent efforts of the current labour 
government to align the domestic policy with the policy of the EU, the juxtaposition 
of economic efficiency and social justice will guide the future development of the 
employment relationship in the UK. This again shows that the dynamic development 
of the social context dictates a dynamic view of the employment relationship and 
employees’ role in corporate governance.  
 
C. FINANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE 
MANAGEMENT OF LABOUR 
1. The Company Level 
The liquid stock market and the active labour market in the UK not only 
facilitate corporate restructuring activities but also drive innovations by providing for 
entrepreneurs readily accessible financial resources through flotations.37 This in turn 
leads to an economy with both a high birth rate and a high death rate of enterprises. 
Such a high rotating rate not only presses companies for good short-term financial 
performance so that they can keep their heads above the rapid water but also helps to 
mould short-termism in employment patterns, training and the work force 
development, as evidenced in the increasing uses of contingent employment in 
practice and also in the introduction of incentive schemes for employees based on 
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short-term financial performance.38  Accordingly, workers in the UK are prone to 
‘hold-up’ activities, which emphasize job control and restrictive practices due to their 
perception that the current governance system does not offer long-term benefits for 
co-operation.39   
 
Nevertheless, the short-term implication on employment practices can be 
mitigated by the observed stickiness in employment at the company level.40 This is 
because the flexibility of substitution is limited within the term of the capital. 
Additional flexibility is only possible when new capital is coming in. Besides, certain 
costs relevant to labour, such as those of recruiting and training, are fixed. As 
adjustments will also bring in new costs, companies prefer a kind of stability in their 
labor force.41 In fact, companies neither casually decrease the employees in bad times 
nor increase their employees as the increasing productivity demands. The inflexibility 
or stickiness of employment practice, “in effect, …, [implies] a stream of relatively 
fixed payments, not easily adjusted to accommodate variation in revenues, for firms 
which are going concerns.”42 In turn, the “intangible liabilities” of a company to its 
employees can engender an effect of the so-called labor leverage, like that of financial 
leverage, on corporate finance policies such as the equity investment policy, the 
dividend distribution policy and the capital structure.43 
 
Alternatively, while it is costly or unrealistic to make income redistribution in 
the wide economy, such adjustments are surely possible within a given company.44 
Moreover, disadvantaged employees may politically unite, to some extent, with a 
subgroup of the finance suppliers of the company to safeguard their interests.45 For 
example, compared with risk-favouring shareholders, banks, which hold rather fixed 
claims on corporate returns, stand closer to the labour. By politically influencing 
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company’s risk taking, labour may thus unite with banks to secure their interests.  
 
2. The Social Political Context 
Within the wider social context, the industrial relationship is merely a knot of 
the whole institutional network. Thus, even though a supportive culture for employee 
governance role will encourage employees to make firm specific investment, “the 
effectiveness of worker governance devices may depend on a highly reticulated set of 
supportive background institutions including intermediate institutions such as unions 
and financial monitors and public institutions for social welfare entitlements.”46 
 
Such an institutional view of corporate governance also necessitates a 
reconsideration of the current changes in employment relationship. The current 
promotion of workplace democracy can further entrench the acquired interests of 
employees because “the higher these labor rents, the stronger is the political interest 
to protect them from corporate risk.”47 This may, in turn, engender backlashes from 
financial providers. For instance, shareholders, especially institutional shareholders, 
will strengthen their inherited role as residual claimants within the scope of company 
law. Creditors, similarly, will take advantage of their negotiating power to reinforce 
their contractual rights. The end result may not be easily predicted.  
 
Indeed, both the relationship between employees and the financial aspects of 
corporate governance at the company level and that between labour and capital within 
the wider society are interactive ones. These concerns implicate that financial 
concerns and employment issues are juxtaposed in the decision making agenda of the 
company. Often, if not always, there is no predetermined priority order between 
financial and employment issues. 
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PART II. EMPLOYEES IN THE NORMAL LIFE  
A. THE ROLE OF CONTRACTS 
Employment contracts have long been recognized as the cornerstone of the 
modern employment relationship.48 On the one hand, only persons engaged under an 
employment contract can be subjects of the instrumental labour law. On the other 
hand, “it was only through the contract of employment that the terms of the great bulk 
of external regulation were enforceable legally.”49 Thus, the discussion of employees 
in corporate governance will be limited to those who have signed employment 
contracts with the company. 
 
Generally, employment contracts can be understood on two levels, i.e., the 
level of personal scope and that of collective bargaining. The former emphasizes the 
contractual rights of individual employees while the latter focuses on the collective 
negotiating power of employees as a class. Since they are mutually complementary, 
an appropriate understanding of the role of employment contracts in safeguarding the 
interests of employees entails consideration of factors on both levels. 
 
1. Personal Scope 
(a) The Dynamics of Employees’ Negotiating Power  
The current debate on employee protection can be attributed to the asynchrony 
between wage payment and employees’ firm specific investment. Employees are 
commonly said to be exploited by the employer as employees usually do not receive 
due payment for their firm specific investment during their employment term. Such 
argument has its merits for some employees but it may go too far to extend it as a 
generalization to all employees.  
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Employees’ firm specific investment is a dynamic issue which is case-
sensitive to individual employees. For any individual employee, there are four phases 
regarding the development of the relationship between his firm specific investment 
and the payment of wages.50  In phase one, both the employer company and the 
employee make firm specific investments. Thus, it is justifiable to observe that the 
employee is paid with a value over or equal to that of his marginal product but less 
than his opportunity wage in the general external labour market. In phase two, 
employees’ firm specific investment increases though the payment they receive is less 
than both the value of their marginal product and the opportunity wage on the external 
labor market. Employees accept such terms because they defer their compensation for 
the sake of their job security. Thus, employers are benefiting from the contribution of 
employees’ firm specific investment in this phase.  
 
In phase three, employees’ firm specific investment makes them more valuable 
to the employer than other potential employers on the market. However, employees in 
this phase are paid higher than the value of her opportunity wage on the external 
labour market but less than the value of her marginal product. In phase four, 
employees are paid with an amount higher than the value of their marginal product 
and that of the opportunity wage on the external market. It is in this phase that 
employees recoup their former firm specific investment and deferred compensation.51 
 
The realization of four phases in employees’ firm specific investment tells us 
that employees in different phases enjoy different negotiating powers. For employees 
in phase one, due to the ever-changing individual psychological and physical 
conditions,52 the incompleteness of the employment contracts may in fact permit the 
strong discretion for the employee ex post the contract. This is because it is difficult to 
translate into contractual terms efforts from employees, whose investment is not once-
for-all, as what shareholders do, but continuous.53 An inference can be drawn that 
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rational employees in phase one will make long-term firm specific investment only 
when they are reasonably sure about the existence of the intended long-term contracts. 
In fact, in the current uncertain and complex context, a better alternative for 
employees in this phase may be to strike a trade-off between short-term commitment 
and transferable skills with a certain employer. 54  In other words, firm specific 
investment is more likely to be an exception for rational employees in phase one. 
Thus, for employees in phase one, a bilateral monopoly, rather than the usually 
claimed monopoly position of employers alone, is the right description of the 
employment relationship in employment contracting.55  
 
In comparison, employees in phase two may well take advantage of their 
negotiating power to ask for more governance rights or simply leave the employer 
with a newly furnished resumé to a new post with better compensation. In other words, 
such employees may effectively insert contractual terms ex ante to guard against the 
ex post opportunism of the employer. For employees in this category, contractual 
negotiation may well settle the concern of employee participation in corporate 
governance.  
 
For employees in phases three and four, their foregoing firm specific 
investment provides a sound argument for their unexpressed but implied requirement 
for job security. Employees in these two phases suffer from their lessened negotiating 
power as their firm specific investment makes them less attractive to other potential 
employers on the external labour market. Legal intervention in safeguarding the 
interests of employees in these two phases is accordingly necessary as unfair 
dismissals by employers can deprive such employees of opportunities to recoup their 
foregoing firm specific investment. Thus, the often claimed relational contract 
nature56 of employment contracts on the basis of employees’ firm specific investment 
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is of sense only for employees in these last two phases.  
 
The four-phase argument shows that employees’ firm specific investment is a 
case-sensitive, dynamic issue. In turn, the argument for employee control based on 
employees’ firm specific investment must be understood with reference to the specific 
phases each individual employee is in. A general linkage between employees’ firm 
specific investment and the promotion of employees’ governance rights can only 
vitiate the persuasiveness of the argument. 
 
(b) Relational Contracts and the Implied Duty of Mutual Trust and 
Confidence 
Following the above line of reasoning, employees in phases three and four 
contract for both fair wage and job security when they negotiate their employment 
contracts. Employment contracts for such employees accordingly can only be rightly 
understood as relational contracts.57 With this recognition, courts when interpreting 
the employment contract often imply in the contract a term of mutual duty of trust and 
confidence. For example, in the widely cited case, Malik v. Bank of Credit and 
Commercial International [BCCI],58 the court accepted the employee’s argument that 
the fraud conduct of the management destroyed the trust and confidence implied in his 
long-term employment contracts with the employer and thus the employer breached 
its implied duty of trust and confidence to the employee. 
 
The implied mutual duty of trust and confidence has been deemed as “the core 
common law duty which dictates how employees should be treated during the course 
of the employment relationship.” 59  Though the legal effect of implied terms is 
uncertain, 60  the potential expansion of employers’ liabilities under the traditional 
employment contracts may in effect build up a cooperative culture in employment 
                                                 
57
 Lord Steyn said, “[i]t is no longer right to equate a contract of employment with commercial 
contracts. One possible way of describing a contract of employment in modern terms is as a relational 
contract.” in Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] IRLR 279, at para. 20.  
58
 [1997] ICR 606 
59
 Brodie, D., The Heart of the Matter: Mutual Trust and Confidence, (1996), Indus. L. J. 25:121 at 125 
60
 As it is the court who will decide the applicability of the implied terms or whether such terms will be 
implied into the contract or not. Lord Steyn said in Malik v BCCI [1997] ICR 606, “implied terms 
operate as default rules. The parties are free to exclude or to modify them.” at 621, para. A. 
Chapter 5. Employees 
January 2008 211 
contracting.61 This is because the underlying assumption of the implied duty is the 
“judicial vision of the work place as a community,” a recognition that personal factors 
should be implied and the dignity of the workers should be promoted in the 
employment relationship set up by employment contracts.62  
 
(c) Job Security 
Legally speaking, job security is a concept limited by the relevant employment 
contracts. An employee acquires the job through a legal contract with the company. 
His rights are thus off-limits to the employer’s intentional unjustified breaches of the 
employment contract. However, such contractual rights must be differentiated from 
the ownership of the job, as implied by the argument that employees own the job.63 
Rather, the job is owned by the employer company. Thus, job security cannot be 
identified with a job with an infinite term. Viewed from this perspective, employees’ 
firm specific investment should also, like other financial investment, bear the risk of 
zero returns. 
 
A related but often overstated issue is the rate of employee turnover. Even 
though employers are said to be prone to grant a group of core workers permanent 
jobs and leave jobs of the other employees at the discretion of the market, statistical 
data show that the permanent employees are still the mainstream.64 Thus, even if the 
promotion of job security can be regarded as a worthwhile effort, it should not be 
overextended.     
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2. Collective Dimension 
The heterogeneous interests and the free rider concern of employees, which 
have long been blocking effective employee governance, can more or less be settled 
by employee representation in the collective dimension. Intricate issues not suitable to 
individual bargainers, such as physical working conditions, redeployment within the 
organization, and redundancy, may be suitable for collective bargainers. In this regard, 
Kahn-Freund argues that collective bargaining can help to rectify the unequal 
bargaining power between the employer and individual employees “by raising the 
latter to a level of equality of bargaining power.”65 Thus, collective bargaining can be 
deemed as a mechanism to fill the gap of incomplete individual contracts.66  
 
(a) Representation of Employees in Collective Bargaining 
Traditionally, representation of employees in the UK was mainly achieved 
through a single channel of union recognition by employers.67 The importance of 
independent unions in worker representation can mainly be attributed to their financial 
independence from the employer.68 Nor are they chosen or endorsed by the employer. 
In addition, unions in the UK traditionally cover different work places, making them 
aware of the different treatments and have more opportunities to accumulate skills and 
build up expertise in contractual negotiations. 
 
In general, unions are said to have at least three roles, which include acquiring 
substantial bargaining power, providing protection to its members and enhancing the 
voice of the employees. 69  Ever since 1970s when Directives on transfers of 
undertakings and collective economic dismissal 70  were introduced, an additional 
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function of information and consultation has been added to that of the collective 
bargaining. Failure of employers to supply the required information may lead to an 
application of the case by unions to the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
and further to the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC).  
 
However, the current effect of collective bargaining through unions may have 
to be discounted. First, unions in the UK have largely been marginalized, a situation 
which is reflected not only in the decreasing membership or the coverage of members 
under the collective agreements but also in the level of collective negotiations.71  
 
Second, the collective bargaining role of unions is also limited by the inherent 
deficiency of its representativity among employees. 72  Since there is no 
representativity requirement of membership for a recognized union and the 
recognized union will be the only body with which the employer can enter into 
consultation in cases of redundancy and transfer of undertakings, the monopoly of a 
recognized union can block the recognition of another union which represents more 
employees.73 Besides, non-union-members may also be treated differently. 
 
Third, employers may refuse to provide information by relying on defences 
such as potential substantial injury to the company or disproportionate amount of 
work in compiling information needed. 74  Moreover, once the employer fails to 
provide required information to the recognized union, a compulsory award on 
information disclosure is not available. The CAC may ask for certain information to 
be disclosed but again, if the employer does not, the only remedy is to make 
improvements in terms and conditions of relevant employees, rather than to compel 
the employer to supply relevant information. So, the enforcement mechanism is too 
weak to play a serious role.75 
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Admittedly, efforts to rejuvenate unions have been made as evidenced in the 
widely adopted labour-management partnership agreements ever since the mid-
1990s.76 Unions earn their independent representation and the exercise of employee 
voice in the workplace by agreeing to encourage employees’ investments in human 
capital and streamlining the information flow between management and workers, and 
other functions such as to resolve grievances and disputes. However, as no legal or 
institutional guarantees are in place for continuous commitment from both sides, the 
efficacy of these partnership agreements is open to doubt though such arrangements 
do contribute to establishing a cooperative culture. 
 
Alternatively, mainly due to the challenges from the EU, the traditional single 
channel through recognized unions in the UK has largely been changed in the past.77 
Now, in combination with the recognized union scheme is the elected representative 
scheme for those who are not members of the recognized union.78 Considering the 
current marginalization of unions, we may project that the elected representative 
scheme will be more widely adopted than that of the recognized union scheme.79 Still, 
as the employer has no duty to inform and consult the non-recognized unions and 
there are no corresponding steps to equip those elected representatives with necessary 
negotiating skills and expertise on the issue, elected representatives may not represent 
the interests of workers or may not negotiate for a well-considered result. In 
consequence, resources from the non-recognized unions may be wasted. 
 
(b) Collective Agreements 
While collective bargaining can enhance the negotiating power of the 
employees, contractual terms reached in collective agreements must be incorporated 
into individual employment contracts to be effective. In general, except for those 
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terms that cannot be incorporated,80 incorporation can readily be materialized if there 
are express terms to that effect. If not, to view these terms as business practices may 
be possible. However, even if terms in collective agreements are incorporated into 
individual contracts, the termination or major modifications of relevant terms in a 
collective agreement cannot be applied to individual contracts without the employee’s 
express or implied consent.81 Individual employees can thus have opportunities to 
screen any changes in collective agreements. Collins accordingly argued that 
collective agreements should be better viewed as kind of “administrative rules which 
create expectations which deserve a measure of protection.”82 
 
(c) The Relevance of Competition on the Product Market 
Alternatively, labour’s negotiating power is also constrained by the 
competition on the product market.83 Fierce competition on the product market may 
lead to a rather disadvantaged negotiation position for unions. In a highly competitive 
market, union’s movements which have the potential to lower the productivity may 
backfire and thus be counterproductive to the union’s original objectives.84 In fact, not 
only will employers resist such movements persistently, unions themselves may also 
block such movements in the first instance because any achievement in this respect 
may come at the expense of lower payments or losses of job security, which, in turn, 
will lower the number of members of the unions. Thus, the intensiveness of the 
competition on the product market may also constrain employees’ collective 
negotiating power.  
 
The discussion in this section tells us that the role of employment contracts in 
safeguarding the interests of individual employees is a case sensitive issue. While firm 
specific investment and relational contracts provide good arguments for some 
employees, they are definitely not applicable to all employees. Moreover, collective 
bargaining can strengthen the bargaining power of employees as a class but various 
factors can counteract the positive effects.  
                                                 
80
 For example, terms regarding collective actions cannot be readily incorporated.  
81
 Robertson v. British Gas Corporation [1983] I.C.R. 351 (C.A) 
82
 Collins, (1986), at 8. 
83
 Brown, et al., (1998), at 9. 
84
 ibid., at 11. 
Chapter 5. Employees 
January 2008 216 
 
B. THE ROLE OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
Legal intervention in the employment relationship is usually outside the scope 
of company law. Indeed, employment law is the main area where protection for the 
interests of employees, either individually or collectively, can be found. Moreover, for 
directors making strategic decisions both employment law and company law should 
be considered with equal status. The implication for the purpose of this thesis is that 
corporate governance is not an issue limited within the boundary of company law. At 
least, employment law should be included.  
 
1. Employment Law 
(a) The Status Approach and the Public Law Element in the 
Regulation of Employment Contracts 
An appropriate understanding of the employment relationship induced by 
employment contracts entails analyses of both the contractual relationship and the 
social relations involved.85 With the objective to elicit extra-functional contributions 
based on high trust relationships, this view, in turn, requires a promotion in 
employment relationship of a status relationship, which involves “the replacement of 
specific contractual obligations as the main mechanisms of controlling the exchange 
between workers and employing organizations, by general, unspecific and long term 
commitments on both sides to cooperation.”86 
 
The status approach to employment relationship has already been recognized 
in the UK law. Deakin, in his study on the evolution of employment contracts in the 
UK, has noticed that general precepts of private law on contracts have never enjoyed 
primacy in the legal history. “On the contrary, conception of status drawn in part from 
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legislation and in part from judge-made rules which were specific to employment 
underpinned the rise of the modern employment relationship at every stage.”87 This 
status approach thus extends, at least in law, the interests of employees to those non-
commercial considerations.  
 
Alternatively, the status approach dictates that employment relationship must 
be governed by principles of public law, which require that parties with power should 
not misuse their power and that the exercise of the power must be fair and 
reasonable.88 Indeed, the increased government intervention has already led the law 
regulating employment contracts into “a process of transition from the dominance of 
traditional private law regulation to one where welfarist regulation increasingly 
provides the basic discourse of the legal regulation of contracts.”89 Such a welfarist 
conception is in stark contrast to the carefully measured reciprocity implicit in the 
traditional commercial contracts. 90  For example, not only are mutual trust and 
confidence implied in individual employment contracts but specified clauses are also 
required by the Employment Rights Act 1996 in written employment contracts.91 The 
relevance of this understanding is that the redistribution of wealth among stakeholders 
can appropriately be excluded from the coverage of private contracts while at the 
same time still be achieved by the public policy element of employment law.92 
 
(b) Information and Consultation 
Regulations on information disclosure can largely be categorized into process-
driven and event-driven.93 Process-driven information disclosures can be seen as steps 
in a set of general rules on consultation or bargaining process, which is usually 
                                                 
87
 Deakin, (2001a), at 8. 
88
 In detail, “[t]he concept of fairness includes not only conformity to the promulgated rules, but also 
questions about whether those rules are fair in themselves and whether in their application the 
employer has acted fairly,” whereas reasonableness requires rational exercises of the power for the 
interests of the company must be realized with due respect for the rights of those affected. See Collins, 
(1986), at 11. 
89
 Collins, H., Regulating Contracts, (1999), OUP, at 8. 
90
 Hutchison, (2000), at 339.  
91
 Specified clauses of contracts are prescribed across the Act. In specific, see ERA1996 s203(1). Also, 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidated) Act 1992 s288.  
92
 Daniels, R., Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism Be Compassionate?, (1993), 
University of Toronto Law Journal, 43:315, at 342. 
93
 Gospel and Willman, (2004), at 1. 
Chapter 5. Employees 
January 2008 218 
connected with employee representatives with an objective to ensure the continuity of 
the governance scheme. Examples in this category include the European Work 
Council Directive (EWC)94 and the newly introduced Information and Consultation 
(IC) Directive.95 In comparison, event-driven disclosure is initiated by certain events, 
without consideration of the general consultation or negotiation, such as those 
triggered by ownership changes or redundancy. The Acquired Rights Directive,96 and 
the TUPE in the UK, can be categorized into this group. 
 
In addition to information disclosure, mandatory consultation has also been an 
“established feature” of employment law in the UK regarding health and safety issues, 
redundancies, transfers of undertakings and pension schemes. 97  While further 
clarification of the definition of these rights is still needed and the specific 
performance of these rights in practice is still in their incubation, 98  information 
disclosure, in combination with the mandatory consultation, by employers either as a 
continuing obligation or as a duty at crucial junctures in the life of a company can 
however redress the information asymmetry existing between the employees and the 
employer and, in turn, employees can have their voice more seriously considered than 
before. 
 
(c) Unfair Dismissal Law 
By prescribing fairness in both substantive and procedural senses,99  unfair 
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dismissal law grants employees a form, in kind, of property rights in their jobs.100 
Employees unfairly dismissed by their employer can be awarded with legal 
compensations. Employees with such legal supports are thus expected to contribute 
more firm specific investments than if otherwise.  
 
The relevant law in this area can be cited as evidence of how the concept of 
fairness has penetrated into the freedom of contract. However, in deciding whether a 
dismissal is unjust or not, courts and tribunals interpret the law by imposing a range of 
reasonable response tests, whereby a decision is fair “provided that it is not so 
unreasonable that no reasonable employer could have reached such a decision.”101 In 
other words, “fair” is identified with “not unreasonable” in legal practices. The 
nuance between the legal practice and statutory clauses in effect broadens the 
managerial prerogative. In a similar vein, constructive dismissal 102  can only be 
supported if there is a fundamental breach of the contract.103   
 
While unfair dismissal law provides legal protections for employees with firm 
specific investment, it must be noted that a reference of a case to a tribunal is “an 
atypical minority response.”104 In addition, remedies available to unfairly dismissed 
employees are still short of satisfactory. Indeed, if employees are granted with a kind 
of property ownership in their jobs, remedies for unfairly dismissed employees should 
not be limited only to financial compensation, as the court has already done in 
William Hill Organization Ltd. v Tucker.105 However, reinstatement, though preferred 
by the dismissed employees, is hard to achieve in a tribunal.106 This is because the 
tribunal when giving the reward still puts in the first place whether or not the 
reinstated employee will cause problems to the employer.107 Moreover, even though 
financial compensation has long been established in unfair dismissal cases, such 
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compensation does not include compensation for employees’ psychological 
sufferings.108 In sum, although unfair dismissal law improves interests of employees 
both procedurally and substantively, compensation for employees unfairly dismissed 
is still far from satisfactory. 
 
2. Company Law Related 
First of all, it must be realized that the concept of “company” in the UK 
company law “refers to the essentially financial relationship between managers and 
investors; there is no equivalent to those concepts which recognize the enterprise’s 
organizational dimension,” a concept which necessitates contribution from a number 
of stakeholder groups. 109  Thus, it is not a surprise to observe that employee 
governance rights are not the main issue for company law in the UK. 
 
Also, even though company law in the UK does not preclude the possibility of 
employees’ board presentation, such representation is a rarity in practice. Indeed, 
given the predominant financial consideration in the current governance practices, 
employees’ participation in strategic decision making is hard to achieve without a 
mandatory requirement from law. 110   However, as discussed, such a mandatory 
stipulation is incongruent with the current social political situation in the UK.111 
 
In addition to the employees’ board representation, company law has other 
stipulations relevant to the interests of employees. We will discuss them in sequence. 
 
(a) S309 of the Companies Act 1985112 
The main clause relevant to employees in company law is s309 of the CA 
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1985, under which directors are required to take into consideration the interests of 
employees. Section 309(2) points out that the enforceability of such consideration is 
“in the same way as any other fiduciary duty owed to a company by its directors”. 
With no express fiduciary duty to employees and clear guidelines to balance 
conflicting interests within the company,113 a mere mention of the consideration of the 
interests of employees can only be perfunctory. Indeed, the clause has already been 
described as “a statutory provision without teeth” 114  or as “a piece of window-
dressing.”115  
 
The above stance is largely maintained in the new Companies Act 2006. 
Although s172 of the new Act expressly states that interests of employees should be 
included in directors’ decision making process, we still do not know how employees 
can enforce their proactive governance role. Moreover, employees, as such, do not 
have a locus standi in initiating actions against the company and directors. In other 
words, the Companies Act 2006 merely implements the ‘enlightened shareholder 
value’ model of corporate governance. There is still a long way to go to satisfy the 
advocates of employees’ strategic participation in the UK.    
 
(b) Information Disclosure  
From the perspective of corporate governance, provisions in company law 
relevant to information disclosure may also be beneficial to employees. Employee 
Involvement is one main part of the Directors Report.116 Moreover, the Companies Act 
2006 also requires directors of all quoted companies to opine on “the main trends and 
factors likely to affect the future development, performance or position of the 
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companies business” in their Business Review.117Information thus required includes 
not only financial information on company performance but also major strategy 
movements relevant to employees. Such information may well be taken advantage of 
by employees and their representatives especially in wage bargaining. Still, the 
dichotomy between private and public companies exempts directors of private 
companies, whatever the size, from such a duty. Thus, employees in numerous private 
companies, especially those as a result of going private transactions, may still face a 
lack of information in this aspect under company law. 
 
Furthermore, information so disclosed is too financial oriented and often out 
of date. Compliance with the requirement is also unsatisfactory. For instance, one 
research finds that substantive non-compliance with the mandatory information 
disclosure on employee involvement and consultation is up to 44% among 400 
required disclosures.118 Besides, the lack of information on employee human capital 
investment is still apparent even if we admit that the employee contribution to the 
company is indispensable.119 Thus, for employees, information disclosed according to 
company law can only be described as being symbolic. 
 
3. Conflicts between Shareholders and Employees? 
It is often argued that the supremacy of shareholders in the current governance 
structure may lead shareholders and management to seek profits at the cost of 
employees. However, as Rock and Wachter argued, such argument has “misperceived 
the similarities between shareholders and employees.” 120  Both employees and 
shareholders perform as capital investors of the company. They have their own 
governance roles to play with rare overlap. This understanding even holds when we 
consider the property rights of employees in the company arising from their firm 
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specific investment because there is no legal difficulty for different property owners to 
co-own the same property.  
 
Indeed, by defining corporate governance with four parameters, i.e., the degree 
of asset specificity, the extent of information asymmetry, the extent of risk aversion, 
and the costs of drafting and enforcing explicit contracts, Rock and Wachter find that 
employees can enjoy similar control rights to those of shareholders when shareholders 
and employees have similar composition of the four parameters. 121   In fact, 
governance roles of employees and shareholders are more complementary than 
conflicting in nature if we consider the interests of a company is a concept inclusive 
of interests of different stakeholders with different weights. Moreover, it must be 
emphasized that there is no legally prescribed order among the interests of different 
stakeholders. The priority, if there is one, is decided by the market and the social 
institution.122  
 
On the whole, discussion in this Part shows that interests of employees are 
protected in both contracts and laws. Though individual negotiating power is a 
concern for employees, it should not be exaggerated due to the existence of the four 
phases of employees’ firm specific investment and their collective bargaining power. 
In addition, the wide promotion of the status approach in employment relationship 
and the enhancement of employees’ information and consultation rights in collective 
bargaining have already improved employees’ situation both individually and 
collectively. Thus, employees’ lack of control rights within company law does not 
provide sufficient evidence for the conclusion that their interests have been unduly 
prejudiced. Their interests as discussed are at least widely protected through their 
contractual arrangements and multifarious stipulations in employment law. The 
inefficiencies in and the ineffectiveness of the employment law, however, cannot be 
used as evidence to argue for more governance rights for employees in company law. 
Rather, it is better to improve employees’ governance rights outside company law in 
employment law than otherwise.   
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PART III. EMPLOYEES IN FLOTATIONS 
The development of the employment relationship is a continuous process. In 
this part, the discussion will be extended to earlier phases of the development of the 
company. Such extension will help us understand how employee governance 
transforms around the specific juncture of a flotation. 
 
A. THE ROLE OF CONTRACTS 
1. Relative Bargaining Powers of Employees and Employers 
In the entrepreneurship phase of the company, the mutual demand for the 
existence of the company and the fierce competition faced by such companies on the 
product market dictate mutual efforts from both the employer and employees. 
Accordingly, the general employment relationship in entrepreneurships should be 
more cooperative than conflicting in nature.  
 
Within such a cooperative context, employment contracting also has its own 
characteristics. Employees in negotiating their employment contracts may well have 
the knowledge of the outside intensive competition whereas entrepreneurs may more 
often than not follow the market practice or even provide favourable terms for those 
employees they need for their project. Besides, monitoring of employees may not be 
effective and may have to be lax due to employers’ unfamiliarity with the newly 
introduced products or production process. Employees thus enjoy great discretion ex 
post contracting. Indeed, compared with employees’ job-hunting efforts and their 
suffering of being laid off, entrepreneurs may have to face additional pressures of 
capital, management, and reputation, etc. In other words, entrepreneur employers have 
relative higher costs of both entry and exit.123 Thus, the bi-lateral monopoly model of 
employment contracting is more apparent in entrepreneurship than in other phases of 
the company life.  
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While employment contracts are important in establishing rights and duties of 
both parties, it should be noticed that norms, strong interpersonal relationship and 
reputation play more important roles than formal contractual terms in shaping 
employment relationship in entrepreneurship. 124 Such informality can help to redress 
the deficiency of collective bargaining among employees in entrepreneurships125 and 
strengthen the predominance of the bilateral monopoly model in employment 
contracting. The strong role of norms and reputation in shaping employment 
relationship indicate that the regulation of employment relationships in 
entrepreneurship must be flexible and permissive in essence. Accordingly, with a 
general policy to promote entrepreneurship, “regulation [of employment relationships] 
is exercised to maintain the parties’ integrity in their respective roles within the 
market.”126 
 
2. Contingent Employment Contracts 
In order to meet the changing labor relationship with their limited resources, 
entrepreneurs may adopt contingent employment contracts.127 This is especially the 
case for start-ups, where contingent employment contracts are necessary due to their 
lack of ability and legitimacy to attract or retain talents and skilled workers.128  
 
Because employers enjoy great discretion to terminate the contingent contracts, 
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it may be projected that contingent employment contracts may seriously compromise 
the interests of employees. However, this may not necessarily be the case in practice. 
In fact, many contingent employees may just prefer their contingent status and enjoy 
their freedom to move to other small companies.129 For example, employees in high 
tech companies may just want to shift employers every certain period for higher 
payment or higher status.130 Or, contingent workers may intentionally avoid those 
concerns troubling permanent staffs, like contrition due to the long-term interpersonal 
conflicts.131  Alternatively, contingent jobs may benefit the company itself as new 
employees will bring new insights and information into the organization, a situation 
which may be beneficial to start-up companies.132  
 
Beyond the start up phase, contingent employment seldom plays its dominant 
role. Rather, the co-existence of contingent employment and permanent employment 
is the norm.133 This can be attributed partly to the increasing familiarity with the 
market and the stronger anti-risk ability of the company and partly to the mature 
internal labour market, which makes internal movement of employees a much 
preferred choice.134 Within a mature internal labour market, a contingent employee 
may well be transferred to a permanent one during the expanding phase of the 
company. Also, the co-existence of contingent employees and permanent employees 
strengthens the commitment of the permanent staff to the company as the mobility of 
the contingent employees highlights the security of the permanent staff.135 Thus, the 
normal practice of combining permanent employees with contingent employees 
beyond the start-up phase helps to soften the debilitating effect expected of a 
dominantly contingent employment model.136 In other words, employment policies at 
individual companies may adjust in alignment with the development of the company. 
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3. Employee Turnover 
For a company with a high turnover rate of employees, as in start ups where 
contingent employees are dominant, it has to consider both the short-term costs, such 
as the severance payments, unemployment benefits and other contractual 
compensation, and the long-term costs, such as the social costs arising from the high 
turnover rate. One example of the social costs is the reputation damage, which may 
not only produce bad feelings among existing employees but also create hurdles in 
attracting new talents to the company.137   
 
While empirical evidence does support the view that flotations enhance the 
retention rates of employees, 138  the disruptive role of flotations on employment 
relationship will become perceptible as time passes by. If employees hold shares of 
the company going public, the original bond among employees is destroyed as shares 
become transferable. Moreover, as governance requirements of public companies are 
more stringent than those for private companies and are new to the original employees 
of the entrepreneurship, more staff with new skills adaptable to public companies will 
have to be recruited. This is especially true for administrative staffs and financial staff. 
Conflicts may accordingly arise due to the different conception of the enterprise 
culture between new and old staff. 
 
Additionally, outside investors may play a more important role than an 
entrepreneur in employee turnover. For example, venture capitalists usually control 
the board and may insist that certain key employees be retained in or be dismissed 
from the company. Because venture capitalists normally seek ways to exit through 
takeovers or flotations, their short-term investment policy, compared with the life of 
the company, requires of a corresponding flexible employment relationship and 
human resources management. Such intervention may be more apparent in those 
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companies going public than in start-up companies. In such cases, employee turnover 
is better seen as a reflection of the disadvantaged role of labour in the finance 
dominated society than the unexpected result of employers’ discretion. 
 
4. Compensation for Employees in Flotations 
Constrained by the limited cash availability, entrepreneurs may well issue 
stocks and/or options to retain highly wanted employees.139 Payment to employees 
accordingly depends on the cash flow of the company. Several studies reveal that the 
flexibility inherent in such plans plays an important role in retaining and sorting 
employees due to the uncertainty of the development of a company in this stage.140 
Without these alternatives, the founding owner may well select to exit rather than to 
make the ‘overhanging’ fixed payments to employees.141  
 
Still, compensation with only equity or options to all employees is 
unrealistic.142 Given the risk aversion and the negligible ability of employees at lower 
levels to make a difference to the share price, it seems that shareholding and option 
holding cannot provide an appropriate incentive scheme for those employees.143 On 
the contrary, traditional compensation with fixed income may be preferred by risk-
averse employees at lower levels. The introduction of the minimum payment is thus 
relevant here. The problem, however, is at what level such minimum payments may 
dampen the incentives of entrepreneurs to set up their start-ups in the first place.  
 
Another usually prescribed payment is the severance payment in cases of 
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flotations. For example, entrepreneurs or key employees usually insert in their 
employment contracts a clause to the effect that they will leave the company with a 
bountiful severance payment in case of a flotation. In effect, such payments are used 
not only as compensation for their loss of private control but also as an anti-takeover 
device in flotations to safeguard their private control. Thus, for employees with a 
strong negotiating power, contractual arrangements of severance payments may be 
more of sense than legally prescribed minimum payment.  
 
5. Employee Shareholders 
It is usually the case that employees in companies intending to go public are 
also shareholders of the company they serve. The dual status may engender 
complications once the interests of the two statuses depart from each other. Say, once 
employees do not work for a company, they may still keep their shareholding in the 
company. If the remaining shareholders later change the corporate policy, such as the 
dividend policy, the interests of those employee shareholders who have already left 
the company may well be prejudiced.144  
 
Carefully designed contractual terms may mitigate this concern. For instance, 
employee shareholders can insert in their contracts a clause to the effect that once they 
leave the company, their shares will be bought out by existing shareholders or the 
company on a prefixed valuation basis. But if there is no such contractual 
arrangement, relevant laws may prescribe a similar mandatory buyout of those shares 
on fair value or simply order a mandatory dissolution of the company if conflicts 
between shareholders arise.145  
 
Still, the legitimacy of a mandatory dissolution is worth a second thought. 
While mandatory dissolution may help to settle the conflicts between minority 
employee shareholders and controlling employee shareholders, such an order is 
incongruent with the policy of promoting entrepreneurship. After all, one basic nature 
of entrepreneurship is the moderate risk taking. Moreover, it is usually the case that 
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entrepreneurs are the controlling shareholders while other employees join either for a 
reward for their work, (pure employees), or for a financial return for their investment 
(pure investors), or for both (as employee shareholders). If controlling employee 
shareholders do represent the best interests of the company, their decisions, subject to 
the court rectification of unfairness, should be promoted or at least not depressed, as 
indicated by the solution of a mandatory dissolution.  
 
B. THE ROLE OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
1. Employment Law and Entrepreneurship 
There is no employment law or regulation specifically targeting employees in 
companies going public. It is true that the current Labour government has introduced 
many employee-favoured laws and regulations, among which are the new national 
minimum wage; the working time regulations; family-friendly provisions on maternity, 
parental and emergency leave; equal treatment to part-time workers; new rights for 
trade union recognition and information and consultation.146 However, we can see that 
exemptions for qualified small companies do exist across most recently introduced 
employment laws and regulations.147  
 
This is not to say that employees in qualified small companies are left with no 
protection. Rather, a useful resort for employees in small companies is the unfair 
dismissal law, according to which employers cannot fire an employee without a due 
cause and without following a due procedure. In fact, field data show that an 
increased number of small companies have induced disciplinary and grievance 
procedures.148 Moreover, empirical evidence also indicates that tribunals are more 
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pro-employee in cases involving a small company employer than in cases involving 
big employers.149  Thus, although exemptions in such laws and regulations are for the 
purpose of encouraging entrepreneurship, fair treatment to employees has been the 
bottom-line of the current employment laws and regulations. 
 
Nonetheless, most companies intending to go public may not be qualified for 
those exemptions due to the rather low thresholds of those requirements. Employees 
in companies going public will accordingly be protected as those employees in the 
normal life of corporate governance. Still, it must be realized that legal protection for 
employees in such companies may have to be discounted by the constraints of intense 
competition on the product market. This is because fierce competition faced by 
entrepreneurs usually outweighs the constraint effects of laws and regulations.150 
Indeed, if competition is favourable to a company, the constraining effects of 
employment regulations can largely be absorbed by the company. If otherwise, such 
regulations will exacerbate the competitive pressures and threaten the survival of the 
company, a result that even employees may not want to face. Accordingly, enhanced 
individual employment rights in law do not necessarily result in the corresponding 
changes to the employment policy at the end of small and medium sized employers.151  
 
2. Securities Market Regulations  
Once a company decides to go public, employees in this context will be seen 
as the participants in the financial market. Their obligation is subject to the overall 
objective of the integrity of the securities market. For the purpose of this section, 
information disclosure to employees is relevant. UK Listing Rules do not restrict the 
company disclosing price-sensitive information to representatives of employees 
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before such information is disclosed to the public.152 However, these people cannot 
deal with their shares before the relevant information is released to the public nor can 
they share the information with the wider workforce.153 In such situations, compliance 
with the securities market regulations is superior to representatives’ moral 
responsibility to other employees affected by the information. In addition, widely 
publicized advertisements stating the company is a pre-flotation company as an 
allurement for potential employees may court investigations by the LSE, as this may 
surely indicate that the company is arousing the public’s interest in the company 
shares.154  
 
Another issue is the disclosure of information on compensation to employees. 
While executives of public companies are required to disclose stocks or options in 
their compensation package, this is not the case for executives in private companies 
before flotations. In comparison, employees’ holdings are not required to be disclosed 
in both cases unless they are substantial shareholders of the public company.155 This is 
because, in comparison with the limited control of employees, directors may well take 
advantage of their de facto control of the company for their own benefits in their 
compensation package. Law makers may accordingly consider that stock or options 
play different roles as incentive schemes for employees and directors.  
 
In sum, employees are relevant for the purpose of securities market regulation 
only when they are deemed as finance market participants. Employees’ interests are 
not the main consideration of the securities markets regulations. Still, the main theme 
of information transparency on the public securities market may provide employees 
with additional information sources.  
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C. THE PERSISTENCE OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP  
Research has shown that the employment relationship within companies 
before flotations has a ‘blueprint’ function, which shapes organizational development 
routes156 and influences the evolution of the human resources management policy.157 
To impose an abrupt change on the inherited competencies and routines already 
established in companies may engender a counterproductive effect since employees, 
who invest time and energy and usually hold reasonable expectations of the future, 
may have good reasons to think that their investments are made in vain and their 
expectations crushed in organizational changes. Indeed, this blueprint function can be 
identified as an institutionalization process, during which a set of corporate culture is 
set up. As some scholars have already argued: “the longer the [initial] regime is in 
place, the more likely it is to have institutionalized a distinctive organizational 
blueprint and screened out employees who do not fit that blueprint.”158 This corporate 
culture, in turn, requires of the newly recruited to fit in this culture, reinforcing the 
existing culture.  
 
While the blueprint function of the initial regime may produce a stable 
workforce, bureaucracy and stereotype administration may frustrate the company’s 
adaptation to the outside changing environment as the company ages. Employees, 
who favour change over bureaucracy, may accordingly migrate to another employer 
for better chances. 159  In other words, the blueprint function of the employment 
relationship in companies going public may also act as an initiator of turnover for 
some individual employees. Thus, the institution here plays a background role 
whereas individual specific characters, i.e., the negotiating power and psychological 
factors of a given employee, may change or negate the institutional effects. Moreover, 
the dual-effect of the blueprint function also indicates that employees are a 
heterogeneous group, unlike that of shareholders whose interests are single-mindedly 
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settled on the pursuance of financial interests.  
 
PART IV. EMPLOYEES IN TAKEOVERS  
A. THE ROLE OF CONTRACTS 
1. Information Asymmetry 
It is argued that employees, due to the information asymmetry, are often 
disadvantaged in predicting the occurrence of takeover transactions. Accordingly, 
when negotiating employment contracts, employees may project that takeovers are 
only of a low probability in the distant future and in turn they may compromise their 
interests in takeovers in exchange for some other benefits.  
 
The inability of employees to foresee the occurrence of takeovers, however, 
should not be exaggerated. Psychologists have shown us that even though individuals 
have difficulty in foreseeing any particular risk in the future, a group of individuals 
may be more adaptable to foresee, even with rough probabilities, the general category 
of risk which subsumes those particular risks. 160  In other words, even though 
individual employees may well underestimate the possibility of takeover activities, 
employee representatives, or unions, may well estimate the possibilities of merger and 
acquisition activities. In fact, due to the more and more unfavourable exposure of 
takeover activities in the past two decades, it is hard to presume that employees 
cannot foresee the occurrence of takeovers within employment terms, especially for 
those who are going to sign a long-term employment contract with the employer.    
 
Nonetheless, to admit the possibility that employees can foresee the possible 
occurrence of takeovers in the future does not mean that they have the ability to insert 
corresponding terms to protect their interests. Thus, the disadvantaged negotiating 
position of employees still justifies government intervention, which can work either 
through legal support for unions or through safeguarding interests of individual 
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employees. A strengthened role of unions can surely protect their member employees 
generally161  while legally prescribed minimum treatment and compensation when 
these rights are breached can guarantee individual employees with some minimum 
protections.   
 
2. The Implicit Contract 
We have discussed in Part II that employees in phase III and IV may suffer 
from the observed asynchrony between their compensation and their firm specific 
investment. For those employees, an implicit contract of mutual trust and confidence 
exists between employees and the employer. Breaches of such implicit contracts may 
produce important implications in practice as employees’ emotional reactions to the 
destruction of mutual trust can be translated into inefficient work behaviour.162  
 
Takeovers, as the argument goes, deprive employees of the opportunity of 
acquiring their deferred payments and thus are breaches of the implicit contracts of 
mutual trusts between employees and the employer. The destructive effect of 
takeovers is especially apparent in hostile takeovers. One study has shown that even if 
hostile takeovers are unsuccessful, they may still engender a negative effect on 
employment. 163  Within the company, such breaches of trust may engender 
counterproductive effects across different levels of employees. For example, many 
downsizings are expected to increase productivity by separating employees who are 
less efficient than their peers. However, studies show that while the separation of low 
performers can be achieved by force, more efficient performers will leave the 
company voluntarily as the separation goes on.164 Indeed, it is often the case that the 
most valued employees in the original companies are the first to leave the company 
being downsized. 
                                                 
161
 But see constraints of unions in Part II.  
162
 Citera, M., and Rentsch, J., Is There Justice in Organizational Acquisitions? The Role of Distributive 
and Procedural Fairness in Corporate Acquisitions, in Cropanzano R., (ed), Justice in the Workplace: 
Approaching Fairness in Human Resources Management, (1993), Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: 
Hillsdale, NJ, at 211-30.  
163
 Bhagat, S., et al., Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to Corporate Specialization, (1990), 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 1-72, at 22.  
164
 Mone, M., Relationships between Self-concepts, Aspirations, Emotional Responses, and Intent to 
leave a Downsizing Organization, (1994), Human Resource Management, 33(2):281-298. 
Chapter 5. Employees 
January 2008 236 
 
Nevertheless, implicit contracts are in terms of psychological perceptions, 
which are not traditionally protected from a legal perspective.165  Indeed, the current 
implied terms of mutual trust and confidence in employment contracts have emerged 
only after a long time struggle and are a reflection in employment relationship of the 
democracy conception within the wider social context. Still, to imply such a term into 
the employment contracts predicates an employment term long enough to justify the 
bonding effect. If employees are newly employed just before takeovers, or if the 
contract itself is one-off, the argument will lack its lustre. 
 
3. Employee Turnover  
(a) Inconsistent Empirical Evidence 
In general, empirical evidence on the effects of takeovers on employees almost 
always demonstrates job losses after takeovers. For example, according to two recent 
studies by Conyon, et al in 2001, employment declines substantially in post-
acquisitions between 1983 and 1996.166  
 
However, similar studies are narrowly limited by their coverage of the internal 
labour market of the companies being taken over, without considering the wider social 
effects. This lacuna thus leaves open the possibility that the immediate effect of job 
losses within a given employer may overshadow the wider long-term social effects of 
more justified resource distribution and more legitimate human capital flow and 
reinvestment. Indeed, contrary to the pessimistic view of takeovers on employees, 
positive empirical evidence also exists.167 One research shows that most buyouts had 
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a record of increased employment.168 Another study also demonstrates that, buy-outs 
may even produce positive effects on the employment relationship, which are 
reflected in the improved standard of human resource management practice and 
increased real earnings of almost all levels of employees.169 
 
Alternatively, some studies indicate that continuity of the original relationship 
is what management normally cherish and try to maintain.170 Indeed, offerors may 
well have an intention to revive the offeree company in order to strengthen its own 
competitive position. 171  Thus, a replacement of the original owner does not 
necessarily indicate a disruption of the morale of the employee of the offeree company.  
 
In sum, empirical evidence on the general effect of takeovers on employees is 
confusing. Job losses, if they are the real cases in individual companies, may not 
necessarily be the case in the wide economy. Moreover, the debilitating effects of 
takeovers on employment relationship are only partly supported by empirical 
evidence. A possible explanation for such confusing empirical evidence is that in 
many, if not most, takeover transactions, both takeovers and job losses at individual 
companies can be attributed to a third factor such as the general economic depression 
or fiercer competition on the market.172 In such situations, takeovers merely hasten the 
step of transformation the company has to experience anyway in the near future. 
Therefore, it is unjustified to argue that takeovers prejudice the interests of employees.  
 
(b) Unevenly Distributed Job Losses   
Among the empirical studies of the effect of takeovers on employees, two 
studies need further attention. Though large-scale employee layoffs in takeovers are 
observed in both studies, one study finds that it is common that such layoffs are made 
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at the managerial level, where duplication is most likely,173 whereas another study 
reveals that job losses are disproportionately concentrated at the level of non-
production workers.174 Such a concentrated distribution of job losses at least indicates 
that takeovers have different effects on employees at different levels. It seems that 
employees over middle levels may suffer more than those at lower levels in takeovers. 
Such observation thus entails additional discussion. 
 
i) The Relevance of the Hierarchical Structure 
It is widely known that the hierarchical structure of a company requires 
employees to work at different levels. But the issue relevant here is that hierarchical 
levels bear relations with employees’ firm specific investment and the possibility of 
their participation in the decision making process.  
 
As we know, the lower the level an employee works at, the more likely the 
employee has interchangeable skills, and thus the more likely he may find suitable 
exits for their interchangeable skills. In other words, employees’ firm specific 
investment may not provide a good argument for employees at lower levels. But if 
they do lose in these control transactions, they may lose their basic maintenance. This 
bleak concern thus provides a justification for government intervention by granting 
minimum compensation in cases of unfair dismissals and other minimum statutory 
protections.  
 
In comparison, employees at the middle level, though they make more firm 
specific investments and accordingly suffer most in case of takeovers, are more easily 
adaptable to changeable commercial environment. Ex ante, they have more 
opportunities to predict the possibility of restructuring activities and thus negotiate 
corresponding contractual terms to safeguard their own interests. Ex post, they are 
more adaptable to new knowledge and have greater ability to adjust their acquired 
skills to new environments than their colleagues at lower levels. It can be argued that 
their interests can be appropriately protected in their employment contracts. Indeed, 
the higher the level an employee works at, the less important the statutory protection 
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means to him. In practice, the total sum of severance payments to employees at 
middle levels, both in statutes and in contracts, may well operate as a hindrance to 
takeover transactions.  
 
Alternatively, employees at different levels in the hierarchical structure 
participate to different extents in the corporate decision making process. In fact, the 
lower the level an employee is in, the less the possibility that the employee can take 
part in the decision making process. In other words, the promotion of the employee 
participation in decision-making process is only of sense to employees over a certain 
hierarchical level within the administrative structure of a company.  
 
So, if we may hold that employees at lower levels can be protected by 
minimum statutory protection (as this is the main objective of statutory protection) 
and their participation in decision making process is limited, the intriguing finding of 
concentrated distribution to employees in middle levels at least tells us that we should 
not simplify the effects of takeovers on employees by identifying the claims of 
employees at certain levels with those of employees in general. Indeed, it is fair to 
argue that the empirical evidence is “more consistent with a final end game tactic in 
the continuing negotiation over the division of firm value than a breach of contract 
that threatens future relation-specific investments.” 175 
 
ii) A Social-Political Understanding 
Indeed, we may better understand this issue within the wider social and 
political context. Given the number of employees influenced by takeover transactions, 
it is more reasonable to assume that the concern of employee turnover is mainly a 
concern for employees in big established companies than for employees in small 
private companies. If we further accept that employees at middle levels in such 
companies are the main constituents of the middle class in the wider society, we may 
suspect that their claims for more protection and more rights in corporate decision 
making can be seen as the political voice of the middle class in the wider society. 
Therefore, the current zeal on issues of employment protection in takeovers are mere 
indicators that our society gives high esteem to people from middle classes and that 
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those people are reluctant to fall from their original class in society. The extent of the 
success of such claims can only be decided by the political force of those people in 
the society. This is just another example how people from different social classes take 
advantage of their political power to change the law for their own interests.  
 
4. Employees and Shareholders  
(a) Wealth Transfer 
Considering the co-existence of the shareholders’ premium, (especially offeree 
shareholders) and the loss of employees, some argue that takeovers transfer wealth 
from employees to shareholders.176 However, this wealth transfer theory should be 
treated with caution. On the one hand, we have seen that empirical evidence on job 
losses can only be summarized as inconsistent. On the other hand, the direct evidence 
to support the wealth transfer theory is still unavailable. Empirical evidence up to date 
merely documents the co-existence of gains for offeree shareholders, and losses for 
offeree employees.177  To support the wealth transfer theory, we need more direct 
evidence to establish a causal relationship between employees’ loss and shareholders’ 
gain.  
 
Curiously, at least one empirical study shows the non-existence of a direct 
causal relationship between the loss of employees and the returns of shareholders.178 
A similar result is also supported in a more recent study where the authors find that 
there is no such profit transfer from employees to shareholders. Rather, it seems that 
both workers and shareholders “experience a sort of ‘equal misery’ resulting from the 
poor performance of newly formed firms.” 179 In a word, the inconsistent empirical 
evidence throws doubts on the legitimacy of the wealth transfer theory and, in turn, 
also negates the legitimacy of a mandatory redistribution from shareholders to 
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employees.  
 
(b) Alliance between Employees and the Management 
Because of the qua owner status of shareholders, management is often argued 
to work for shareholders’ interests when a company is a going concern. However, this 
argument must be reconsidered due to the potential alliance between employees and 
management in takeover transactions. 180  Such alliance is possible because both 
employees and management have a desire of entrenchment, which is in intensive 
conflicts with shareholders’ persistent pursuance of financial interests.  
 
Examples of such alliance can be observed when the incumbent management 
defends a takeover offer by justifying the protection of the interests of employees in 
takeovers. Alternatively, incumbent management may simply pay a generous sum to 
seek alliance with employees.181 The efficacy of generous payments by incumbent 
management is apparent for the general practice that “generous wages [are] the 
managers’ preferred policy even ex post, while wage-cutting is the raider’s preferred 
course of action.”182 Workers may therefore prefer the incumbent management, at 
least with some acquaintance and certainty, to the raider, who may well adopt a hard-
nosed strategy and only bring uncertainty to current employees. In turn, employees 
may well help to entrench the incumbent management through their statutory rights of 
industrial actions and/or rights of information and consultation to fight potential 
takeovers. As a result, shareholders may suffer a loss of potential takeover premium.  
 
In practice, huge sums arising from terminating or maintaining pre-existing 
long-term employment contracts at a rather high payment level may well forestall any 
raider from initiating the takeover battle. Moreover, the generous payment to 
employees may in the end be paid out of the pockets of those dispersed non-
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controlling shareholders, who cannot make any difference to the strategic decision of 
the company but only suffer from such anti-takeover efforts. Thus, the existence of the 
alliance between employees and the management may indeed compromise the 
interests of non-controlling shareholders and enhance the interests of employees. 
 
(c) Employee Shareholders 
The above discussion distinguishes between the status of employees and that 
of shareholders. However, there are also cases where employees are shareholders. If 
employee shareholders with voting rights make up a majority in the shareholding, 
their attitude towards a takeover may well decide the fate of any takeover offer. Given 
the abovementioned alliance between employees and the management, employees 
holding stock of the employer may thwart any takeover initiative for the sake of their 
job security, indirectly entrenching the incumbent management. Such a projection has 
been evidenced in the US where more ESOPs are found in states with less legal 
protection for managers against takeovers.183 Since employee shareholders are less 
interested in share premium than in job security,184 such a situation indicates that 
employee shareholders’ non-shareholder interests may in effect act as a strong defence 
for incumbent management in takeover battles.  
 
Alternatively, employee shareholders in a company may more often be 
minority shareholders even if all the employees take part in the ESOP. If employee 
shareholders are minority shareholders, they may rely on those protections for 
minority shareholders. 185  Nevertheless, employees who initiate statutory litigation 
may have to face the administrative hierarchical structure, which may well legally and 
legitimately dismiss the employee. Thus, a pragmatic method for disgruntled 
employee shareholders is not to sue but to keep their interests qua employees 
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separately. At least, acting in this way may not make any difference to their interests 
as employees.  
 
Also, under Part 28 of the Companies Act 2006, takeover offers can be made 
to a specific class of shareholders.186  The intriguing questions here, however, are 
whether employee shareholders can be legally recognized as a unique class of 
shareholders for the purpose of s974 (2) (b) and whether employee shareholders can 
claim their interests as employees per se. Since there is no specific definition of the 
concept of class interests in company law, it is hard to determine whether the class 
interests of employee shareholders include non-financial concerns. Still, even if such 
interests are countenanced by the court, valuation of such interests may still frustrate 
the court to make any decision in that direction. 
 
The argument further substantiates that the introduction of employee 
shareholding does not settle the conflicts between employees and shareholders. As 
discussed, employee shareholding may either be taken advantage by the incumbent 
management when employee shareholders are majority shareholders or largely be 
ignored if employee shareholders are minority shareholders of the company. In 
essence, interests as employees cannot be mitigated by or commingled with their 
accompanying interests as shareholders. The beauty, if it does exist, of the employee 
shareholding is thus merely a psychological commitment to the company, a 
commitment which is expected to be transformed into productivity but cannot be 
measured. The efficacy of employee shareholding thus needs further evidential 
support. 
 
B. THE ROLE OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS  
1. Laws and Regulations on Securities Markets  
(a) The Takeover Code 
In alignment with the duties of directors in company law, the board of the 
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offeree company under the Takeover Code must act for the interests of the company 
as a whole, the concept of which surely overlaps the interests of employees. 187 
Specifically, boards of the offeree and the offeror must make available to employees 
or their representatives of the offeree company a summary of terms of the offer.188 The 
opinion of the offeree board on the potential effects of the offer on employees and 
employment relationship must also be disclosed to employees or their 
representatives. 189  Moreover, such opinions must be accompanied by a separate 
opinion of employee representatives on the effects of offers. 190  The intentional 
juxtaposition of these two opinions may provide employees with a better chance to 
evaluate the potential effects of the intended offer on employment issues. Besides, if 
changes to pension schemes of the employees of the offeree company are introduced, 
the Panel must be consulted for the frustrating effects.191 
 
The essence of such stipulations is to provide employees with a right of 
information and consultation. Employees’ right of information and consultation is, 
however, in stark contrast to the ex ante right of the offeree shareholders to decide the 
fate of the takeover offer. 192  The information and consultation right only refers 
employees back to the contractual protection, which, given the disadvantaged position 
of labour to capital, is hard to provide due protection for employees. Even though the 
Takeover Code expressly states that opinions of the offeree board to shareholders 
must also include the effects of the implementation of the offer on the company’s 
interests, “specifically, employment” and the potential repercussions of the offeror’s 
strategic plans,193 it is the offeree shareholders who will decide the fate of employees. 
 
More importantly, there is no supporting sanction clause for employees in case 
of any breach of the duty by directors. For instance, employees do not have standing 
for action within the framework of the Takeover Code. In practice, the regulation is 
usually met by routinely inserting a boilerplate formula into the offer documents 
without due consideration of employees’ specific interests in specific conditions. 
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Moreover, the actual transaction is materialized by contracts between the offeror 
company and each individual shareholder of the offeree company, with no 
participation by other stakeholders. Thus, it is hard to deny that the interests of 
employee can only be taken perfunctorily under the Takeover Code.  
 
The lack of due protection for employees under the Takeover Code has already 
been pointed out as a lacuna in the law.194 Still, it is easy to exaggerate the extent of 
deficiency in safeguarding the interests of employees in takeover transactions. In fact, 
as discussed below, protection for employees is mainly provided in laws in other areas 
than the Takeover Code and company law. Furthermore, an efficient corporate control 
market is not without benefits for employees. At least, the reduction of capital raising 
cost is beneficial to all stakeholders including employees. Thus, a complete negation 
of the positive effects of takeover transactions on employees is unjustified. 
 
(b) Other Laws and Regulations on Securities Markets 
For employees, information on takeovers may also be accessed through other 
routes than from employers. For example, in order to reduce the possibility of 
information leakage during the interval, announcement of price-sensitive information 
is required to be made as soon as the proposals are finished.195  It has become a 
business practice that the company makes the decision at the end of the day and 
informs the Exchange to disclose the information on the following working day. 
Accordingly, in case of large-scale redundancies after takeovers, the affected 
employees may first hear the news from sources other than their employer. Thus the 
government may in practice promote a good practice by letting the market and the 
employees have the information at the same time.  
 
However, employees may also be subject to the control of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1993 if an employee falls into the category of insiders due to his access to the 
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inside information by virtue of his employment, office or profession.196 In such cases, 
employees are deemed as financial participants in the securities market under the law. 
Still, it must be realized that such concerns may be of sense more to employees on 
higher levels than to those on lower levels.  
 
2. The Implication of TUPE  
(a) The Relevance of TUPE in Takeovers 
When there is a transfer of an economic entity which retains its identity in a 
takeover transaction, employees concerned can further be protected by the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (TUPE)197 in addition to 
those as set out in the Employment Rights Act 1996.198 However, as most takeover 
transactions are effected through share transfers with no transfer of the economic 
entity, the application of TUPE to takeover transactions is strictly constrained.199 The 
legal justification for this stance is that a transfer through share acquisition does not 
bring injustice to the employees transferred.200 
 
Employees in such transactions may have to resort to the general law on 
redundancy and unfair dismissals for potential protection. 201  Moreover, pension 
scheme protection is also available.202  Alternatively, the European Works Council 
Directive and the Information and Consultation Directive statutorily provide 
employees channels to be informed and consulted on companies’ potential strategic 
movements. Under the latter Directive, an employer must consult employees at an 
appropriate time and, considering the different natures of the issues, at different levels 
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of the employees within the undertaking. “Anticipatory measures” which may 
threaten employment are within the information to be disclosed. Moreover, if 
management decisions may lead to substantial changes in work organizations or 
contractual relations, representatives’ opinions must be considered with a reasoned 
response and consultation must be “with a view to reaching an agreement.”203 To 
achieve that objective, confidential information should also be disclosed but an 
accompanying contract of confidentiality may be signed with employee 
representatives and “any experts who assist them”. Besides, since “effective, 
proportionate, and dissuasive” sanctions are also explicitly supported in the 
Directive, 204  employees’ participation in the decision making process may be 
meaningful. 205  
 
Although takeover transactions effected through share transfers are not 
covered by the TUPE, a change of shareholders may well indicate a possible change 
of the strategy of the company, which may possibly include changes in the current 
employment relationship. Accordingly, employees in takeovers via share transfers 
may be less adequately protected than their counterparts in relevant transfers covered 
by TUPE.206  Nonetheless, if the court finds that complex transactions are designed to 
avoid the liabilities under the TUPE, a takeover on a share-for-share basis may be 
considered a step within a series of steps, the whole of which will be deemed as a 
single transaction within the coverage of the concept of the transfer of undertaking 
under the TUPE.207 Indeed, as summarized by Lindsay, 208 
The aim of the [TUPE] is to ensure continuity of employment 
relationships within the economic entity irrespective of any change of 
ownership and our domestic law illustrates how readily the courts will 
adopt a purposive construction to counter avoidance.  
 
Thus, even though the application of TUPE is circumscribed by the legal 
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definition of transfer of undertaking, TUPE may still be relevant in some takeover 
transactions through share transfers.  
 
(b) The Application of TUPE  
i) Unfair Dismissal  
Once TUPE applies, the legal result of regulation 4, the core of TUPE, is the 
automatic novation of the original employment contracts. Indeed, if there is a 
substantial change of working conditions to the detriment of employees, employees 
who voluntarily terminate their employment contracts may still be deemed as being 
unfairly dismissed under regulation 7 of the TUPE.  
 
TUPE, however, does not render a dismissal before the transfer automatically 
void209 and the transferee does not assume an unconditional obligation to take on all 
the employees of the transferor. Rather, employers may resort to economic, technical 
or organizational reasons for a defence. But, it is their responsibility to show the 
transfer is the sole or a substantial reason for dismissal.210 For instance, dismissals as 
an effort to meet the requirement of the transferee or to achieve a higher price have 
already been judged not covered by this exception.211  
 
In addition, an employer must also show that he has acted reasonably in 
dismissing a relevant employee.212 Case law has indicated that adherence to the proper 
procedure is important as a failure to consult with the employee concerned may 
primarily be deemed as an indicator of unfairness.213 Such procedural protection for 
employees is important as it is possible that both sides can review the situation fairly 
in a properly designed complaint and grievance scheme. Moreover, even if a dismissal 
is by all means inevitable, employees dismissed by redundancy are still entitled to a 
redundancy payment.214    
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ii) Information and Consultation 
Section 13 of the TUPE stipulates that the transferor and the transferee 
employers owe a duty to inform and consult the employees or employee 
representatives affected by the transfer. Information to be disclosed includes the 
timing of the transfer, implications of the transfer on employees, and measures to be 
adopted for affected employees.215 And, the duty to consult must be performed “with a 
view to seeking their agreement to the intended measures.”216 In order to redress the 
potential deficiency in cases where employees do not in fact have enough time to 
digest the information disclosed and accordingly take part in a meaningful 
consultation, the TUPE requires that the employer inform employees “long enough 
before a relevant transfer.”217  
 
Employees’ information and consultation rights do move forward the 
participation of employees affected by the transfer in the decision-making of the 
intended transfers. However, such rights cannot be identified with the veto right 
granted to shareholders in company law. It is highly possible that this liability will 
only be imposed when the management has almost made their decision. In such cases, 
employers may have already prepared most, if not all, arguments to defend their 
decisions while employees are left unprepared with only a scarce chance to negate the 
decision to transfer and a right to defend their compensation.  
 
Moreover, even if employees are consulted, further restriction on the number 
of parties privy to the information before the announcement of the takeover may in 
effect compromise the intended effect of the consultation. According to the City Code 
(now the Takeover Code) Panel’s Annual Report 2003, the number of such people 
privy to the information can be no more than six external persons or parties, among 
which include employee representatives. While the Panel will consider employee 
representatives as constituting one person for this purpose, it seems a large number of 
representatives may not be appropriate for the spirit of the Code.  
 
On the whole, the disadvantaged negotiating position of employees in private 
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contracting in takeover transactions can partly be redressed by the statutory protection 
for employees. On the one hand, the statutory information and consultation rights for 
employees impose on management a parallel liability to that owed to shareholders as 
stipulated in the Takeover Code and company law. This is a strategically important 
counterbalance to the current primary status of shareholders in corporate governance. 
On the other hand, the prohibitive cost, including the failure of the transfer, 
accompanying the breach of the employers’ liability under the TUPE may seriously 
constrain the discretion of employers. In fact, courts have been stringent in this regard. 
In Hagen v ICI Chemicals,218 an ambivalent statement that “broadly equivalent” rights 
for employees will be available under the scheme of the transferee is interpreted to 
mean a maximum 2% worse off as a result of the transfer. The finding that some 
employees received a 5% off their benefits under the transferee benefit scheme 
resulted in the failure of the transfer under the TUPE. 
 
iii) The Pension Rights 
Another important function of TUPE is its protection of the pension rights of 
employees transferred. Generally, employee pension schemes can be divided into two 
main separate categories, i.e., personal pension schemes and occupational pension 
schemes.219  Employees’ pension rights under former schemes are covered by the 
TUPE while those under the latter schemes are not.220 The legitimacy and legality of 
such regulations in the UK has already been confirmed by the Court of Appeal in 
Adams v Lancashire County Council and BET,221 even though continuing efforts have 
been made to include in the employment contracts transferred the pension rights under 
the occupational pension schemes.222  
 
However, such exemption should not deprive the employees and their 
representatives of the right to be informed of and consulted with any change in the 
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pension rights.223 In fact, the lack of protection in this respect under the TUPE has 
been mitigated by the Transfer of Employment (Pension Protection) Regulations 2005 
and section 257 and 258 of the Pensions Act 2004, which have already extended the 
TUPE protection to employees of the transferor who have access to the occupational 
pension scheme immediately before the transfer.224  
 
Nevertheless, since an employee cannot require the transferee company to 
accept a transfer in of his accrued benefits, it is the usual practice that such a transfer 
is declined by the transferee even though Article 119 of the EC Treaty225  requires the 
transferee company to be liable for any inequality of benefit. However, if this is the 
case, the accrued rights of the employees will be preserved in the former employer’s 
pension scheme but subject to a statutory revaluation so that the real value of such 
benefits is maintained at the employees’ retirement date.   
 
Therefore, pension benefits of employees transferred are generally protected 
through contracts but with a statutory guarantee of a no-worse-off treatment after the 
transfer. If such an agreement cannot be reached between the parties, the transferee 
will usually inform those affected employees that the existing scheme is being wound 
up and their accrued benefits will be secured by another contract with an insurance 
company.226   
 
In practice, the liabilities on pension transfer may change the financial model 
for potential purchasers, who may have to consider not only the statutory contribution 
of up to 6% from the transferor employer if the transferee employees select the money 
purchase scheme 227  but also the further complicated due diligence phase of the 
transaction, where the transferee has to take time and personnel to investigate relevant 
pension issues. Even though private contracts between the affected employees and the 
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transferee can help the transferor to avoid the contribution obligation, the possibility 
of such contracting out in practice may be too low to be meaningful. Thus, as far as 
takeover transactions are concerned, the statutory pension consideration may 
effectively frustrate the takeover transaction in concern, counterbalancing the 
shareholder primacy in the corporate control market. 
 
iv) The Effect of TUPE  
In sum, the protection for employees under the TUPE includes both procedural 
(information and consultation) and substantive aspects (unfair dismissal and pension 
rights). The inclusive coverage of the employee protection under the TUPE may, 
however, be limited by the difference in the existing working schemes of the two 
employers. This may either be reflected in the different payment and performance 
evaluating schemes or in the difference between the new grievance channel and their 
familiar one.228 Additionally, psychological conflicts between transferred employees 
and other employees in the transferee company may be far more profound than the 
above mentioned effects, thus debilitating the ultimately intended commitment to the 
company or the organization, an element “at the heart of any analysis of HRM 
(Human Resources Management).”229    
 
Furthermore, it is still not clear whether TUPE is applicable to those 
employees who work for the part transferred but sign the employment contract with 
the undertaking to which the part is attached.230 In CPL Distribution Ltd v Todd, the 
application of TUPE is decided by the duties and the status of the employee as stated 
in the contract, rather than by the actual work or the function of the work of the 
employee.231 However, a reverse decision was made in Sunley Turriff Holdings Ltd v 
Thomson232, where the contract of a secretary, who signed the employment contract 
with the company but worked for a company subsidiary which was later transferred, 
was decided to be transferred to the transferee.   
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This is just one situation where transferor and transferee may have different 
understanding of which employees are transferred. Under such a situation, employees 
may well be left “in a state of limbo with both the transferor and the transferee 
denying that they were the employers.”233  However, if this is the case, it clearly 
contravenes the intention of the TUPE that “an employee should not forfeit his job 
because of a change in the identity of his employer.”234 
 
C. EMPLOYEES IN BUY-OUT TRANSACTIONS 
1. Employee Buy-Outs 
In employee buyouts, employees will become the shareholders of the company. 
Employee buyouts may bring several financial benefits to the company. 235  For 
example, accession of the excess assets in pension plans, which is achieved by 
converting pension capital into equity claims, helps to finance the transaction. 
Meanwhile, the potential substitution of equity claims for the cash compensation for 
labour may also make available to the company more financial credit, decreasing the 
risk accompanying the highly leveraged transactions. Moreover, authorities have long 
been using favourable tax treatments to promote employee shareholding.  
 
In addition to these financial incentives, employee buyouts may also be 
initiated by some other considerations. For example, employees may initiate 
employee buyouts for the mere desire of job security. Some empirical evidence shows 
that employees may use their redundancy payments to purchase a workplace from a 
parent company for the purpose of saving their jobs. 236  Alternatively, employees 
might use employee buyouts as a bargaining chip for their expected payments.237 For 
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instance, employees in unprofitable businesses may ask for a payment at a certain 
level while at the same time offer a price to buy the company in concern. Valuable to 
employees in this scenario is the negotiating process, through which employees may 
acquire more information regarding the real situation of the company, even though 
they may still suffer the lack of expertise in interpreting and understanding possibly 
truncated and distorted information in such precarious situations. This mechanism 
thus plays, more or less, a function of signaling or monitoring.  
 
Despite these benefits, the occurrence of successful employee buyouts is still 
very low.238 It should be noticed that most benefits we covered are for the company 
not for the employees. The unpopularity of employee buyouts on the one hand shows 
the employees’ perception of the discrepancy between their own interests with those 
of the company while on the other hand indirectly reflects the risk-averse nature of the 
employees, who may prefer a stable income to a fluctuating income from 
shareholding.  
 
2. Other Buyout Transactions 
Different types of buyout transactions may produce different effects on 
employees. Empirical evidence reveals the positive effects on level of employment 
and improved employment relationship in MBO transactions whereas negative effects 
are evident in MBI transactions, where management teams are different from the 
existing management team. 239 This may be attributed to that fact that MBOs exploit 
the growth opportunities in the offeree company while MBIs are more likely to be 
involved in the ensuing restructuring processes. 
 
However, the potential default risk of highly leveraged debt contracts in the 
current private-equity or hedge fund supported buy-out transactions may counteract 
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the above positive evidence.240  Moreover, there is a tendency that the number of 
unions recognized declines after buyout transactions. 241  Also, asset stripping 
following some buyout transactions has already led to the insolvency of several 
pension funds. 242  Besides, employees in public companies going private may be 
deprived of public information disclosure as required by company law and regulations 
on the securities market. 243  Considering the size of the current going private 
transactions, employees’ information rights are extremely weakened in those 
companies going private. In turn, the end result may well be that the pre-existing trust 
between employees and companies will be harmed.244 
 
Additionally, even though the impotence of the TUPE for employees in buyout 
transactions has already been widely pointed out by some worker organizations,245 the 
government still did not insert a corresponding regulation in the TUPE 2006. 
Nevertheless, employees’ negotiating power in such transactions cannot be 
underestimated. As identified by the FSA, several transactions have been stalled 
because the pension fund trustees of the offeree company require the private equity 
purchaser to make a substantial contribution to the deficit of the pension fund.246 
More broadly, the staggering income for private equity fund and hedge fund industries 
has already courted advocates from employees for distributive justice in the society. 
Indeed, the government has already promised to review the tax issue on private equity 
funds.247 In this case, employees successfully take advantage of their political power 
in the society to claim their governance rights and protect their interests. This is just 
another piece of evidence that corporate governance can only be understood as an 
institutional issue. 
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PART V. EMPLOYEES IN INSOLVENCY  
First, it must be warned that since insolvency is legally evaluated in financial 
terms, employees’ non-financial interests cannot be seriously considered.248 This is 
because any discussion of employees as stakeholders of a company is set up on the 
presumption that the financial existence of the company is not an issue. Indeed, as we 
will see, employees are mainly deemed as creditors and are financially compensated 
in insolvency. Their non-financial interests are largely outside the coverage of 
insolvency law. Even though employees can resort to employment law for their non-
financial interests, the solvency status which is judged only in financial terms can in 
fact suffocate such claims. Advocates for incremental employees’ governance rights 
are accordingly suggested to propose alternative methods to evaluate the solvency of 
the company before their argument can be seriously be considered.  
 
Within this background, the current promotion of corporate rescue culture may 
have a special meaning to rescue the company financially first. Still, as recommended 
by the Cork Committee, corporate rescue can help achieve the social objective to 
protect those affected by the insolvency. A corporate rescue culture not only enhances 
the ongoing value of the company, providing more for whatever parties in 
participation, but also promotes a stable society and labour force, a very important 
political objective to be achieved in a welfare state. However, as said, the tricky 
question here is that it is hard to project the result of the corporate rescue. While 
corporate rescue may be good efforts to save jobs and maintain stability, it may be 
achieved only for a short-term and at the cost of other stakeholders. As pointed out by 
Brown, “government and the workforce will regard the preservation of jobs as a 
success, even though unsecured creditors are left begging.”249 It is within this context 
that our discussion of employees in insolvency is carried out.  
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A. THE ROLE OF CONTRACTS 
In cases of insolvency, employment contracts with new employees are rare 
even for the purposes of corporate rescue. Rather, it is more likely than otherwise for 
insolvency practitioners to insert new terms in existing employment contracts or to 
sign new employment contracts with existing employees. Under such situations, 
employees may either select to quit or to stay put to help saving the life of the 
company in distress. 
 
If employees select to exit they will get compensation according to the 
statutory protection and contractual protection. However, too many exits will also 
accelerate the demise of the company and thus minimize the pie left. In the latter 
situation, employees can still get the legal guaranteed minimum payment even though 
other parts of their compensation will be left as claims of unsecured creditors, who 
usually get nothing at the end.  
 
Alternatively, employees may suspend their original contracts and sign new 
contracts with the company or the insolvency practitioner to contribute to the 
turnaround of the business of the target. In some cases, employees may compromise 
their own interests to tide the company over. Or they may adopt buyouts, as discussed 
in the former Part, to be the owner of the company. Thus, despite extensive legal 
penetration in this juncture, private contractual arrangements still provide employees 
with opportunities to play a proactive role in corporate rescue.  
 
B. THE ROLE OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
1. Employment Contracting in Statutory Corporate Rescue 
Procedures 
(a) Adoption of Employee Contracts  
In general, the inception of administration and administrative receivership 
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should not automatically terminate existing employment contracts because the 
insolvency practitioners are normally acting as the agents of the company, the 
appointment of whom does not make any difference to the continuance of the 
company’s existing contracts with employees. 250  In law, the continuance of the 
employment contracts can be maintained by administrators or receivers through 
adoption,251  “which presupposes their [employment contracts’] continuance at the 
date of the administration order or commencement of administrative receivership.”252  
 
For employees whose employment contracts are adopted in administration 
after the 14 days grace period, their claims for their services after the adoption date 
may enjoy a super-priority status to those of the insolvency expenses.253  With a 
guarantee of at least some compensation, employees may prefer to stay put rather than 
to leave. Moreover, morale among employees will also be enhanced. Such a statutory 
protection thus grants a better protection to employees in administration than to their 
counterparts in administrative receivership, under which employees may only be 
protected by the receivers’ personal liabilities if the receiver has not contracted out 
their personal liabilities with relevant employees.254 
 
However, the super-priority status of “wage and salary” to employees in 
administration does not extend to their redundancy or unfair dismissal payments, 
which are neither strictly “[liabilities] arising under a contract of employment” nor 
can fall under the rubric of “necessary disbursement” under the r.2.67 of the 
Insolvency Rules 1986.255 Such decisions indicate that courts still hold the rescue of 
the company as a going concern an objective superior to the protection for 
employees.256 In this sense, interests of employees are not identified with the interests 
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of the company or are only one component of the interests of company at most. 
 
(b) The Implication of the Grace Period on the Consultation of 
Employees 
The statutory interval of the 14-day grace period in corporate rescue is in 
effect to postpone the legal effective date of the adoption of employment contracts.257 
While the 14-days grace period for an insolvency practitioner is too short to make a 
comprehensive and well-considered decision, the short time appears even more 
limited for employees to realize their information and consultation rights. 258  
 
In fact, it seems that there is a conflict between the insolvency law and the law 
on employees’ information and consultation rights. In contrast to the 14-days grace 
period, employees are given longer time to be consulted and informed under s.188 of 
the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. 259 Under s188, the 
period of consultation is relevant to the size of the dismissal. The bigger the number 
of employees dismissed, the longer the consultation period. If insolvency practitioners 
have to make a balanced decision to sell the company as a going concern by 
considering the cost accompanying any lay off within the 14-day period, it is apparent 
that corporate rescue under the current insolvency legal regime cannot meet the legal 
requirements on consultation under the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992. Still, to employ employees in administration for additional 
90 days period simply for the purpose of consultation is definitely not cost-
justified.260 Thus, the statutory 14-day interval may be a little arbitrary but any change 
of it necessitates further delicate cost-efficiency analyses.  
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2. Sales of the Company or Parts of the Company       
For the purpose of corporate rescue, it is highly possible that a part or the 
whole of the company is sold or that the assets are realized. Employees under such 
situations may either be laid off or face a new employer, who may also consider 
possible changes to the original employment contracts. Legal protection for 
employees is mainly achieved through their rights to information and consultation, 
and the transfer of the employment contracts in concern. We will discuss these issues 
below. 
 
(a) The Implication of TUPE 
i) The Application of TUPE 
The Collective Redundancies Directive (‘CRD’), the Acquired Rights 
Directive (‘ARD’) and the Insolvency Directive within the EU have already made a 
difference to the corporate rescue process.261 The essence of these Directives is to 
grant employees a property-like claim on the enterprise.262 The effect, however, is 
two-sided. For the negative aspect, the cost consideration of the employees’ interests 
may hinder potential efforts from the outside to buy the company as a going concern. 
For the positive, the integration of the interests of employees into the rescue 
negotiation process may produce a healthy productive unit.  
 
Implementation of these directives in the UK is achieved through TUPE. If a 
transfer in insolvency meets the requirement of “a relevant transfer”,263 TUPE will 
apply and the employment contracts will be automatically transferred to the transferee. 
In turn, the transferee will be liable to compensate the employees for their unfair 
dismissal. Thus, if the transferor is in financial difficulties, TUPE will be especially 
important for the employees of the transferor since employees under this situation can 
hardly get any compensation from the transferor. Indeed, even when the identity of the 
transferee is still uncertain, TUPE may still apply as long as the dismissal is made 
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with an objective to facilitate an intended transfer. 264  If this is the situation, the 
transferor will bear the responsibility for any loss incurred by employees. 
 
Nevertheless, once the company is in any proceeding with a view to 
liquidating its assets or is under the supervision of an insolvency practitioner, 
regulations of 4 and 7 of the TUPE do not apply.265 Moreover, employers may rely on 
the “economic, technical or organizational” exception to exempt their liabilities in 
business transfer transactions. However, it is worth mentioning that the efficacy of 
such exemptions for employers may strictly be limited by the courts. For example, 
one court has already decided that keeping a good price of the insolvent company by a 
sale as a going concern does not fall within the coverage of the “economic, technical 
or organizational” exception.266  
 
The transfer of the acquired rights of employees to the transferee, however, is 
only one side of the coin. On the other side of the coin, the transferee also inherits 
rights against the transferor for the failure of the latter to observe any statutory 
liabilities. However, if insolvency of the transferor is impending, the possibility of 
success in such actions will be very low. Thus, if a sale is ensuing, the transferee may 
be especially careful about the fate of the insolvent company.267  
 
ii) The Deterrent Effect of TUPE 
According to TUPE, employees have a continuous right to access these assets 
and this continuity should not be interrupted merely by the transfer of the enterprise. 
Indeed, TUPE “is another way of recognizing that the employee’s human capital is 
firm-specific in the sense of being bound up with complementary physical assets and 
organizational routines.”268 Thus, TUPE is a strong indicator in law that employees’ 
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firm specific human capital investment should be protected from undue prejudice.269  
 
In specific, the TUPE is a mechanism to realize the novation of employees’ 
current employment contracts with the transferee. However, as far as dismissal in 
connection with a transfer is concerned, TUPE has already amplified the rights 
granted to employees transferred by referring to the exemption of “economic, 
technical and organizational” (ETO) reasons, which is much narrower than the 
coverage of the concept of “some other substantial reason” used as exception in non-
TUPE restructurings.270  It is thus clear that the transfer transaction serves as the 
trigger in law of a “stronger-than-normal level” protection for employees.  
 
Due to the strong legal protection provided to employees, it seems doubtful 
that TUPE can facilitate corporate rescue efforts through the sales of the insolvent 
company as a going concern. This is because an immediate break-up of the transferee 
within reasonable expectation may substantially decrease the price a purchaser would 
pay. Indeed, case law shows that the transferor may have to take into consideration 
those employees dismissed by insolvency practitioners. In Litster, 271  actions of 
insolvency practitioners to lay off employees one hour before the transfer were seen 
as one of a series of steps “in contemplation of the transfer”. Employees so displaced 
were accordingly deemed as being employed immediately before the transfer. Cases 
like these are clear indicators that TUPE can increase the expense of the corporate 
rescue. Therefore, it is highly possible that the price a transferee promised to pay has 
already made a corresponding reduction for their potential liabilities to employees 
transferred. Such reduction in effect is a reduction of the pool value for creditors. In 
other words, “TUPE operates ex post to shift resources from the creditors as a group, 
to the employees.”272 
 
Still, the deterrent effect of TUPE on corporate rescue should not be overrated. 
First, since the fate of the rescue is an accumulative result of a set of different factors, 
such as the number of employees to be displaced, the length of their service and the 
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negotiating power of the potential buyers, the amount and quality of information 
available to both parties, it is unfair to attribute the low success rate of corporate 
rescue solely to the deterrent effect of TUPE.273 Second, the government has been 
making efforts to redress the potential debilitating effects of TUPE on corporate 
rescue. Indeed, two regulations of the TUPE purposefully refer to the specific context 
of insolvency and thus are of special importance to corporate rescue. One is regulation 
8, according to which the liability of the Secretary of State under the Employment 
Rights Act 1996 applies to any relevant employees in such transactions and cannot be 
transferred to the transferee.274 Thus, relevant employees affected by TUPE can get 
guaranteed protection under the Employment Rights Act 1996, facilitating their 
proactive involvement in the corporate rescue. The other is the newly inserted 
regulation 9, corresponding to article 4a of the Acquired Rights Directive, which 
expressly permits the variation of the employment contracts to be transferred but on 
the condition that such variation must be designed with a view to safeguarding 
employment opportunities through the survival of the part transferred. 275 
Correspondingly, employee representatives and employees are granted with rights to 
be consulted if a permitted variation of the contracts is intended. The regulation thus 
provides some flexibility in rescuing the company in distress, clearing the former 
obstacle established in case law that the TUPE cannot be contracted out,276 while at 
the same time duly promoting the employee interests in such precarious junctures.  
 
(b) Information and Consultation 
If large scale redundancies are in consideration or if a transaction within the 
meaning of TUPE is about to be concluded, the law requires that representatives of 
the employees be consulted with a view to reaching agreement on ways of protecting 
the employees’ interests.277 Employers may have to pay an exorbitant penalty with a 
punitive nature if they fail to meet these requirements.278 In addition to his or her 
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contractual entitlements, an employee affected by such breaches may also be awarded 
“appropriate compensation.”279  
 
It is true that employers who fail to inform and consult the employees in the 
proposed redundancy dismissal280 may cite “special circumstances” as a defence.281 
However, mere insolvency or the fact that the company is in administration cannot be 
referred to as a “special circumstance.”282 There must be something uncommon or 
unordinary that has made it practicably unreasonable to comply (at least fully comply) 
with the requirements.283  
 
Nevertheless, case law in the UK tells us that employers’ breaches of this 
consultation duty still cannot avoid the transaction. 284  In fact, with a penalty of 
compensation which the tribunal considers appropriate, the failure to observe the 
consultation obligation may make no difference to the existing employment 
relationship. Still, the effect of the potential penalty may be intimidating. As two 
scholars observed: 
“By doubling the salaries and wages of the workforce for a period 
of weeks or perhaps months, the sum owed by the employer soon mounts 
up, eating into the income and assets which would otherwise be available 
to shareholders or, in some cases, creditors. The viability of a particular 
managerial strategy for restructuring may thereby be undermined.”285  
 
Accordingly, even though the failure of the employer to observe this liability 
only leads to the dismissal being considered unfair, and does not make the transaction 
void, the ultimate effect of the penalty may still be frustrating ex ante. The difference 
in the end result is thus “one of degree, not one of kind.”  
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(c) Unfair Dismissal under Non-TUPE Transfers 
While TUPE provides employees with a powerful weapon to safeguard their 
interests, a lot of sales or business transfers are not covered by TUPE. If there is no 
application of TUPE to the business transfer, employees may have recourse to general 
protection provided by the Employment Rights Act 1996.286  
 
Still, employers, by showing the reasons for dismissal are potentially valid and 
reasonable under the specific condition, can have recourse to “some other substantial 
reasons” to defend the fairness of their decision to dismiss the employees.287 In effect, 
the statutory defence of “some other substantial reasons” has generally enhanced the 
prerogative of the management since “Judicial and tribunal interpretations have read 
into reasonableness an overly generous view of managerial prerogative.”288  
 
Nonetheless, justifications for such exceptions may still exist in some cases 
where employment contractual terms may have to be changed for the sole purpose of 
saving the company. It should be noticed that in some cases employees themselves 
may even ask for similar changes in order to tide the company over.289 In such cases, 
individual employee’s interests may have to be subjugated to the overall corporate 
rescue objective.  
 
Such understanding has been testified in Ellis v Brighton Co-operative Society 
Ltd290 , where the dismissal of the employee, who refused to accept the changed 
contractual terms, was decided fair for the reason that he could not be an exception to 
the whole rescue program. However, two points are worth mentioning about that case. 
The first is that reorganization is identified as a business necessity in Ellis, without 
which the whole business would come to a standstill. The second is that the employer 
observed a set of proper procedures, such as timely consultation with the aim to reach 
agreements. Such understandings may produce important implications on employees. 
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On the one hand, it can be seen that the interests of the company are different from 
those of employees and that the latter must be subjugated to the former if a 
reorganization is really needed for the survival of the company. On the other hand, 
regulations on unfair dismissal and those regarding information and consultation, still 
play their due role by providing employees with a chance to get involved in the 
corporate strategic decision making process, though such a right cannot be identified 
with the ex ante decision right. 
 
3. Distribution to Employees in Liquidation 
On liquidation, with the exception of members’ voluntary liquidation, 
employment contracts terminate automatically. The publication of the winding up 
order or a compulsory liquidation can be seen as the notice of discharge of the 
employment contracts.291  The ensuing issue is thus the distribution to employees. 
While employees are generally deemed as creditors and the general distribution 
principle of pari passu still works, statutory qualifications can also be located. For 
example, some claims are regarded as insolvency expenses and are thus paid in the 
first echelon and some of the claims are regarded as having a super-priority even to 
the insolvency expenses.292  Claims in the latter category are mainly for services 
rendered by employees during the corporate rescue period, during which the 
contributions from employees are indispensable parts of the rehabilitation process or 
their services rendered in the liquidation phase.293 In addition, part of their claims, i.e., 
wages and holiday pay accruing in the four months before “the relevant date”294 of 
proceedings have a preferential status, ranking ahead of unsecured creditors and 
floating charges, but subject to a limit of £800.295 Other claims from employees will 
generally be regarded as claims from unsecured creditors, who usually end up with 
almost nothing.  
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In liquidation, employees may have no third party to claim their entitlements 
except through the National Insurance Fund.296 The end result of this process is that 
the employees will be substituted by the NIF as the creditor of the company. 
Employees’ claims against NIF are guaranteed to be paid in full, subject to a statutory 
limit, and there is no concern of priority for their claims as would happen if they claim 
as creditors. Indeed, the creation of NIF indicates that the compensation for 
employees in such categories is not an issue specific to any particular employer but 
rather a general concern to all employers. Viewed from this perspective, the 
mandatory requirement of insurance may operate as a potential constraint on the 
management’s opportunism arising from the limited liability.297  
 
Given the embarrassing financial conditions of companies going into 
liquidation and the superior status of claims from secured creditors, compensation for 
employees may in practice be limited to statutory minimum protection. The minimum 
statutory protection thus guarantees employees a superior protection compared with 
that for other creditors. The seemingly inconsistent treatment of employees, either in 
comparison with that of creditors or across different groups of employees, however, 
reflects the importance of an ethical concern, which is wider than the mere concern of 
distributive justice.298 For example, for some employees a job is identified with the 
only source of their living maintenance. A mere legal status as unsecured creditors 
thus cannot meet this moral requirement.  
 
In contrast, a resolution of voluntary winding up does not terminate existing 
employment contracts automatically.299 Employees in such situations can be protected 
by unfair dismissal law. In one case, an express instant dismissal of an employee 
whose employment contract does not expire has been decided unfair and employees 
concerned can claim damages.300  Indeed, even if the employer has ceased to do 
business, a dismissal following a resolution of voluntary winding up has been decided 
to be a wrongful dismissal.301 Furthermore, since it is more often the case that the 
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company has enough to distribute among different claimants, financial interests of 
employees may not be a big issue. Still, employees’ non-financial interests can be 
compromised in such situations.  
 
4. Statutory Arrangements 
(a) S425 of the Companies Act 1985302 
Arrangements under s425 of the Companies Act 1985 involve a wide range of 
re-structuring transactions. An approval of a statutory majority representing three-
fourths in value of creditors or class of creditors or members or class of members is 
required.303 Thus, if an employee shareholding scheme has already been in place, 
employee shareholders, if they are in the majority of the shareholding of the company, 
can protect their interests through their shareholding of the company concerned. 
However, in this case, it is highly possible the compromise or the arrangement is to 
some extent a sacrifice of the interests of the employees. Moreover, it must realized 
that case law has largely excluded employees’ service contracts from the coverage of 
the ‘property’ or ‘liability’ transferred to the transferee under the s427(6) of the 
Companies Act 1985,304 indicating that some employees’ rights cannot be protected 
under an arrangement of s425 of the Companies Act 1985. 
 
Employees may, however, rely on employment law to protect their interests. If 
there is a relevant transfer under TUPE, employees can seek relevant protection under 
that regulation. Alternatively, if such transfers are achieved through share-transfers, 
we may notice that such a change may well modify the contractual terms. Breaches of 
implicit contracts, especially in terms of trust and confidence, may be more common 
than apparent breaches of employment contracts. Nonetheless, it should be borne in 
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mind that trust and confidence have already been implied in those long-term 
employment contracts.305  
 
(b) S110 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
In a process under s110, insolvency of the old company is impending. The set-
up of the new company is merely a vehicle for the purpose of rearranging the debt 
and/or the capital structure of the old company. Even though such a change of the 
company’s legal personality is important as the company with original shareholders 
and/or creditors but in a different, and perhaps healthier, capital structure, will open a 
new page of its own life, employees may well be dismissed in such a situation as the 
company is expecting a new start. However, it should be noticed that dismissals of 
employees at this time may well be considered unfair as common law has already 
established that a resolution of voluntary winding-up does not terminate the 
employment contracts at least if the company does not cease its entire business.306 
Since an arrangement under s110 usually does not change the business of the original 
company, it is highly possible that employees dismissed in an arrangement may 
succeed in claiming their compensation in court. In addition to their rights in 
employment contracts, employees may also rely on unfair dismissal law and the law 
of redundancy for corresponding protection. Moreover, as an arrangement under S110 
of the IA 1986 is mainly employed as a rescue effort with a view not to liquidate the 
assets of the company, regulation 8 of the TUPE will apply if there is a relevant 
transfer.307 Employees may accordingly enjoy the protection under the TUPE.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we begin our discussion with the social political issues relevant 
to employees. Even though the promotion of workplace democracy has made a 
difference to employees’ governance rights, the current finance dominated 
commercial culture and the historically established confrontation between capital and 
                                                 
305
 See discussion in Part IV of this Chapter. 
306
 Fowler v Commercial Timber Company [1930] 2 K.B. 3. 
307
 TUPE 2006 reg. 8(6) and (7). 
Chapter 5. Employees 
January 2008 270 
labour seriously constrain the effectiveness of such efforts. In fact, labour controlled 
companies are rare. Nor can workplace democracy, which emphasizes the decision 
making rights of employees, improve productivity as expected within other 
organization forms. Moreover, the single-tier board practice in the UK can only be 
understood as an end-result of the political struggle between capital and labour during 
the post-war period, indicating that the specific business practice in the UK is not 
compatible with the two-tier board structure as in Germany or some other forms of 
employee codetermination. However, creative contractual solutions such as ESOPs 
and pension fund arrangements can help to achieve employees’ financial participation, 
partly mitigates the long-established conflict between capital and labour. Still, as we 
have seen, several factors constrain the effectiveness of these arrangements in 
safeguarding the interests and governance rights of employees.  
 
Indeed, workplace democracy can only be promoted when companies are 
financially viable. But on the other hand, the short-termism of financial pursuance co-
exists with the stickiness of employment policy at the level of individual companies. 
Also, the current pursuance of both economic efficiency and social justice within the 
EU has greatly improved the situation of employees’ participation within the UK. We 
thus observe that labour and capital are interactive knots in the governance institution 
network. 
 
We then discuss employees in the normal life phase of corporate governance. 
As discussed, the implicit contractual right to job security is a case sensitive issue for 
individual employees. Accordingly, the general linkage between firm specific 
investment and job security may do a disservice as employees’ firm specific 
investment is a dynamic issue. Moreover, collective bargaining through union 
representatives and selected representative schemes strengthens the negotiating power 
of employees though some concerns still constrain the representativity of such 
systems. Even though the marginalization of unions may discount the above effects, 
the newly introduced selected representative scheme and the strengthened information 
and consultation rights may more or less enhance the collective bargaining power of 
employees.  
 
Next, we discuss the role of laws and regulations in safeguarding employees’ 
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interests. What is apparent in the regulations on employment contracting is the 
recognizance of the status approach to employment relationships and the existence of 
public law elements to redress the redistributive concern. Such a stance informs the 
whole legal institution on employment relationships. Also, as we have seen, through 
mandatory standards, contractual interpretation, interventions of industrial tribunals or 
courts, and such governance rights as recognition of trade unions, collective 
bargaining, information and consultation with worker representatives, labour law 
plays an important role in reshaping the governance role of employees under the 
governance structure established merely by the company law.  
 
We then examine employees in the three thresholds in the life cycle of 
corporate governance. We intentionally extend the discussion of employees in 
flotations to earlier stages when companies are in their incubation. Such an approach 
reveals that the employment relationship before the flotation stage has a strong blue 
print effect on its latter development. Moreover, the predominance of the bilateral 
monopoly model in employment contracting and the strong role of norms and 
reputation in shaping employment relationship are two features of employment 
relationship for companies in this stage. In addition, the intensive competition on the 
product market may also constrain the legal protection for employees. Strong legal 
intervention, especially those affecting medium sized companies, may in fact impose 
costs on companies intending to go public.  
 
For employees in companies going through takeovers, the traditional argument 
for disadvantaged employee negotiating power must be viewed with reservation. For 
one thing, it is hard to argue that employees cannot project the possibility of takeover 
activities and claim corresponding contractual rights. For another, we see strong legal 
intervention through unfair dismissal law and TUPE in protecting the interests of 
employees. Admittedly, the prior approval rights granted by the Takeover Code to 
offeree shareholders may substantively vitiate employees’ participation in the decision 
making process. However, the counterbalancing effects of employment regulations, 
such as the ICE and the TUPE, are also very strong even if directors may prioritize the 
interests of shareholders in practice. In fact, the cost of breaches of legal stipulations 
may well lead to the abortion of the intended takeover transactions. Furthermore, as 
revealed in the quick response of labour to the recent private equity and hedge fund 
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supported buyout transactions, employees may seek a general protection through their 
political strength in the wider society. 
 
When companies face financial embarrassment, we observe strong legal 
intervention in the employment contracting process. Detailed laws and regulations 
strongly constrain the discretion of employers to dismiss employees. Employees may 
participate in the rescue process voluntarily either through employee buyout 
transactions or by accepting lower payments to tide the company over. Also, 
employees are granted with important information and consultation rights to rescue 
strategic movements such as sales or transfer part or whole of the company. Even if 
rescue efforts fail at last, employees are protected by minimum legal compensation 
with support from the national insurance fund. However, it must be realized that the 
solvency status only judged by financial performance may preclude any serious 
consideration of non-financial interests of employees. In fact, to deem employees as 
financial creditors is the main principle for distribution to employees in insolvency, 
although we observe different priority is prescribed for different categories of 
compensations. However, it is fair to argue that strong legal intervention at this stage 
grants employees a stronger negotiating power in distressed companies than in 
companies in normal life.  
 
In sum, our discussion shows that employees’ relative lack of decision-making 
power in company law has been somewhat counterbalanced by rather strong 
employees’ rights in employment law, through which a range of institutional 
arrangements have arisen to constrain the discretion of the employer. Importantly, by 
providing substantive protection for individual employees in redundancy and unfair 
dismissal cases, voice rights in mandatory information and consultation regulations, 
and retention of their rights in cases of specific events like business transactions in 
TUPE and insolvency of the employer, UK employment law “acknowledges the 
existence of a contingent control right for employees.”308  Indeed, for boards making 
decisions, company law and employment law are parallel.309 In other words, boards 
may have to consider the potential liabilities imposed by employment law when they 
                                                 
308
 Armour and Deakin, (2001a), at 16. 
309
 The parallel argument also indicates that shareholders and employees have different governance 
roles. See Davies, (2002b), at 274 and Rock and Wachter, (1999). 
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consider the interests of shareholders or when they present the argument to 
shareholders. Considering the strong threatening effects of liabilities when employees’ 
statutory rights are breached, it may be too simple to say that shareholders will leave 
aside the interests of employees.  
 
Moreover, even though the past history paves the way to a governance 
institution with shareholder supremacy and weak labour unions, the current 
development in employment law, mainly derived from the wider Europe, has already 
changed the landscape. In fact, if we consider the overwhelming influence of the dual 
pursuance of both economic efficiency and social justice within the EU, there is a 
strong argument that more intrusive employee rights will be imposed in the near 
future in the UK. The governance role of employees is thus a dynamic issue which 
must be considered within the ever-changing social political context. 
 
In a word, protection for employees in the UK largely corresponds to their 
social political status and is instituted with flexibility according to the specific 
situations of the company.  
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
PART I. A REVIEW OF THE THESIS 
A. A REVIEW OF THE THESIS 
In this thesis, I begin by viewing corporate governance as a control system, 
which includes both the internal and the external control scheme. I argue that only by 
integrating these two schemes can we have a holistic picture of corporate governance. 
With the help of institutional economics, I reorganize factors included in those two 
schemes and set up a three-dimensional structure to integrate both the internal and 
external control schemes.  
 
The discussion in this thesis shows that the corporate governance institution in 
the UK is largely appropriate for the purpose of providing due protections for 
stakeholders given their status in the wider society.  We observe that stakeholders 
have different combinations of laws and contracts to safeguard their interests in 
different phases of the life cycle of corporate governance. In the normal life of a 
company, we see that protection for shareholders’ interests has mainly been 
standardized as a set of default and mandatory rules in company law and securities 
markets regulations. In this phase, the interests of creditors are protected mainly 
through contractual arrangements. For employees, their interests are protected mainly 
through employment law, which provides not only minimum protection in their 
financial interests but also their rights arising from their status as citizens with dignity 
in welfare states. Moreover, some employees, depending on their strong negotiating 
power, may also enjoy protection from their own contractual arrangements with the 
company. 
 
Once a company goes through a flotation, we observe that public companies 
are also subject to the laws and regulations on the securities markets. We also observe 
that institutional shareholders can enhance their established interests by taking 
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advantage of their business relationships with financial intermediaries on the public 
capital market. As a flotation more often than not indicates a good prospect of the 
company in concern, contractual arrangements are still the main method for creditors 
and employees to protect their interests. What is worth emphasizing is that corporate 
governance practices at the company level present a path-dependent nature. In fact, 
we observe not only the ‘lock-in’ effect of institutional shareholders and venture 
capitalists but also the ‘blue print’ effect of the employment relationship in companies 
going through the process of flotation. While such observances do show that corporate 
governance develops continuously, a more important implication may be that finance 
dominated governance practices may well be maintained years after companies go 
public.  
 
In takeovers, we observe that different stakeholders have different rights and 
different sets of constraints to safeguard their interests in this conjuncture. One 
important issue in the UK is that shareholders are the only group of stakeholders 
entitled with a decision making right. Still, the decision making process is not that 
clear cut as a single-minded target at financial interests for shareholders only may not 
be feasible considering the strong legal intervention for the interests of employees and 
the strong negotiating power of creditors. Since the strong negotiating power of 
creditors may justify the legal protection they receive, the disruptive effects on 
employees are especially apparent. However, it must be realized that disruptive effects 
of takeover transactions on employees more often than not refer to those of the 
ensuing sales of companies or insolvencies of companies. But on the other hand, we 
also see that strong legal intervention through TUPE and other employment laws 
which have greatly improved their legal protection. Moreover, the enhanced 
information and consultation rights in cases of important strategic movements can 
also improve the collective negotiating power of employees. It is true that such legal 
intervention still cannot meet the requirements of advocates for stakeholder-oriented 
corporate governance. However, it must be realized that such improvements can only 
be achieved through persistent political efforts.  
 
In insolvency, shareholders are marginalized to the extent that they may only 
get involved proactively as participants in the corporate rescue process. Interests of 
creditors are expressly prioritized in insolvency law though their main protection is 
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achieved through contractual arrangements in earlier phases of the life cycle of 
corporate governance. Employees, again, are protected in insolvency law as creditors 
and in employment law as both firm-specific human capital investors and citizens 
with dignity in welfare states. However, one intriguing point of insolvency in the life 
cycle of corporate governance is that the criteria judging the solvency status of a 
company have always been made in financial terms. Even though this lacuna can be 
explained by the strong role of finance in the current social political context, it is still 
curious to find that no advocate for stakeholder-oriented corporate governance has 
ever suggested the introduction of the non-financial interests of employees into the 
criteria evaluating the solvency status of a company.   
 
B. THE INTERESTS OF A COMPANY 
The above review thus sheds some light on the understanding of the concept 
of the interests of a company. Up till now, there is no clear definition of the interests 
of a company. Still, at first blush, it is easy to link the financial interests of a company 
with the interests of the company. The financial interests of a company are not only 
prescribed by the relatively strong position of capital to that of labour in society but 
also dictated directly and forcefully by insolvency law as whatever the interests of the 
company are, it must be sure that one primary objective of corporate governance is to 
ensure the survival or the solvency of the company. As we said, the criteria for a 
company to be insolvent are stipulated in purely financial terms. In other words, there 
are good reasons to argue that the financial solvency of a company is one basic 
component of the interests of a company. Accordingly, the objective of directors’ 
fiduciary duty to achieve the long-term success of the company under the new 
Companies Act 2006 must first be understood as to achieve the financial sustenance 
and then the long-term development of a company. In combination with the 
understanding in this thesis, the long-term success of a company requires the 
company to be flexible and strong enough to suit the ever-changing internal and 
external environment. 
 
However, this understanding may in practice be easily transformed to pursue 
financial profit to the extreme and in turn the identification of the interests of 
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shareholders with those of the company. Our analysis show that only the interests of 
shareholders fluctuate in tune with the rise and fall of the company. In comparison, 
creditors may only care for their already established financial interests in their 
contracts with the company. They may insert covenants to safeguard their interests 
long before the statutory insolvency criteria are met. Protections provided in 
insolvency law are thus in most cases a last resort. Alternatively, interests of 
employees, with minimum protection either from law or from social political concerns, 
are not so tightly knitted with the fluctuation of the development of the company. 
Indeed, employees are separately protected to some extent without due consideration 
of the phase of the development of the company. As shown in this thesis, the interests 
of employees can at least be distinguished into a fixed part and a fluctuating part. 
Though the fluctuating part is closely connected with the development of the company, 
the existence of the fixed part in the interests of employees at least provides some 
argument for the residual status for shareholders. Thus, compared with the other two 
stakeholders, shareholders’ interests can be easily measured and also fluctuate in tune 
with the life cycle of the company. In turn, it is not a surprise that the interests of 
shareholders are more often linked with those of the company in practice. 
 
Nevertheless, there is still a big step between such a link and the identification 
of the interests of shareholders with those of the company. On the one hand, the 
involvement of creditors and the firm-specific investment of employees are all 
relevant. Financial performance, or specifically the performance of the share price, is 
influenced by several factors in both the internal and the external governance systems. 
It is hard to separate the financial interests from the other influencing factors. On the 
other hand, if we agree that distributive justice is a worthwhile pursuit in any 
democratic welfare state, we may prefer a modest pursuit of financial health to a 
pursuit of the financial profit to the extreme. Moreover, a relentless pursuance of 
financial interests will attract violent opposition from labour either at the company 
level or in the wider society and thus is infeasible in modern society.  
 
To put things together, it is arguable to say that the interests of a company 
should at least include both an element of financial healthiness and a due 
consideration of the distributive justice among different stakeholders within a 
company. In other words, given the coverage of this thesis, the interests of the 
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company must overlap interests of all three stakeholders though different weight will 
be attached to different stakeholders in different phases of the life cycle of corporate 
governance.  
 
We then need to put into perspective the decision making process by directors 
in public companies. One implication of this study is that directors’ decision making 
must be a multiple-objective decision making process. It is naive to claim that 
directors only consider interests of their own or those of a certain group of 
stakeholders. Indeed, the enlightened shareholder governance model implied in 
Companies Act 2006 expressly prescribes that directors must take into consideration 
interests of the other stakeholders. Moreover, the decision making process must be a 
dynamic process subject to the constraints and incentives from both the internal and 
external control systems, in which the weight attached to different interests within a 
company can only be decided by the specific condition each individual company is in.  
 
In sum, the above review shows that a holistic approach integrating both the 
institutional perspective and the dynamic life cycle of corporate governance is the 
only appropriate way to study corporate governance. Through this approach, 
corporate governance can only be understood as an embedded and multiply connected 
system in which the interests of participants are balanced and orchestrated to pursue 
the purpose of the company. Such a control balancing understanding thus is in stark 
contrast with the traditional control or power pursuance perspective of the concept of 
corporate governance. In other words, corporate governance should not be about who 
control whom but be about how control should be shared and balanced between and 
among the different stakeholders. This thesis thus provides support to the view of 
Teubner, who deems corporate governance as a dynamic process in which no 
stakeholder ‘has a natural claim to “sovereignty within the group” and through which 
inside and outside are aligned for the “the interests of the “corporate actor”, which do 
not coincide with the interests of any participants.”1  
 
                                                 
1
 Teubner, G., Law as an Autopoietic System, (1993), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, at 140. 
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PART II. IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
A. STAKEHOLDER-ORIENTED OR SHAREHOLDER-ORIENTED 
Discussion in this thesis reveals that stakeholders employ different sets of 
constraints to establish, reinforce and protect their interests. In the meantime, their 
interests are also interdependent and thus counterbalanced among themselves. In other 
words, corporate governance can only be understood as an institutional network. A 
touch of the knot may produce important implications for the whole network. In turn, 
to review and propose for improvement on the current governance practice we must 
see whether the whole net is stable or not, rather than only consider whether any 
specific knot is tight or not.  
 
Viewed from this perspective, the enlightened shareholder model and the 
stakeholder-oriented model are only two methodologies to address the discretion of 
directors in their decision making process. Which is better? It is hard to say. But at 
least our discussion in social political issues may provide us with a hint. Indeed, the 
specific approach to corporate governance adopted in any certain jurisdiction is first a 
choice of the special social political context in concern. In other words, the path-
dependent nature of the development of corporate governance indicates that an abrupt 
and violent transition from one model to the other is inadvisable.  
 
Nevertheless, the stakeholder oriented governance model has its merits and is 
worth pursuing. But the pursuance of that model cannot be made from a blank sheet 
of paper. An arrogant disregard of the merits of the existing shareholder-oriented 
governance model can only be misleading and be unfeasible in practice. In fact,  
“It is easier to find particular legal obligations or legislation that 
may be socially sub-optimum. But it seems almost impossible to specify 
any institutional mix that is more efficient or just than any other.”2   
 
Advocates for the stakeholder oriented governance model must realize that a 
                                                 
2
 Hyde, A., Ownership, Contract, and Politics in the Protection of Employees against Risk, (1993), 
University of Toronto Law Journal, 43:721-750, at 724-5. 
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mere change, or even a profound change, in company law is not enough. Indeed, 
company law is not the only legal source for corporate governance. Insolvency law, 
employment law, even the capital market law also play important roles. Accordingly, 
even if we limit our discussion to law only, such a change can only be possible when 
we consider the legal institution as a whole.  
 
Moreover, it seems that advocates for stakeholder-oriented corporate 
governance must provide a feasible plan to achieve their objective. The complexity of 
the decision making process for directors and the feasibility of integrating non-
financial interests of employees into the legal rules in each different phases of the life 
cycle of corporate governance are two examples of potential concerns. Even if such 
alternatives are available, caution should still be paid to the potential costs of such 
changes. For this, Dooley warns that “in a complex and interdependent system, 
inefficiencies in one part of the system should be tolerated if ‘fixing’ them would 
create even greater inefficiencies elsewhere in the system as a whole.”3 
 
Indeed, to promote stakeholder-oriented corporate governance practices, a 
change of business culture is advisable.4 For instance, a supportive culture for the 
employee governance role apparently facilitates the introduction of employee-
favourable improvements. Still, it cannot be an easy job to change the current finance-
dominated commercial culture, which has deep-rooted and wide-ranging implications 
on governance practices. Just as observed by Teubner, within a capitalist world, “the 
logic of the market is central and profit necessarily assumes primacy as an objective. 
The board of the enterprise must then work within the logic of and the priorities of 
capitalism.” 5  All these understandings thus point out that the transition from one 
model to the other, even if it is preferred, can only be carried out as a work of an 
institutional scope. 
 
                                                 
3
 Dooley, M., Two Models of Corporate Governance, (1992), Bus. Law., 47:525. 
4
 For example, Charny points out culture, a concept defined as shared beliefs and social norms, is an 
important factor that makes difference to the corporate governance practice. See Charny, D., Workers 
and Corporate Governance: The Role of Political Culture, in Blair, M., and Roe, M., (eds), Employees 
and Corporate Governance (1999), Washington DC Brookings Institution Press, at 117. 
5
 Teubner, G., Industrial Democracy through Law? Social Function of Law in Institutional Innovations, 
in Daintith, T., and Teubner, G., (eds), Contract and Organization: Legal Analysis in the Light of 
Economic and Social Theory, (1986), Berlin, 261-273, at 268-9. 
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B. PIECEMEAL REFORMATION RATHER THAN VIOLENT 
CHANGES 
The above discussion thus points out that governance reform must be carried 
out with caution. However, the realization that corporate governance is a dynamically 
developing institutional network is not enough by itself. We must also realize that 
institutions need not be optimal for a buoyant economic performance. Rather, 
institutions are only required to be “just good enough to survive.”6 That is, even 
though the current legal institution relevant to corporate governance in the UK cannot 
be deemed as optimal, it may still be the “best fitted for adaptation in a given 
environment.”7  
 
Alternatively, the flexibility of institutions should not be underestimated. 
David Kershaw argues that “…organizational efficiency is much more flexible than 
currently believed and that the pursuit of shareholder value can accommodate 
considerable institutional variation, even an employee role in strategic 
participation.” 8  In turn, over-intervention through mandatory stipulation into the 
regulation of corporate governance is inadvisable since the law making process per se 
can be seen as a rent seeking process by interest groups, whose view of participation 
in decision making process in the company is at best no better than the market 
selection process.  
 
In light of this understanding, corporate governance reform, if it is desirable, 
can only be a delicate balancing process, in which gradual, piecemeal modifications 
rather than violent and abrupt changes should be preferred.9  
                                                 
6
 Roe, M., Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, (1996), Harvard L. Rev., 109:641, at 647. 
7
 Deakin, S., Evolution for Our Time: A Theory of Legal Memetics, (2002), Current Legal Problems, 
55:1. 
8
 Kershaw, D., No End in Sight for the History of Corporate Law: The Case of Employee Participation 
in Corporate Governance, (2002), Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 34-81, at 37. 
9
 But notice that such a gradual change cannot be identified with a mixture or a simple and legalistic 
transplant of foreign elements to domestic schemes. See Bratton, W. and McCahery, J., Comparative 
Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case against Global Cross Reference, (1999), 
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 38:213; Schmidt, R., and Spindler, G., Path Dependence and Complementary in 
Corporate Governance, in Gordon, J. and Roe, M., (eds), Convergence and Persistence in Corporate 
Governance, (2004), CUP, 114-126 at 121 et seq; and Deakin, S., and Ahlering, B., Labour Regulation, 
Corporate Governance and Legal Origin: A Case of Institutional Complementarity?, (2005), CBR 
Working Paper No.312, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=898184. 
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